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Abstract 
 
This thesis offers an account of the role of betrayal in the works of poet, playwright, 
novelist, and occasional journalist, James Joyce. Moving away from pathologizing 
conceptions of Joyce as “obsessed” with betrayal, I follow the development of this 
theme throughout a range of Joyce’s writings. Joyce came to an understanding of the 
workings of this narrative as a young child, experiencing the national trauma of the 
downfall of Irish politician Charles Stewart Parnell and the fallout of this affair in his 
own household. At his father’s promptings, Joyce learned to experience betrayal as an 
active, though invisible force in Irish affairs, from the quotidian to the grandiose. This 
thesis contends, however, that this early understanding of betrayal as an “immanent” 
force gives way to a highly self-aware investigation into the dramatic and narrative 
potential of betrayal as a structuring principle in human relationships. Looking in 
detail at three of Joyce’s literary works—A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, 
Exiles, and Ulysses—as well as a selection of Joyce’s Triestine journalism and 
criticism, I attempt to offer a narrative account of how the theme of betrayal operates 
in and is operated on by Joyce’s texts. In Joyce’s non-fiction we find a reliance on 
betrayal as a means to introduce a note of melancholic pathos to nominally 
journalistic pieces. But in betrayal Joyce also finds a way to critique Irish 
constructions of heroic failure and to support the healthy antagonism necessary to his 
principled exile. In Portrait, Joyce studies the positive potential of betrayal as a tool 
of self-narration. Stephen is seen to achieve a narratively satisfying break with his 
community that is made possible by his imputation of Irish betrayal. In Exiles, the 
central dynamic of betrayal—that it is present as a possibility in any relationship—is 
taken to its extremity and ultimately rejected. In Ulysses, Joyce denies Stephen the 
narratives he had formerly relied on and studies instead the pathos of his painfully 
incomplete severance. In the same book, Joyce turns his attention once again to 
adultery. Molly’s sexual affair with Hugh “Blazes” Boylan offers Joyce a way of 
critiquing accepted conventions of the cuckold and the “adulteress” in favour of a far 
more nuanced understanding of the human impact of betrayal. Ultimately, the idea of 
betrayal is itself destabilized to the point that Molly’s act of extramarital sex can no 
longer be maintained as in any simple sense a betrayal. 
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Introduction 
 
Betrayal: the great donnée of Joyce studies 
Betrayal, I contend, is one of the great données of Joycean criticism. When 
James Fairhall suggested, in 1995, that “the theme of betrayal runs throughout 
Joyce’s writings,” he did so with the certainty of someone not so much stating a 
position as acknowledging a fact.1 The idea was an old one thirty-five years earlier, 
when William York Tindall, with a similar sense of treading on old ground, 
suggested that “betrayal . . . was one of Joyce’s central themes.”2 Neil Davison, 
shortly after Fairhall, displays the curious mix of insistence and unease that crops up 
time and again in discussions of Joycean betrayal. “The very idea of betrayal,” 
Davison suggests, “became, of course, a preoccupation of Joyce’s adult life”—the “of 
course” is significant.3 It seems that by the mid-nineties (if not earlier), it was no 
longer acceptable to speak of betrayal in Joyce’s work without apologizing to the 
reader for what was, the writer was keen to stress, a digression into “well-known” 
territory. Since the reader is assumed to know everything there is to know on this 
subject, it is best for the critic to move on quickly. One cannot refuse to mention 
betrayal altogether—after all, this “preoccupation” was clearly at the centre of 
Joyce’s thinking—but neither can one linger on its intricacies or its 
indeterminacies—one cannot labour to unravel what this centrality might signify. 
The complacency within Joycean studies on this issue is evident from the 
language that has been adopted to discuss it. While Tindall’s suggestion that betrayal 
was one of Joyce’s “central themes” leaves open the question of what this centrality 
might mean, he slips into another discourse altogether that does quite the opposite. 
“[B]etrayal, [is] one of the most evident [themes] in Exiles, and if we may judge by 
its presence in A Portrait and Ulysses, one of Joyce’s obsessions.”4 Davison, after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 James Fairhall, James Joyce and the Question of History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 43. 
2 William York Tindall, A Reader’s Guide to James Joyce (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1995), 25. (First published in 1959 by the Noonday Press). 
3 Neil R. Davison, James Joyce, “Ulysses,” and the Construction of Jewish Identity: Culture, 
Biography, and “the Jew” in Modernist Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 39. Italics mine. 
4 Tindall, Reader’s Guide, 119. 
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speaking more coyly about Joyce’s “preoccupation” also describes it as an 
“obsession.”5 The linguistic shift that occurs here is telling, since both 
“preoccupation” and “obsession,” rather than offer an explanation or description of 
Joycean betrayal, attempt instead to pathologize it. When we speak of prevailing 
motifs and “central themes” we are speaking of a predominately volitional interest. 
But “obsession” suggests rather that this interest is so extreme in type and/or extent 
that it moves beyond the normal range of explicable action. In using the language of 
compulsion, we tacitly accept that this aspect of Joyce’s writing is fundamentally 
inaccessible to analysis. There have certainly been (problematic) attempts to analyse 
Joyce as a product of his “obsession” with betrayal,6 but more commonly this 
pathologization merely allows for betrayal to be set aside altogether. Once we have 
acknowledged its importance, we can safely ignore it. The question of the how, why, 
and what for is answered tautologically: Joyce writes about betrayal because he is 
obsessed by betrayal, he is obsessed by betrayal because he is obsessed by betrayal. . . 
. The only possible continuation of this line of thought is an unsatisfying recurrence 
or a psychoanalytic foray into the author’s unconscious mind. So totemically 
incontrovertible is Joyce’s “preoccupation” with betrayal, I suggest, that it has shut 
off potentially fruitful avenues of exploration. We might forgive Andrew Gibson for 
engaging this language when he claims that Joyce was “obsessed by betrayal. He was 
obsessed with it in personal, historical and political terms.”7 In this case, Gibson’s 
intention is to shake up, with typical rhetorical adroitness, a stagnating field of study. 
In calling on the force of “obsession,” Gibson hopes to bring home to his reader just 
how central betrayal was to Joyce’s thinking and writing. But while his intentions are 
laudable, it isn’t clear that appealing to the very language that typifies the critical 
complacency surrounding the subject is an effective way to combat it. The effect, 
intended or not, is to cast Joyce’s exposure of betrayal in the same murky light as the 
“cloacal obsession” that H. G. Wells identified and named. As with those “[c]oarse, 
unfamiliar words,” the theme of betrayal “seems to be deliberately obtruded.” By 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Davison, Jewish Identity, 47. Seamus Deane, notably, has also described Joyce’s interest in 
betrayal as an “obsession.” See, for example, Seamus Deane, “Joyce the Irishman” in 
Cambridge Companion to James Joyce, ed. Derek Attridge (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) 
6 Most notable is Hélène Cixous, The Exile of James Joyce (London: Calder Books, 1980). 
7 Andrew Gibson, James Joyce (London: Reaktion Books, 2006). 
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pathologizing it, and apologizing for it, Wells denudes Joyce’s carefully constructed 
unseemliness of its power and interest.8 The damage is done not by Wells’s 
disapproval, but by his insistence that the matter was “by the way. . . . The value of 
Mr. Joyce's book has little to do with its incidental insanitary condition.”9 This is, 
precisely, the power of a pathologizing critical discourse, it asserts the centrality of 
some element of the text under discussion even as it insists that that element is 
entirely incidental (since sourced in some largely inexplicable authorial quirk). In this 
sense, betrayal is seen to be of great interest to Joyce, but only incidental interest to 
the reader/critic. 
A brief perusal of the indexes of books on Joyce offers some indication of the 
complacency I am describing. While hardly an absolute measure of the nature and 
extent of work on Joycean betrayal, taken together critical indexes do offer a way to 
give shape to the critical orthodoxy regarding Joycean betrayal. Imperfect though 
they are, an index must, if it is to have any value, offer some considerable insight into 
the contents of the book it indexes. More importantly, however, it carries with it a 
strong indication of what is considered “of interest” to the author; what the author of 
the text expected her readers to find interesting; and, in some cases, what the 
publisher and/or editor deemed worthy of reference. It is striking then that so very 
few books from any period of Joyce studies should choose to index betrayal. This is 
as true of biographies and general investigations of Joyce’s work—such as Steven 
Connor’s James Joyce,10 Lee Spinks’s James Joyce: A Critical Guide,11 Morris 
Beja’s James Joyce: A Literary Life,12 Sydney Bolt’s A Preface to James Joyce,13 
Stan Gebler Davies’s James Joyce: A Portrait of the Artist,14 Mitzi Brunsdale’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For a discussion of Wells’s comments on Joyce’s “cloacal obsession,” see: Patrick 
Parrinder, James Joyce (Cambridge: CUP, 1984). 
9 H. G. Wells, review of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man by James Joyce, New 
Republic, 10 March 1917. The review can be read online at: http://www.james-joyce-
music.com/wells031017.html . 
10 Steven Connor, James Joyce (London: Northcote House, 1996). 
11 Lee Spinks, James Joyce: A Critical Guide (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 
2009). 
12 Morris Beja, James Joyce: A Literary Life (Columbus: University of Ohio Press, 1992). 
13 Sydney Bolt, A Preface to James Joyce (London: Routledge, 2000). 
14 Stan Gebler Davies, James Joyce: A Portrait of the Artist (London: HarperCollins, 1975). 
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James Joyce: A Study of the Short Fiction,15 and Richard Ellmann’s The 
Consciousness of Joyce16 and Ulysses on the Liffey17—as it is of more targeted 
investigations. Books with clear reason to discuss Joycean betrayal choose not to 
acknowledge this in their indexes. Bernard Benstock’s The Undiscovered Country, 
which deals directly with Joyce’s “exilic condition,” does not index betrayal18; 
Sheldon Brivic’s Joyce Waking Women,19 which deals directly with female 
entrapment and liberation, most relevantly in reference to adultery, does not; Lucia 
Boldrini’s Joyce, Dante, and the Poetics of Literary Relations20 does not; Joseph 
Valente’s The Problem of Justice21does not; Sean P. Murphy’s James Joyce and 
Victims22 does not. Joyceans are not alone in taking Joycean betrayal lightly. An 
ambitious new book, Playing False: Representations of Betrayal, which seeks  to 
“gain a fresh perspective on betrayal” through a wide survey of literary betrayal, 
makes no reference to Joyce at all. This despite giving time (and index space) to 
Dante, Chaucer, Ezra Pound, Knut Hamsun, Leonard Cohen, and Anatole Broyard, to 
name only a very few.23 In most of these cases, the problem is that, even when they 
are discussing issues of great importance to Joycean betrayal, they shy away from 
tackling these problems head on. But other texts discuss betrayal more clearly and yet 
do so with a reticence that is worrying. Zack Bowen’s Musical Allusions in the Works 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Mitzi M. Brunsdale, James Joyce: A Study of the Short Fiction (New York: Twayne 
Publishers, 1993). 
16 Richard Ellmann, The Consciousness of Joyce (Oxford: OUP, 1977). 
17 Richard Ellmann, Ulysses on the Liffey (Oxford: OUP, 1972). 
18 Bernard Benstock, The Undiscovered Country (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1978). 
19 Sheldon Brivic, Joyce’s Waking Women: Introduction to “Finnegans Wake” (Madison, 
WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995). 
20 Lucia Boldrini, Joyce, Dante, and the Poetics of Literary Relations: Language and 
Meaning in “Finnegans Wake” (Cambridge: CUP, 2009). 
21 Joseph Valente, James Joyce and the Problem of Justice: Negotiating Sexual and Colonial 
Difference (Cambridge: CUP, 1995). 
22 Sean P. Murphy, James Joyce and Victims: Reading the Logic of Exclusion (Madison, NJ: 
Fairleigh University Press, 2003).  
23 Kristina Mendecino and Betiel Wasihun, eds. Playing False: Representations of Betrayal 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2013). 
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of James Joyce24 does not index betrayal, yet there are clear references to the topic on 
pages 32, 104, 215, 312, 313, and 315. Bowen is informative on the subject, yet 
unwilling to acknowledge betrayal as a unifying structure behind many of the 
allusions he lists. Len Platt similarly discusses betrayal informatively at several points 
in James Joyce: Texts and Contexts,25 yet does not allow these discussions to 
coalesce into either an index entry or a more general discussion. This is not merely 
the complaint of a graduate student who has had to go the long way round every 
obstacle, stumbling blindly and without a road map. This tendency in Joyce studies to 
push betrayal to the edge of discussion is not only suppressing new answers to an old 
question, it is allowing an imperfect and at times contradictory model of Joycean 
betrayal to harden ever further.  
The sense of ennui around this topic (the sense that everything has already been 
said) seems to have set in sometime shortly after the publication of Richard’s 
Ellmann’s James Joyce.26 That biography (not to mention Ellmann’s contributory 
portraits of Joyce’s working mind27), has done more to shut off investigation into 
Joycean betrayal than any other work. While Ellmann himself generally maintains an 
admirable sense of the difference between Joyce and even his most autobiographical 
literary creations, the enduring effect of the work as a whole is not Ellmann’s 
generally careful description of the process by which Joyce converted the stuff of 
experience into the stuff of fiction, but the seemingly limitless anecdotes about 
Joyce’s sense of persecution, his paranoia, and his absurd hypersensitivity to the 
potential for betrayal. With the evidence of Joyce’s obsession so readily available, 
there has been little reason to pry further into either the mechanics of Joycean 
betrayal or the motivations that underpin Joyce’s exploration of it.  
As a result, those books that do index betrayal often follow the same basic 
model as those books that don’t. For example, Eric Bulson’s Cambridge Introduction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Zack Bowen, Musical Allusions in the Works of James Joyce (Buffalo: State University of 
New York, 1974). 
25 Len Platt, James Joyce: Texts and Contexts (London: Continuum, 2011).  
26 Richard Ellmann, James Joyce (Oxford: OUP, 1982). First published 1959. 
27 Most notably, Ellmann, The Consciousness of Joyce and Ellmann, Ulysses on the Liffey. 
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to James Joyce,28 Roy Gottfried’s Joyce’s Misbelief,29 and Michael Seidel’s James 
Joyce: A Short Introduction30 all index several references to betrayal, yet essentially 
repeat the standard critical account. This account usually takes the following form: 
Joyce is obsessed with betrayal on a personal level; he sees Irish history as a series of 
betrayals (with special reference to Charles Stewart Parnell); his own multifaceted 
paranoia is encoded into his texts in the form of put-upon autobiographical 
protagonists and a series of antagonists, such as Oliver St John Gogarty and Roberto 
Prezioso, whose betrayals are preserved forever in fiction. While this model is not 
wrong exactly—it does not entirely misconstrue the basic facts of Joycean betrayal—
neither is it a sophisticated account of the processes by which Joyce developed and 
sustained his interest in betrayal; developed his understanding of its workings on a 
structural, theoretical, and narrative level; and engaged with these ideas in his texts.  
There have, of course, been some fresh and interesting additions to the 
understanding of Joycean betrayal. Most of these have come from Seamus Deane, 
who over the last thirty years has regularly returned to a theme he seems to 
understand with an intuitive certainty. The great shame is that he has never been 
compelled to produce a longer, less concentrated account of his thoughts on the 
matter. To date, his most concerted effort perhaps can be found in Derek Attridge’s 
Cambridge Companion to James Joyce. Deane’s contribution to that collection, 
“Joyce the Irishman,” contains within its twenty-two pages some of the clearest and 
most imaginative writing to date on how Joyce absorbed, understood, and recycled 
the narratives and structures of betrayal. Some of what follows in this thesis 
represents an extension of Deane’s probing suggestions, some of it finds new ground, 
I hope, using the tools he provides, and some of it moves away altogether from what 
Deane suggests. I cannot go along with Deane in his apparently credulous acceptance 
of Joyce’s “obsession”—Deane uses the word regularly—but lurking behind Deane’s 
conviction always remains the possibility that he understands Joyce’s continuous 
return to betrayal in a manner that is very close to the central contention of this thesis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Eric Bulson, Cambridge Introduction to James Joyce (Cambridge: CUP, 2006). See 
particularly pages 22-31. 
29 Roy Gottfried, Joyce’s Misbelief (Tallahassee: University of Florida Press, 2008), 28-29. 
30 Michael Seidel, James Joyce: A Short Introduction (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002), 7-9, 
24. 
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Joyce’s performance of betrayal is necessary not because it is a psychological 
compulsion, but because in betrayal Joyce finds a way to negotiate an embattled state 
of Irishness that is consoling, challenges hypocrisy, has a political charge, and is 
narratively satisfying. While it is not clear how much of my analysis Deane would 
accept, I hope I have carried it out with a small share of his subtlety. 
More recently, Matthew Campbell and Jefferson Holdridge have each 
contributed an excellent piece to Marc C. Conner’s The Poetry of James Joyce 
Reconsidered. Campbell’s account of the “invocation of betrayal” at the heart of 
Chamber Music teases out the complex “range of models” that lie behind it—
resisting the temptation to convert a complex piece of literary production into a 
simple biographical event—while establishing the way Joyce uses these narratives of 
betrayal to establish his lyric as “unconsortable.”31 Holdridge makes a connection 
between betrayal, the individual, the family, and society that bears some 
resemblances to the stresses I place on betrayal in several chapters of this thesis. I do 
not think it a coincidence that a book devoted to “reconsidering” an overlooked area 
of Joyce’s writing—Holdridge’s question “why the poetry?” 32 could equally be asked 
of betrayal—should also include an overdue reconsideration of how betrayal operates 
in Joyce’s writing. Whereas a study of Portrait or Ulysses feels the weight of a 
century’s criticism bearing down upon it, it tends to be in discussions of Joyce’s 
“lesser works” that we find the most interesting and suggestive discussion.  
While the standard model has remained largely unchanged for decades, 
elements of its key structure have been considerably nuanced in recent years, without 
this nuance being brought back into the standard model in a clear or ordered way. 
According to this model the political dimensions of Joyce’s emphasis on betrayal are 
as “well known” as his interest in betrayal itself. Early critical responses to Joyce’s 
major works established him as an “international modernist who had shrugged off 
provincial Ireland, its history, politics, and culture”33 and while that conception of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Matthew Campbell, “The Unconsortable Joyce,” in The Poetry of James Joyce 
Reconsidered, ed. Marc C. Conner (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012), 51-77. 
32 Jefferson Holdridge, “Bleeding from the ‘Torn Bough’: Challenging Nature in James 
Joyce’s Pomes Penyeach, in The Poetry of James Joyce Reconsidered, 187-207, 187. 
33 Andrew Gibson, The Strong Spirit: History, Politics and Aesthetics in the Writings of 
James Joyce, 1898-1913 (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 92. 
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Joyce has rightly faded from acceptability, it does live on in an amended form. 
Michael Seidel, embodying a summative, conflative tendency in Joyce studies, has 
suggested that the “theme” of betrayal is provided to Joyce by “Irish politics.”34 Yeats 
was “stung into poetry,”35 but Joyce is stung into exile by a country that “in a spirit of 
Irish fun, / Betrayed her own leaders one by one.”36 “Stephen Dedalus,” Seidel 
informs us unblinkingly, “speaks Joyce’s sentiments in A Portrait of the Artist as A 
Young Man” when he complains that: 
 
No honourable and sincere man . . . has given up to you his life and his 
youth and his affections from the days of Tone to those of Parnell but you 
sold him to the enemy or failed him in need or reviled him and left him 
for another. And you invite me to be one of you. I’d see you damned 
first.37 
 
Stephen may not speak for Joyce at all times, Seidel suggests, but here, in this 
respect, he does. Stephen’s analyses of Irish history and his proud yet essentially 
fearful rejection of Ireland as maliciously unfaithful are taken to be not only sincere 
expressions of Stephen’s own view (rather than a useful contrivance) but also Joyce’s 
own, which is expressed elsewhere in Joyce’s non-fiction. The simple plausibility of 
this account allows it to remain in place even as similarly author-centric accounts fall 
away. Its primary benefit comes in that it allows for the maintenance of Joyce’s 
absolute rejection of Irish affairs, even as it asserts its centrality. 
The last two decades have, of course, seen a powerful shift towards a more 
politically invested image of Joyce. Dominic Manganiello, Andrew Gibson, Len 
Platt, Joseph Valente, Emer Nolan, and Enda Duffy have offered particularly forceful 
readings of Joyce as making materialist interventions into Irish politics and history. 
While this thesis does not go as far as any of these works in establishing Joyce as a 
political commentator, I take his political and historical intelligence seriously. I move 
away from these other authors perhaps only in my insistence on maintaining an 
absolute narcissism in Joyce’s artistic approach, at least until the production of 
Finnegans Wake, which moves away from close attention to thinking, feeling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Seidel, Joyce: A Short Introduction, 7.  
35 W. H. Auden, “In Memory of W. B. Yeats.” 
36 These two lines are taken from Joyce’s “Gas from a Burner,” written in response to the 
destruction of the printed sheets for Dubliners. Joyce, PSW, 103. 
37 Joyce, P, 202-03. 
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protagonists. So, in my discussion of Joyce’s non-fiction, I take seriously Joyce’s 
interventions but assert also that these interventions are mediated by concerns that are 
not expressly humanistic.  
A great deal of the negotiated distance achieved in the standard model comes 
from its assertion that Joyce’s “obsession” with betrayal was founded on his youthful 
exposure to Parnell’s ousting from the leadership of the Irish Parliamentary Party and 
subsequent death. I don’t refute this in this thesis but I do attempt to offer an account 
of how this early experience marked Joyce’s ongoing understanding of betrayal that 
does not give way to a stagnant understanding of its workings. The ideas Joyce 
develops about history, politics, and interpersonal relationships are complex and 
shifting. And rather than a fixed position from which to view Irish history,38 the 
figure of Parnell39 becomes a constant source of inspiration for Joyce as his analyses 
develop. Though Parnell does not perhaps play as large a role in Joyce’s theorization 
of betrayal as some would have it (though he is far more important in other ways than 
is generally accepted), his role is indeed significant. Unfortunately, this thesis does 
not have the scope or space to deal with this matter in any great detail. More 
fortunately, some of the work necessary to understand Joyce’s relationship to Parnell 
has begun to appear over the last decade or so. Joseph Valente is the chief 
orchestrator of this new interest. His contribution to Derek Attridge’s and Marjorie 
Howes’s Semicolonial Joyce opened up an entirely new way of seeing Parnell’s 
influence on Joyce: as a model for a form of manner that did not degrade back into 
colonial expectations.40 The Myth of Manliness in Irish National Culture, 1880-1922, 
extends the potential of this piece into direct and applied insight into how the notion 
of manliness plays out in Irish national culture and in Joyce’s writing.41The main 
influence of Valente’s work on this thesis is his clear-eyed refusal to reduce Joyce’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Dominic Manganiello, Joyce’s Politics (London: Routledge, 1980), 8. “The Parnell 
crisis was the pivot from which Joyce viewed the rest of Irish history.” 
39 I use the word figure here carefully to suggest Parnell as a public persona, a 
conglomeration of tropic features. 
40 Joseph Valente, “'Neither fish nor flesh' or how 'Cyclops' stages the double-bind of Irish 
manhood,” in Semicolonial Joyce, ed. Derek Attridge and Marjorie Howes (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2000), 96-127. 
41 Joseph Valente, The Myth of Manliness in Irish National Culture, 1880-1922 (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2011). 
	   15	  
understanding of Parnell to simple  hero-worship; Joyce always navigates his way 
through the complexities of Parnell’s cultural legacy, rather than simply absorbing it 
wholesale. Anne Fogarty has similarly challenged the standard view of Joyce’s 
Parnellism in her contribution to Andrew Gibson’s and Len Platt’s Joyce, Ireland, 
Britain. In it, she challenges the idea that there was anything straightforward about 
Joyce’s Parnellism, favouring an understanding of literary Parnellism more widely as 
a complex and unstable phenomenon.42 Matt Bevis’s chapter on Joyce in the excellent 
The Art of Eloquence similarly establishes Parnell’s influence on Joyce as a model for 
silence, a distrust of rhetoric, and an Irish propensity for talk that is played out in 
interesting ways in Joyce’s writing.43 
Discussions of Joyce’s political conscience often hang on the degree to which 
one see’s Joyce’s desire for various political changes as “sincere.” The word can 
barely be uttered without the scare-quotes in which I have encased it, yet the problem 
remains to what extent Joyce’s analyses of Irish paralysis, for example, should be 
seen as the reason for that writing, or to what extent it is an incidental part of it. Is 
Joyce a political writer, a writer with a political interest, or a writer whose books are 
complete enough to contain politics within them? Indeed, the word politics itself 
quickly breaks down in a discussion such as this. For the most part, I take the position 
in this thesis that Joyce is capable of feeling compassion for his nation, of feeling a 
desire for change, of analysing that need astutely. But I also seek to keep a distance 
from attempts to posit a “do-gooder” Joyce, the Joyce as socialist who briefly 
occupies Trieste. The tension between throwing oneself into a communal conflict and 
keeping oneself aloof is, I suggest, central to Joyce’s writing. As such, Joyce’s 
writing always seeks to achieve a kind of communion with Irish affairs that is enacted 
through a powerful performance of severance. Indeed, this severance is what the 
betrayal narrative works so well to enact. Similarly, in discussing Exiles and Ulysses, 
I distance myself from accounts that seek to establish Joyce’s attempt to promote an 
“ethical love.” The possibilities of such a love, while an acknowledged problem 
within these texts, is seen to take a back seat to a narcissistic concern with the 
potential for betrayal. This narcissism, rather than a character flaw, is seen as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Anne Fogarty, “Parnellism and the Politics of Memory: Revisiting ‘Ivy Day in the 
Committee Room,’” in Joyce, Ireland, and Britain. 
43 Matt Bevis, The Art of Eloquence: Byron, Dickens, Tennyson, Joyce (Oxford: OUP, 2007). 
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most effective way to study and understand the dynamics of the interpersonal 
relationships Joyce is interested in.  
Though I do not accept all of the conclusions that follow from the ethical 
accounts of Joyce that have emerged in recent years,44 I am struck by the willingness 
of Janine Utell in particular to try to see a way beyond the standard model of Joycean 
betrayal. As she puts it: 
 
A number of critics and biographers have noted his peculiar propensity, 
even need, to see betrayers and usurpers around every corner, using this 
as a rationale for his fear of losing his woman to infidelity while also 
finding a frisson in imagining himself as a cuckold; I would argue that 
these contributions do not tell quite the whole story.45 
	  
I concur. Though I am under no illusions that this thesis offers a full account of the 
workings of Joycean betrayal, I hope that it at least offers a fuller one, and one more 
closely attuned to betrayal as a tool rather than merely an outcome of Joyce’s literary 
mind.  
 
Defining betrayal 
The verb “to betray” has two clear, though related meanings: to “expose 
unintentionally” (“he betrayed his true intentions”) and to deliver into harm through 
treachery (an informant “betrays” his nation). Certainly, both uses share a close 
metaphorical association, since many acts of treachery involve the exposure of those 
who are betrayed, whether it is their person or their plans that are given into the hands 
of their enemies. When Joyce suggests in “Fenianism: The Last Fenian” that “in 
Ireland, at the crucial moment, an informer appears” it is clear that he considers this 
act of exposure an act of betrayal. But there is also a problem in using these two 
definitions interchangeably, for while the idea of exposure is of central importance to 
Joyce’s understanding of betrayal, betrayal as a rather clichéd phrasing must be kept 
rigidly separate from the far grander, more precise conception of betrayal that Joyce 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 In addition to Utell, see Christopher Devault, Joyce’s Love Stories (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2013) and Marian Eide, Ethical Joyce (Cambridge: CUP, 2002). Both Utell and Devault 
build on Eide’s far more successful attempt to read Joyce’s writing with reference to a 
Levinasian language of ethics. 
45 Janine Utell, James Joyce and the Revolt of Love: Marriage, Adultery, Desire (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 19. Italics mine. 
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analyses throughout his writing. This is not to say that there is not interesting work to 
be done (and being done) on the former, but this thesis seeks to understand the 
workings of Joycean betrayal in its core rather than incidental manifestations. By way 
of example, Seamus Deane has suggested that “[t]ranslation involves betrayal in two 
senses.” Firstly, translation “betrays that which is native into that which is foreign.” 
But betrayal for Deane is also inherently “a discovery, an exposure of something 
about the nature of language itself rather than language in one of its culture-bound 
manifestations.” This is a challenging and exciting notion, but there is a process of 
equivalence here that I find troubling. Deane justifies this reading by appeal to the 
fact that “[i]t is well known that Joyce’s work returns obsessively to the notion of 
betrayal.”46 Lacking significant evidence for this reading in the text itself, Joyce’s 
“obsession” allows, even requires, that two relatively distinct areas of interest be 
confused. The wide applications and manifestations of betrayal—which Deane 
immediately summarizes as  “usurpation, deceit, self-cancellation . . . Irish 
history”47—permit a concept rooted quite firmly in an applied theoretical framework 
to be extended metaphorically into a wider description of language that is not, at this 
point, rooted in specific textual evidence. My aim throughout this thesis is to provide 
an account of what I consider to be the core aspects of Joycean betrayal. This is not to 
say that readings such as those provided by Deane are unjustified, but that in a critical 
climate that has not properly established those core features, such an extension seems 
strangely complacent and potentially suppresses moves towards the kind of clarity I 
am seeking. 
I am strengthened in this resolve by the fact that Joyce maintained a tight 
control over the word that best summarized his “master theme.” Dubliners contains 
two examples48 of “betrayal” being used as a form of unintentional exposure—this is 
usually an unwilled exposure, but part of the problem with its loose use is that it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Seamus Deane, introduction to Finnegans Wake, by James Joyce (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1992), xlii. 
47 Deane, FW, xlii. 
48 The narrator-protagonist of “An Encounter” “delay[s] a few moments . . . lest [he] should 
betray [his] agitation” (D, 20); “Little Chandler” in “Little Cloud” is “aware that he had 
betrayed himself,” having revealed the deeper meaning behind his suggestion that Gallaher, 
“will put his head in the sack . . . like everyone else if he finds the right girl” (D, 76). 
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increasingly suggests the revelation of anything that is not immediately apparent. It 
balances this out with two further uses of betrayal in its more direct sense—as a 
pernicious, harmful breach of trust. At this time, it seems that Joyce was not 
concerned with maintaining the distinction. Consider, however, that as Joyce 
becomes increasingly intoxicated by the dramatic and thematic possibilities of 
betrayal in his autobiographical fiction, he ceases to use “betrayal” to indicate 
“unintended exposure” altogether. While A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
makes use of some conjugation of the word[s] “betray[s/ed/al]” three times49 and 
Ulysses five,50 not a single one of these uses has betrayal as an unwilled exposure.51 
As Joyce increasingly refines his theorizations of betrayal as a form of interpersonal 
and grandly historical necessity, he begins to shy away from diluting the force of the 
key word of his master theme by diffuse and incautious use. The sense of drama that 
Joyce packs into the word betrayal is achieved and maintained in part through 
cautious and infrequent use. When he makes use of the word, he is sure that it will 
have its effect.  
Compare Joyce’s frugality and caution with Conrad’s comparatively liberal 
treatment of it. Conrad, along with Joyce and Shakespeare,52 could rightly be 
described as one of the leading literary analysts of betrayal, having dwelt on the 
theme in several of his major works.53 On one page of Under Western Eyes we find 
the protagonist of the novel, Razumov, offering an astute dissection of the logic of 
betrayal in which some form of the word appears four times in a few lines. Here the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 “they turned on him to betray him and rend him like rats” (P, 34); “Didn’t the bishops of 
Ireland betray us in the time of the union” (P, 38); “Can you say with certainty by whom the 
soul of your race was bartered and its elect betrayed . . . ?” (P, 193). 
50 “her gay betrayer” (U, 1.405); “of lost leaders, the betrayed, wild escapes” (U, 3.243); 
“And what, though murdered and betrayed” (U, 9.1036); “the Williamites . . . betrayed us” 
(U, 12.267); “misappropriation of public money, betrayal of public trust” (U, 17.2184). 
51 These figures are correct to the best of my knowledge. I’ve done my best to catalogue 
every use of the word, but it is possible one or two have evaded me. 
52 And Homer and Shakespeare most prominently. 
53 As well as Under Western Eyes, Nostromo, The Secret Agent, and a number of his short 
stories take up the theme quite openly. 
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repetition strengthens the effect, but on several other pages of the novel54 we find 
Razumov “paus[ing] in the door way” long enough “to ensure his face did not betray 
his angry curiosity and mental disgust”; we find “eyes [that] betrayed no animation”; 
and someone who “betrayed no sentiment.”55 It may be that Conrad hoped to play the 
two meanings off against each other for ironic effect, but for the most part what 
occurs is actually an awkward dilution of the force of the very idea the book 
professes, so powerfully, to be about. While Conrad was clearly enthralled by the 
dramatic and theoretical possibilities of betrayal, he does not appear to have had 
Joyce’s connection to the word as a nexus point for a powerful range of themes and 
emotions.56 Joyce’s refusal to dilute the power of this word is a testament to his 
insistence on maintaining all its melancholic, melodramatic, angry, bittersweet, 
saccharine intensity.57  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 "Betray. A great word. What is betrayal? They talk of a man betraying his country, his 
friends, his sweetheart? There must be a moral bond first. All a man can betray is his 
conscience." Joseph Conrad, Under Western Eyes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957), 38-39. 
55 Conrad, Under Western Eyes, 29, 121, 91. 
56 For a discussion of Conrad and betrayal, see, in particular, Robert Hampson, Joseph 
Conrad: Betrayal and Identity (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992). While these authors are 
obviously quite different, this thesis attempts to do many of the things Hampson’s book does: 
place betrayal at the centre of an author’s writing practice, tie it into a conception of identity 
in relation to culture and community, and understand that author’s approach as developing 
over time. 
57 One might compare this to his use of the word “faith” in Portrait. This was a word rich in 
meaning for Joyce—one need only think of his claim to Lady Gregory that he had “found no 
man yet with a faith like mine”—and of fundamental relevance to betrayal. After all, it is 
usually faith that is betrayed. Yet in Portrait, Joyce uses the word twelve times, ten of which 
directly refer to the Catholic Church as “the faith.” The other two are merely colloquial uses 
by Mr. Casey and Temple that carry a potent ironic charge. 35; 108; 141; 148; 165; 188; 190; 
282; 226; 249; 38; 229. Joyce actively makes use of the ironic potential of this word’s various 
uses, playing Stephen’s “faith” in Catholicism off against his growing faith in himself. 
Similarly, his mother’s “faith” is seen to be misplaced, in that it moves further towards the 
church as Stephen moves further towards Europe and his personal destiny. 
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Joyce and the narrative of betrayal 
Part of the problem with using betrayal as a catchall to identify any kind of 
“exposure” is that such exposure does not necessarily require or include a preceding 
act of “dedication,” which Joyce understands as part of the drama of betrayal. 
Stanislaus Joyce, in a statement that represents perhaps his most insightful piece of 
criticism, remarked that his brother James “was always of the opinion that a dramatist 
could understand only one or two of life’s tragedies, and that he always presented 
different aspects of the few he understood. One of the tragedies that obsessed my 
brother’s imagination, beginning from the time when he first understood the Mass as 
drama, was the tragedy of dedication and betrayal.”58 Though we should always take 
Stanislaus’s declarations about his brother with a pinch of salt (especially those that 
begin “my brother always”) it is hard to argue with the prevalence of just such 
“drama[s] of dedication and betrayal” in Joyce’s writings. Not only does Joyce 
regularly fall back on these tropes, he does so in reference to a remarkably wide range 
of material: political, historical, personal, sexual, and platonic relationships, national 
narratives. When Joyce (supposedly) claimed that a dramatist could understand only 
one or two of life’s tragedies, he was not suggesting that a writer could only write 
about tragedies that fell easily and obviously into that category. On the contrary, his 
intuitive and methodological understanding of those tragedies acted as a lens through 
which the diverse data of existence was refracted; betrayal was one of the ways Joyce 
narrativized and dramatized the stuff of existence. The tired question of whether 
Joyce really felt betrayed by his Dublin contemporaries et al thus changes shape a 
little. Questions about the sincerity of his emotion are complicated by the realization 
that whatever martyr complex Joyce may have possessed, his representations of that 
sense of martyrdom were largely shaped by a process of dramatization that almost 
always seemed to have the refractive pressures of this structure of betrayal built into 
it. 
It is important to understand that I am not suggesting that Joyce was unable to 
narrativize or dramatize without reverting to crude descriptions of betrayal, or that, 
concomitantly, betrayal is written into every element of his texts. Rather I am 
suggesting that the “drama of dedication and betrayal” represented a coherent series 
of tropic variations with which Joyce felt intuitively comfortable. The ultimate reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Stanislaus Joyce, My Brother’s Keeper (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 168. 
	   21	  
for this connection to betrayal will always, I think, remain beyond the remit of 
criticism. I will argue, however, that his upbringing in John Joyce’s particular brand 
of Parnellism, the Catholicism of his education at home and at school (the narrative 
of Jesus and Judas), and his own tendency to identify with those who had been 
betrayed, all led to an acute understanding of the dramatic qualities of such events 
and a keen eye for where such dramatic readings were available. While this led Joyce 
to think of his own life in such terms in so much as he wished to think of his own life 
in dramatic terms, it also led him to strongly associate—and at times conflate—the 
processes of dramatization (by which I mean both “turning into drama” and making 
“dramatic” in the more colloquial sense) with the processes of reading (and then 
writing) betrayal.  
 
Sources for betrayal 
Joyce was eight years old when Charles Stewart Parnell’s leadership of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party was challenged by the majority of its parliamentary members. A 
year later—after a long, bitter, and acrimonious political struggle—Parnell died of 
heart failure brought about by stress and exhaustion. Parnell’s death marked the final 
act in a public and social trauma in which central Irish concerns (most prominently 
religiously defined morality and “home rule”) were played out against each other, but 
just as importantly to the young Joyce, it marked a breaking apart of a fictional 
harmony within the Joyce household. His aunt on the one side defending the role of 
the priests, his father on the other lamenting the death of the “uncrowned king of 
Ireland” and striking out against the church, Tim Healy (as well as the majority of the 
Irish Parliamentary Party that had broken with Parnell), and the Irish people for their 
“betrayal” of Ireland’s Moses. The Christmas dinner scene in Portrait appears to 
recreate rather closely the conflict within the young Joyce; his allegiance to the 
Parnellite camp was not so surely in the ascendancy as it would be later in his life. 
But it is precisely because the young Joyce was forced to choose, in a certain sense, 
between Dante and his father, the church and Parnell, that his identification was so 
strong. His wholehearted acceptance and repetition of the betrayal narrative of 
Parnell’s fall was not merely an initiation into a way of viewing a single event in Irish 
history. It was, for the young Joyce, a form of bonding with his father, a confirmation 
of his place as the favourite son, an attempt to deserve his father’s affections. Can 
you imagine how Joyce would have felt, at nine years old, to have had his father’s 
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approval to such an extent that his naive poem, “Et tu Healy,” should be printed up 
and handed out? At this very early stage there was a conflation between Joyce’s sense 
of himself as possessing artistic talent, his father’s love and approval, and, 
importantly, a reading of Parnell’s fall as caused by betrayal.  
As I will discuss shortly, I am hesitant to pursue a psychoanalytic reading of 
Joyce’s writing. I could, in an act of wild psychoanalysis establish this moment in 
Joyce’s life as defining the mental space of his writing career. But, while I put this 
anecdote forward as possibly pivotal, I don’t claim that it planted an unconscious 
motive force to Joyce’s writing that would survive, in a powerful though submerged 
form, in his adult unconscious. At the age of nine I have little doubt that the desire to 
please his father was fairly central to the satisfaction this act of literary production 
provided, but I would be suspicious of any reading of Joyce’s work that placed some 
residue of this youthful desire at the core of Joyce’s mature writing. Indicative, yes; 
formative, perhaps; but not defining. What is important is that from a young age, 
Joyce was being introduced to a heady mix of powerful emotions—love, hate, sex, 
violence, pride, envy, greed, anger, pity, tragic resignation, angry vindication—all 
constructed through a recurring set of structures, mediated by well-chosen words. 
Stanislaus establishes the founding moment of Joycean betrayal in the Catholic mass. 
I cannot argue against this, but I would argue that in Parnell’s fall Joyce found a 
narrative with a far greater applicability and scope. As he grew, Joyce would come to 
find that he had at his disposal a powerful literary toolkit through which even the 
most mundane of events could be made grand. It is also important, I contend, that his 
sense of these narratives as malleable constructs, as rhetorical structures that he could 
himself manipulate, resulted immediately in his first publication—the raw thrill of 
having been accepted into this cultish world of drama and story-telling must have 
been overpowering. Writing began for Joyce as precisely this rhetorical reorientation 
of the world into the betrayed and the betrayers, the heroes and the villains. But Joyce 
did not remain a child forever. By the time he came to write his great works, he was 
deeply aware of the nature and magnitude of his interest in betrayal and of the degree 
to which this interest was at times obsessive, paranoiac, and imbalanced. What I am 
willing to assert with some confidence is that Joyce’s youthful conflation of writing 
with betrayal—and, most importantly, with effective writing—established a train of 
thought that would shape his writing career. Once the involuntary associations with 
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parental praise had long faded, Joyce would come back to betrayal time and time 
again as a source, a structuring principle, and tropic stockpile for his writing. 
Though self-identification with the betrayed Parnell would of course play a 
major role in Joyce’s self-image as an artist and as an Irishman, the degree to which 
he learnt this self-association from his father has been widely overlooked. In their 
biography of James Joyce’s father, John Wyse-Jackson and Peter Costello describe 
how often John Joyce came close to his hero Parnell, indeed how like Parnell John 
felt himself to be, in manner, in outlook, and, after Parnell’s removal from power, in 
their propensity to be betrayed. They describe just such a post-Parnellian occasion 
when John offered his services to the remaining Parnellites as an electioneer in an 
attempt to win a seat in Cork (John’s home city) at the July 1892 general election. 
John was “not due any time off work” so he “pleaded illness (a ploy he had used 
before), then caught the train down to the city.” Unfortunately for John, the 
Parnellites lost the election and he was spotted, apparently “thriving,” by someone 
who knew him and knew his occupation. For when he returned to work, he “was 
reprimanded and his file taken down again from the shelf.” Though the incident is not 
in itself remarkable, John’s reaction to it was. Rather than accepting blame for what 
he had done, he bristled at the idea that anyone should have turned him in and, 
“[t]hough he may never have discovered the informer’s identity, John was becoming 
more and more convinced that there was a conspiracy against him. There had, after 
all, been a conspiracy against Parnell.”59 The degree of identification that John felt 
with Parnell should not be underestimated. He idolized Parnell for what he had done, 
what he had tried to do, and how he had gone about it. Parnell was of “his sort” and 
John confused his own scornful superiority with the sombre diffidence he saw in 
Parnell. While the young James would take from Parnell’s fall the lesson that “great 
men” in Ireland are always betrayed before they can complete their work, John took 
from Parnell’s fall a similar, though less grandiose message: men like himself, the 
right kind of men (ambiguously defined), were always at risk of being betrayed. 
All this John Joyce passed down to his eldest son who, as his father’s favourite, 
had greatest access to his father’s colourful accounts of his activities. John was not a 
quiet man, and as such his conviction that he was the victim of persecution was 
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broadcast constantly into the ears of his then twelve year old son. John was still a 
towering and impressive figure for Joyce and, already primed by his father’s accounts 
of Parnell’s treatment at the hands of Healy and the anti-Parnellites, was prepared to 
think of his father in the same way. After all, John’s fortunes had seemed tied up with 
Parnell’s for the majority of Joyce’s life. John’s political ambitions and his winning 
character ensured that he was continually “mixing with the great” and was thus 
brought into contact with Parnell and other key figures in Irish nationalism in the 
1880s.60 His failed attempt to get selected as a nominee for Cork in the 1885 election, 
though it did not shake his faith in Parnell, would contribute later to his distrust and 
distaste for Tim Healy; it had been his brother Maurice Healy who had been selected 
ahead of John.61 His excitement throughout the mid 1880s was entirely wrapped up in 
the march towards independence that Parnell represented for him and the majority of 
Ireland at this time. When Parnell later fell, taking Home Rule with him, it was as 
good as a direct attack on John himself. In these early years, Joyce would have heard 
recounted his father’s many misfortunes, always and ever the fault of someone else, 
the result of a conspiracy, or a betrayal. The disappearance of a satchel with the 
“municipal rates in it” was spun into a yarn in which John had been set upon by a 
“cad with a pipe” in the Phoenix Park.62 His children were perhaps the only ones to 
believe his tale, which emphasized all the more that he was an eternally put upon 
man, who deserved to be a good deal more than a rates collector, and indeed would 
have been were it not for misfortune. This misfortune would morph permanently into 
persecution and betrayal in the period after Parnell’s fall. Faith in the reality of forces 
aligned against his father and against Parnell was a matter of youthful credulity (why 
would he disbelieve his father?) but it also represented a powerful psychological 
stake. So much was placed on betrayal and persecution as a way of explaining John 
Joyce’s failure to elevate himself beyond rates collector (indeed to explain his falling 
well below that position) that Joyce’s acceptance of betrayal as a force at work in his 
life was conflated psychologically with the status of his father. The dramatic 
possibilities of betrayal as a theme were made evident to Joyce at exactly the same 
time as he became aware of his talent as a writer. It may be too much to claim that 
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this would define his career as a writer, but we can certainly say that Joyce’s 
awareness of the dramatic possibilities of betrayal must have been heightened by the 
fact that betrayal was such a part of the drama of his family life. He had not only 
experienced the pathos of betrayal as it affected his literary heroes, but as it affected, 
quite directly, his family. In Portrait, Joyce offers an account of how his protagonist, 
Stephen, is “thrilled” by the “spoken word,” the language of betrayal. My contention 
is that Joyce was himself introduced to betrayal not as a political position—though 
through Parnell it came to him as a political position—but as an incredibly powerful, 
incredibly loaded set of formal, thematic, and linguistic concerns. Before he 
understands the politics that betrayal represents, he understands the effects of its 
artistic representation. Moreover, the sense of betrayal as something mystical and 
malevolent, as a force of history that acted on the grand and the quotidian scales, was 
founded in these early experiences. After all, it was as natural for the young Joyce to 
accept the underlying forces of betrayal at work in the world as it was for him to 
accept the underlying force of gravity in the falling of an apple or, differently, the 
beneficence of God in the rising sun. Each supposition explains an occurrence in the 
world through the positing of an invisible force. Among other things, Joycean 
betrayal seeks to recapture this sense of betrayal as somehow immanent, as saturating 
quotidian reality. 
 
“I can psoakoonaloose myself:” Psychoanalysis, psychology, and 
“intellectualizing” the self 63 
In the autumn of 1919 one of Joyce’s patrons, Mrs Edith Rockefeller 
McCormick, tried to arrange for him to be psychoanalysed by her friend and adviser 
Carl Jung. Joyce’s superior retort—“I can psychoanalyze myself”—may well have 
lost him Mrs McCormick’s patronage. But though Joyce was famously sceptical 
about psychoanalysts, the analysis of the psyche had always been of great interest to 
him. Perhaps his scepticism about Jung and Freud was a similar form of embattled 
professional rivalry as that which led him to be so dismissive of other, especially 
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Irish, writers.64 Joyce’s particularly complex brand of psychological realism had from 
the first relied on a powerful capacity to dig deep down below purely conscious 
rational motors to the psychological core of his characters’ behaviour. At various 
stages in his life Joyce displayed an interest in dream interpretation that was kept 
proudly separate from any institutional methodologies, regularly interpreting his own, 
Nora’s, and others’ dreams using a sense of symbolism, emotion, and psychology 
derived from and developed through artistic rather than “scientific” practice.65 Where 
other writers saw great possibilities in the developments of psychoanalysis, Joyce 
seemed to perceive a turf war, a battle over the depiction and explication of the 
realms of the conscious and subconscious mind. Freud and Jung were muscling in on 
a market that Joyce felt already belonged to literature. 
Unsurprisingly for Joyce, his most powerful psychological studies (at least 
early on) were drawn from his own experience and that of his close acquaintances. 
Harry Levin has suggested that “[t]he history of the realistic novel shows that fiction 
tends toward autobiography. The increasing demands for social and psychological 
detail that are made upon the novelist can only be satisfied out of his own 
experience.”66 For Joyce, the writing process almost always began with a fierce 
contemplation and analysis of his own thoughts and experiences. Stanislaus wrote in 
his Dublin Diary of Joyce’s “extraordinary moral courage,” which he felt allowed his 
brother to “say the most shocking things . . . not because they are shocking merely, 
but because they are true.”67 Joyce, upon reading this (he was in the habit of reading 
his brother’s diary), corrected his brother on the basis that “moral courage” did not 
accurately describe him. “When the Bard writes,” he said, “he intellectualizes 
himself.”68 Ellmann is sceptical of the difference between Stanislaus’s and Joyce’s 
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conceptions, thinking that the latter amounted to much the same thing couched in 
“more esthetic language.”69 But whereas Stanislaus’s conception is of Joyce as a 
fearless confessor—he thinks of him here as a future “Rousseau for Ireland”—Joyce 
takes his attempt to move away from such terminology seriously. For one thing, 
though Stanislaus is thinking of Joyce as a writer, he is focussed really on his 
qualities of character—what he “says” to people more than what he writes. That 
Joyce would then aggressively refocus the discussion onto a matter of writing 
practice—a description of writing in practice—is telling. As I hope to show through 
this thesis, the distinction that Ellmann glibly brushes away is in fact central to 
Joyce’s conception of his fiction-writing process.70 Of course, at the time of his 
comment, Joyce had not produced a great deal of fiction and his comments cannot be 
taken as wholly representative of the practices that would produce his major works. 
Yet, as well as some poems and a number of reviews, he had completed (in 1900) and 
destroyed (in 1902) “the first true work” of his life—a play titled A Brilliant 
Career71—and sketched with varying degrees of complexity, at least seventy 
“epiphanies” ranging from literal transcriptions of overheard dialogue to lyrical 
recitation of remembered dreams.72 Joyce may not have been an experienced writer 
just yet, but his understanding of his skill and purpose was developing rapidly 
through these experiments—the “epiphanies” in particular would have a powerful 
role to play in Stephen Hero and Portrait. As such, I would see Joyce’s considered 
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consciously transcriptions of the artist’s perceiving consciousness, are rigorous accounts of 
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correction of Stanislaus as representing an understanding that would underpin his 
writing practice for at least the next fifteen years.73 
The approach Joyce gestures towards in correcting Stanislaus can be 
characterized broadly as an acute impersonal analysis of the self. To intellectualize, 
one presumes, does not mean here to remove emotion from analysis but to find some 
way to look upon and interpret those emotions without merely repeating them or 
reading through them. To find a way, in short, to see those emotions for what they 
are—to understand where they come from, and to what end they strive. Joyce 
suggested in a February 1905 letter to Stanislaus that the “individual passion [was] 
the motive power of everything.” We can see in his fiction an attempt to understand 
the nature of these passions down to the finest detail and in the finest degradations. 
As I will outline in my discussion of Joyce’s non-fiction, the passions tangled up in 
the complex that is betrayal represent a defining interest for Joyce. In his fiction, he 
set out to understand and dramatize these passions exhaustively (though not, of 
course, exclusively). What Joyce’s distinction between “confession” and 
“intellectualization” allows us to do, is make a hard separation between the role of 
betrayal in Joyce’s personal life—both as a “hard-wired,” involuntary response to 
hardship and as a motivational, consolatory, and justificatory tool—and his analysis 
of these mindsets and others in his fiction. While it should hardly need to be said that 
Joyce is not Stephen and Stephen is not Joyce, there is a tendency in Joyce 
criticism—that goes back to the earliest reviews of Portrait—to make this conflation. 
More dangerous than this kind of conscious acknowledgement of the connection, 
however flawed, is criticism that does so without acknowledging the shaping force of 
Joyce’s biography on our reading of the texts. As Mark Wollaeger has suggested, 
while the “naivete of early criticism has been replaced by more self-conscious usage, 
some . . . critics still analyze the two-headed creature Stephen/Joyce.”74 
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This common tendency becomes particularly problematic when we attempt to 
understand Joyce’s interest in betrayal. Since this interest borders on obsession, and 
since this obsession is visible also in his own life, the temptation is to accept 
Stephen’s paranoia as indicative merely of Joyce’s own acceptance of betrayal as a 
part of Irish life and not to ground these betrayals in purposes contained within the 
text(s). To put it another way, we might take simply Joyce’s claims in his non-fiction 
that Ireland is a nation of gay betrayers, and see the multiple betrayals of Dubliners, 
Portrait, Exiles, Ulysses, and Finnegans Wake as the logical result of this conviction. 
In assuming that Joyce sees betrayal everywhere, we lose sight of the extent to which 
this conviction is itself analysed, broken down, and reformed in his writing. 
Moreover, we lose sight of the complex uses to which Joyce puts these betrayals in 
his texts. In my chapter on A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, I attempt to 
understand Stephen’s developing sensitivity to betrayal not simply as a representation 
of Joyce’s own paranoia—as an account and an apology for events that have 
occurred—but as an analysis of the role that that betrayal might be able to play in the 
Künstlerroman Joyce creates. The contrivance at the heart of Stephen’s paranoia is 
exposed to analysis and found to be a constituent part of the narratively satisfying 
conclusion to the novel. In making this claim and others in this thesis, I sometimes 
stray into dangerous territory—Mark Wollaeger might accuse me of using “characters 
as windows onto the author’s hidden desires”75—but, in maintaining a strict emphasis 
on Joyce’s own distinction between “confession” and “intellectualization,” and by 
steering clear of the psychoanalytic temptations thrown up by my subject matter, I 
intend to avoid producing a “Stephen/Joyce” of my own. 
I accept to some degree Harry Levin’s premise that Joyce’s reliance on his own 
experiences was a natural by-product of his fictional process and commitment to an 
advanced form of psychological realism. But I do so without accepting his broader 
premises and associated conclusions.76 In seeking to produce the most finely 
observed characters, Joyce’s best source was his own experience. Similarly, the 
greatest source Joyce possessed for his understanding of the workings of betrayal 
were his own thoughts, feelings, and declarations. But, contrary to Levin, Stephen is 
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not a mouthpiece for Joyce’s modern world-view. Despite his brother’s corrective, 
Stanislaus does not appear to have been willing to leave the framework of confession 
behind. In My Brother’s Keeper he suggests that Joyce’s writing is in essence a way 
of “confessing in a foreign language,” as if the act of incorporation was merely one of 
coding one’s sins in language abstruse enough that it could be made safely public—
an attempt to achieve the satisfaction of exposure without the concomitant risk. Since 
Joyce had abandoned the Catholic confessional, Stanislaus sees him embracing a 
secular one. This dynamic envisages first of all a need on Joyce’s part to achieve 
some secular absolution, a demand for forgiveness that requires an acknowledgement 
of one’s own sinfulness. This idea is problematized throughout Joyce’s fiction, where 
both Stephen and Richard Rowan separately refuse the consolations of confession on 
the basis that, in a godless universe, there is no other sufficiently elevated to judge 
them. Moreover, as I will argue, both men construct confession as an inherently 
perilous situation, a giving over of power that leads, necessarily, to betrayal. 
The line I maintain between writing as an act of confession and writing as an 
act of intellectualisation does not negate the fact that these texts nevertheless 
represent a startling form of controlled, but near-total, exposure that creates a 
potentially confessional dynamic between author and reader. But in emphasizing 
intellectualization over confession, Joyce attempts to distance himself from the 
material of his own life. The confessional possibilities of his texts are kept always in 
mind, so that, when Stephen is asked (in Portrait) whether he believes Rousseau to be 
a “sincere man,” he “laugh[s] outright” and says: “He was . . . I fancy . . . an 
emotional man” (P, 200). Given Stanislaus’s avowed desire to see his brother become 
the “Rousseau of Ireland,” the reference seems unavoidably loaded. Davin’s desire to 
judge Rousseau on the “sincerity” of his self-depiction is neatly dodged by Stephen, 
who appears to reject the grounds of the question. In desiring confession, Rousseau 
records only the history of that desire. It is hard not to read this moment as a mise en 
abyme for the whole of Joyce’s autobiographical fiction, which plays continuously 
with the reader’s eagerness to read it as confession,77 even as it insists on its own 
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status as an act of intellectual reconstitution.78 This distinction, between 
“intellectualization” and “confession”—this scepticism about the utility of confession 
as a mode to describe Joyce’s writing, combined with an openness to confession as a 
model for understanding the games Joyce’s fiction plays—is maintained throughout 
this thesis.  
 
Joycean betrayal 
The aim of this thesis is not to overthrow a dogma that is rapidly approaching 
its centenary. Rather, I have set myself the task of getting to the bottom of an aspect 
of Joyce’s writing that has for too long appeared so self-evident as to not need 
questioning. So, in the first chapter of this thesis I attempt to read Joyce’s Triestine 
non-fiction with a close eye on what it can tell us first of all about his writing 
practice. That is to say, when Joyce sat down to produce writing that needed to be 
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Joyce’s texts. 
	   32	  
arresting and original, but not revolutionary or aesthetically groundbreaking, how did 
he do it? More specifically, what role did the narrative structure of betrayal play in 
this process and how did Joyce manipulate the basic constituents of a drama he had 
learnt at his father’s side into a model that could be repeated and renewed time and 
again? Part of this approach requires an insistent focus also on the purposes of 
Joyce’s non-fiction, not primarily in terms of their status as potential political 
manifestoes, but as the product of a period of extreme and unusual uncertainty for 
Joyce. If Joyce took seriously the prospect of a career in journalism, as I will argue he 
did, then what role did betrayal play in maximizing his chances of success? 
In approaching A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, I attempt to make sense 
of the connection between Joyce the author and Stephen the “artist as a young man.” 
Moving away from an image of Stephen as repeating Joyce’s own paranoia, reliving 
Joyce’s own experiences of betrayal, and overcoming Joyce’s own hardships, I 
suggest that Joyce is conscious from beginning to end of betrayal as a performance, a 
narrative into which Stephen slots himself. While accepting the absurdities into which 
Stephen must move at times, Joyce allows betrayal a special position for its capacity 
to console, buoy up, and motivate Stephen as he progresses through a teleological 
narrative (the Künstlerroman) that he seems to feel pulling him along. I take the 
normal separation from the family that the child experiences as the “family romance” 
in Freud’s description of it as a model for a far more conscious, far more extreme 
severance with family, nation, and race in Portrait. Betrayal proves to be the 
mechanism by which Stephen achieves and consoles this painful manoeuvre. 
Moving away from Stephen, the two chapters dealing with Joyce’s largely 
unloved play, Exiles, seek to understand the play as Joyce’s most concerted attempt to 
make sense of betrayal as a (necessary) structural element of human relationships. 
The process of “dedication” or “commitment” that Stanislaus identifies is provided an 
exaggerated significance as it is seen to bring about the immediate threat of betrayal. 
This is not to say that a dedication leads inevitably to betrayal, but the experience of 
spiritual exposure that the act of commitment is seen to bring about is constructed as 
intolerable. The first of these chapters deals with Joyce’s resumption of hostilities 
with Ireland as he investigates a new aspect of exile. If exile is maintained on the 
basis that failure is inevitable in an Ireland that must, out of some historical 
imperative or racial flaw, destroy those who will save it, then what would it do to 
those who return to it, (published) book in hand? The rather vague restrictive and 
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destructive forces he dramatizes in his non-fiction and in A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man are constructed in greater detail as provocations to “self-betrayal,” a form 
of compromise that is seen as fatal. The second Exiles chapter takes up the theme of 
sexual or adulterous betrayal, which, though it was hardly new to Joyce’s writing 
(Dubliners has several examples of it), is investigated in depth for the first time in 
this play. Exiles is seen to challenge a conception of jealousy as “sensational,” 
working consciously against the bodily obsessions of Shakespeare’s Othello to 
produce an account of the cuckold as potentially heroic. The tradition of adulterous 
literature, which positioned the cuckold as a helpless, often comically ignorant 
victim, is turned on its head as Richard Rowan seeks a complete knowledge of the 
adultery that may befall him. This pursuit of absolute knowledge is, ultimately, seen 
as an attempt to master the unmasterable, as Richard ends the play declaiming his 
desire to love Bertha not in knowledge, but in doubt. 
The fifth chapter returns to Stephen as Joyce does. Having taken betrayal to its 
theoretical extreme in Exiles, Joyce becomes interested more in the pathos of 
Stephen’s stagnation than in the potential glory of his overcoming. Stephen is 
deprived of the capacity to narrate himself through betrayal in the way he was 
accustomed in Portrait. The figure of the betrayed mother is found to interfere fatally 
with the narratives of overcoming Stephen had relied on and he spends the day caught 
between the desire to sever finally with his family, race, and nation, and the 
realization that that severance would be painful and, perhaps, impossible. The 
paradigm of absolute separation, complete isolation, that betrayal helped narrate, is 
ultimately abandoned in favour of an acceptance of entanglement. 
The final two chapters deal with Molly Bloom’s adulterous betrayal of her 
husband Leopold. I construct my argument as Joyce did, following first Bloom’s 
journey towards acceptance (in chapter six), before giving Molly the last word. 
Ulysses offers a significantly different image of adulterous betrayal to Exiles and it is 
perhaps because Joyce was able to express the farthest reaches of a doubt 
masquerading as certainty in his play that he was able to express so tenderly and 
completely Bloom’s far less impassioned anguish. Through Bloom, Joyce questions 
the boundaries of betrayal; at what point does an act of betrayal become an act of 
betrayal? In the act or in the conception/imagination? The role of sex as the ultimate 
synecdoche for betrayal is challenged and abandoned, while the traditional role of 
cuckold breaks down even as Bloom appears to embody it. Ultimately, Molly’s 
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betrayal is seen to be not the sexual act itself, but her decision to exclude Bloom from 
the fantasy it describes. The boundary between fantasy and reality that the novel 
challenges is ultimately restored by this act. Molly’s decision towards the end of her 
monologue to reintroduce Bloom into this fantasy relationship by encouraging him to 
play the role of cuckold provides the sense of optimism and renewed affection that 
closes the novel. 
 
Dubliners, Finnegans Wake, and the poetry 
In conceiving of this thesis I was forced to make various determinations about 
what could and could not be included. A theme as pervasive as betrayal could not be 
dealt with in its entirety, example by example, quotation by quotation. I would not be 
building up a theory from a sparse array of textual mentions, but from a large body of 
work, much of which tackled the problem head on. As a result, I decided early on that 
the contribution I felt I could make to discussions of Joyce’s most obviously 
autobiographical texts and his journalistic work was greater than that I could make to 
discussions of Dubliners, Finnegans Wake, or Joyce’s poetical works. There is no 
doubt that all of these works contain a great deal that is of interest to a study of 
Joycean betrayal. As I have suggested, Matthew Campbell and Jefferson Holdridge 
have gone  some way towards doing the work that I neglect here. In the case of 
Dubliners, the betrayals that occur are generally of a more subtle form than those that 
I deal with in this thesis. Is the complex sense of loss and self-awareness that Gabriel 
experiences in “The Dead” really a sense of having been betrayed? Has Gretta 
betrayed him with the memory of the dead Michael Furey? Joyce’s notes for Exiles, 
where he discusses the virginity of the soul, would suggest that perhaps she has. Has 
Gabriel betrayed Ireland by attempting to set its political liberation to one side in 
pursuit of his own Europeanization? Will Eveline be betrayed into prostitution by 
Frank and would leaving her family be in itself an act of betrayal? The manipulations 
of Corley in “Two Gallants” would probably read as a betrayal to the maid he 
manipulates, but is it really represented to us as a betrayal in Dubliners, with all the 
sense of drama this word carries with it in Joyce’s writing? Perhaps not. Betrayal was 
certainly one of Joyce’s defining themes in Dubliners, but he does not make it the 
centrepiece or keystone of the book in the way that he does with those texts I am 
dealing with here. Finnegans Wake offered a somewhat different challenge. Betrayal 
is present, without question, from the opening pages of the book and it continues to 
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provide one of the key historical and dramatic structures around which the book is 
built. I am convinced that a lengthy study of the precise workings of betrayal in 
Finnegans Wake would be valuable and interesting, but a cursory five to ten thousand 
words would offer little. It is just too big and too broad a theme, too interrelated with 
too many other themes. This brings me on to my final introductory point. This thesis 
never set out to catalogue, discover, or re-evaluate the full range of references to 
betrayal (historical, political, personal, or literary) in Joyce’s writing. A brief glance 
at any of the many Joycean reference books would prove that that would have been a 
hopeless task.79 Nor do I profess to tell the whole story of Joycean betrayal, only 
what I consider to be its core manifestation as a structural principle that is both 
theoretical and dramatic. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Weldon Thornton, Allusions in Ulysses: an Annotated List (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1961) does not index betrayal, but one finds any number of references 
within the text. This is true also of Don Gifford, “Ulysses” Annotated (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1992) and Don Gifford, Joyce Annotated (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1992). 
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Chapter One: Writing Drama, Writing Betrayal: Joyce’s Triestine Non-Fiction 
 
Introduction 
In the five and a half years between writing his first piece for Il Piccolo della 
Sera in February 1907 and beginning his series of lectures on Hamlet for the 
Università Popolare in September 1912, Joyce published eight further pieces for Il 
Piccolo—“Home Rule Comes of Age” (19 May 1907), “Ireland at the Bar” (16 
September 1907), “Oscar Wilde: the Poet of “Salomé” (24 March 1909), “The Battle 
Between Bernard Shaw and the Censor” (5 September 1909), “The Home Rule 
Comet” (22 December 1910), “The Shade of Parnell” (16 May 1912), “The City of 
the Tribes” (11 August 1912), “The Mirage of the Fisherman of Aran” (5 September 
1912)—and three lectures at the Università Popolare—“Ireland: Island of Saints and 
Sages” (27 April 1907), “Realism and Idealism in English Literature: Daniel Defoe” 
(March 1912), and “Realism and Idealism in English Literature: William Blake” 
(March 1912).80 These Trieste articles and lectures, like the bulk of Joyce’s “critical” 
writings have long been troublesome sources for the critic. Early on, they were 
largely dismissed as curios that sat uneasily with the dominant view of Joyce as a 
metropolitan, European, aesthete perched in his eyrie, disdaining the petty stuff of 
politics. But the last three decades have seen a dramatic about-turn in the treatment of 
these pieces, as the general direction of literary studies has moved ever further from a 
conception of High Modernism as deracinated and deprovincialized. Even before 
postcolonial studies had migrated into Joyce studies with sufficient force to demand a 
book on the subject—Semicolonial Joyce (2000)—several critics found in this strange 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Both Ellsworth Mason (CW) and, following his lead, Kevin Barry (OCPW) include an 
editorial from the Freeman’s Journal under the title “Politics and Cattle Disease.” This has 
been uncovered as a misattribution, the details of which can be found in T. Matthews, “An 
Emendation to the Joycean Canon: The Last Hurrah for ‘Politics and Cattle Disease,’” James 
Joyce Quarterly 44.3 (2007), 441–55. As Matthews points out, a sub-editorial on the subject 
of cattle disease and referring to the “Styrian cure” did appear on 6 September 1912 as 
Charles Joyce suggested in a letter to Stanislaus, but, whether or not it was penned by Joyce 
(Matthews is doubtful), this single (four clause) sentence hardly represents a significant foray 
into politics or journalism. If it does indeed represent Joyce’s last non-fictional enterprise 
until his short address to PEN on 5 April 1927 (regarding the illegal publication of Ulysses by 
Samuel Roth), then it is perhaps a fittingly underwhelming and off-message finale. 
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collection of articles and lectures material ripe for re-evaluation. Dominic 
Manganiello quotes freely from them in Joyce’s Politics, as does Vincent Cheng in 
Joyce, Race, and Empire,81 Emer Nolan in James Joyce and Nationalism,82 Len Platt 
in Joyce and the Anglo-Irish,83 and Enda Duffy in The Subaltern “Ulysses”.84 Since 
Ellsworth Mason and Richard Ellmann first edited and published Joyce’s Critical 
Writings, we have had a new, more politically aware edition by Kevin Barry, whose 
annotations and introduction take the pieces more seriously as statements of Joyce’s 
thought. While these critics do not all agree on the precise significance and meaning 
of Joyce’s journalistic and critical non-fiction, it is clear that the “indifference” that 
Andrew Gibson reads in Mason and Ellmann’s “cursory annotation . . . is no longer 
acceptable.”85 
Yet it is also certain that we must treat these pieces carefully. The proliferating 
ambiguities of Joyce’s fictional texts are to be welcomed, but in presenting 
themselves as part of another discourse entirely—political journalism, literary 
criticism—Joyce’s Triestine articles demand to be treated differently. Though always 
a fruitful source of pithy quotations, they remain a source of some considerable, 
though measured, suspicion. One can use these pieces conditionally to support an 
argument made strongly through reference to one or more of Joyce’s literary texts, 
perhaps an anecdote or two from James Joyce, but one cannot begin with these piece 
and work up. Whereas the non-fictional writings of avowed and lifelong critics such 
as Virginia Woolf or T. S. Eliot may be safely quoted as long as the usual caveats are 
maintained, there is the prevailing sense that Joyce’s rhetorical formations must be 
strained through several more layers of cautious equivocation. This is partly a result 
of their form. Openly rhetorical, the tone lacks the precise distancing we find in 
Joyce’s literary works. Used to catching a glimpse of the artist behind his texts 
“paring his fingernails” and nothing more, it is disconcerting to read in these pieces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Vincent Cheng, Joyce, Race, and Empire (Cambridge: CUP, 1994). 
82 Emer Nolan, James Joyce and Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1994). 
83 Len Platt, Joyce and the Anglo-Irish: A Study of Joyce and the Literary Revival 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi Press, 1998). 
84 Enda Duffy, The Subaltern “Ulysses” (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 
1994). 
85 Gibson, The Strong Spirit, 92. 
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the image of an author thrusting itself bodily forward. We are not sure if this author 
figure is, indeed, Joyce—with all the illusion of finality that such a declaration 
entails—or some version of him, filtered through some specific performance of a 
more complex selfhood. Much of the suspicion regarding these pieces comes, I think, 
from the sense that the Joyce we are forced to posit and construct from imperfect 
clues in his literary texts (the distant genius behind the works) is suddenly so close 
and, though Andrew Gibson might disagree, so disappointing. These pieces, while 
they display some of Joyce’s obvious wit and intelligence, show also his flaws. The 
rhetoric becomes tiresome and overwrought, the phrasing, while effective, also lacks 
the measured subtlety we come to expect from Joyce’s prose. It is also, I suspect, not 
so much that the reader fails to fit the author of these pieces into their fanciful image 
of a deracinated modernist but that she cannot imagine the author of Ulysses as 
stating a positive opinion of any kind. Portrait and Ulysses, which appear at times to 
treat all views with equal derision and equal humour—in reality all views are not, of 
course, treated equally—seem a world away from the pieces we find in Joyce’s 
Triestine journalism. This is true even when one recognizes a phrase that has 
recurred, often ironically, in one of Joyce’s literary texts. 
Terence Killeen has offered a typically common-sensical response to these 
suspicions. Embodying the cautious embrace of these pieces that I described above, 
Killeen accepts that “[t]he . . . pieces concern[ing] Irish politics . . . are Joyce’s most 
direct and unmediated expression of political opinion.” But Killeen feels also that 
“[t]oo much can be made of the positions espoused in these articles, and too much has 
been made of them in some recent publications that wish to enlist Joyce in the post-
colonialist cause.”86 What Killeen stresses, however, is that Joyce’s Triestine writings 
(most of them at least) are “indeed works of journalism . . . . Joyce remains true . . . to 
certain general principles but this does not necessarily imply consistency in particular 
instances. Journalism is of its nature tied to its occasion, its period, and should not be 
pressed too hard beyond that occasion.” Joyce is, like all journalists, Killeen suggests, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Terence Killeen, “From the ‘Freeman’s General’ to the ‘dully expressed’: James Joyce and 
journalism,” in Irish Journalism before Independence: More a Disease than a Profession, ed. 
Kevin Rafter (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 201; 204 . Killeen cites by 
way of example: Emer Nolan, James Joyce and Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1995) and 
Vincent Cheng Joyce, Race, and Empire (Cambridge: CUP, 1995). 
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“sincere and committed at the time of writing but circumstances and attitudes may 
change, without breach of good faith being thereby involved.”87 I share Killeen’s 
insistence on the compositional moment and on seeing these pieces not merely as 
flawed or immature examples of Joyce’s writing—as if they were an extension of his 
fiction—but as pieces responding to and playing with specific mediums of 
publication. I seek to understand Joyce’s reliance on betrayal here as something that 
emerges partly from a specific negotiation Joyce undergoes as he considers, seriously, 
though temporarily, a career in journalism. I also take something from Ellsworth 
Mason who, despite Andrew Gibson’s imputation of “indifference” offers some 
interesting insights into the workings of these pieces. Mason’s understanding is too 
easy, too cosily concerned with Joyce’s heroic and detached artistry, but in his 
suggestion that “[t]hese writings are best understood as part of that dramatized 
autobiography which [Joyce] spent his life in piecing perfectly together,” Mason 
suggests a line of inquiry that has been lost of late.88 I take seriously the idea that 
Joyce saw these opportunities to publish and to speak publicly as a chance to carve 
out an image. Rather than a “dramatized autobiography” that reaches a final and 
perfect consistency, as if the Joyce struggling in Trieste had the same concerns as the 
Joyce flourishing in Paris, I argue that Joyce negotiates the image that he wishes to 
put forward as part of a pragmatic commodification of himself as embattled Irishman. 
Betrayal offers Joyce an effective narrative structure on which he relies in drafting his 
political pieces, but it also represents a way that he can maintain the embattled stance 
embodied in his exile. 
 
“The problem is to get money”89 
So accustomed are we to thinking of Joyce as the pre-eminent literary artist of 
the twentieth century that we can at times forget that the path to artistic immortality 
was not so clearly marked for Joyce himself, that even his remarkable faith was 
shaken sufficiently to make him consider another life. His repeated flirtations with 
singing were not merely fantasies or passing fancies but attempts to translate one of 
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his talents into a viable and lasting career. It is sobering to think that had Joyce been 
able to read music sufficiently well to win first place at the Feis Ceoil he may never 
have sat down to write any of his masterpieces. This annual “Festival of Music” 
represented an opportunity to win a year’s vocal tuition in Italy. Joyce had prepared 
seriously for this competition, borrowing heavily from Byrne and Gogarty in order to 
pay for lessons with Bernedetto Palmieri – the preeminent voice teacher in Dublin – 
at seven shillings each and, once the money began to run a little dry, from the less 
expensive Vincent O’Brien. He went so far as to rent a room on the pretext that he 
required a place  in which he could practice his singing undisturbed and managed, 
with the help of C. P Curran, to hire a piano. The effort would have paid off had 
Joyce acknowledged his inability to read music well enough to “sing an easy piece at 
sight.” The “startled judge,” Ellmann recounts, “had intended to give Joyce the gold 
medal” before he stormed indignantly from the stage at being presented with sheet 
music he had not seen before.90 In contrast to Richard Ellmann, who remains 
unconvinced by Joyce’s efforts throughout this episode, I am not interested in this 
moment in Joyce’s life as a mere biographical curiosity in Joyce’s journey towards 
artistic immortality. I take seriously Joyce’s efforts in a way that Ellmann refuses to. 
Consider what Joyce’s literary legacy would have been had he won the Feis Coil, 
received his voice training in Italy, and gone on to have a serious operatic career. The 
sum total of his literary output up to this point would have secured only a footnote in 
histories of the Irish revival as a minor, enigmatic, and contrary figure whose literary 
promise never bore fruit. Even if he had returned to writing, it is fruitful to question 
whether he could have possibly written Ulysses or Finnegans Wake from the less 
embattled position of working singer.  
Pushing speculation aside, my point here is to emphasize that Joyce 
acknowledged the contingency and insecurity of his future. The sense of destiny we 
find within the narrative constraints of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man should 
not be read back into Joyce’s early adulthood. For all his declarative confidence, 
Joyce treated his development as a literary artist pragmatically. Though Ellmann 
continues to maintain a tone of coy incredulity on the matter, he acknowledges that 
the possibility of a singing career was not entirely quixotic. As he says, it was “in the 
middle of his rich book [Stephen Hero] and poor circumstances” that Joyce 
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“reconsidered” the singing career that he had previously “never pursued, but never 
abandoned.”91 In short, a combination of literary anxieties and monetary hardship—
though not yet excessive amounts of either at this time—drove Joyce to consider an 
alternative career. Impressed by the example of John McCormack, who had risen 
meteorically from his own performance at the Feis Ceoil, Joyce saw singing as a way 
of making money and making a name; both concerns that had and would continue to 
spur and shape his writing. Ellmann’s rather glib conclusion that Joyce’s refusal to 
consider Palmieri’s offer of singing lessons in exchange for a share of concert fees 
was because the “tedious discipline did not suit him, and to be a second McCormack 
was not so attractive as to be a first Joyce” perhaps hides the fact that, for a moment 
at least, an alternative to writing, albeit one perceived as less glorious, was seriously 
considered. Ellmann himself suggests that Joyce retained the clippings that followed 
his recital at the Feis Ceoil because he “probably anticipated that they might be useful 
to him as publicity material should he revert to a singing career.”92 The ideal destiny 
towards which Joyce strove was certainly to become a leading literary artist, but 
when one sheds the sense of telos that comes with his eventual success, we can see in 
Joyce’s behaviour a genuine sense of unease. Without sacrificing his sense of himself 
as gifted or special, Joyce set about exploring suitable alternatives to the destiny he 
had chosen for himself. Though the hierarchy remained relatively clear, Joyce was 
acutely aware that to live required money and that literature was not guaranteed to 
provide it.  
 
Reviewing his options: Joyce in Dublin 
If we look at Joyce’s non-fiction writing chronologically and with an eye on the 
biographical context of these pieces, a pattern begins to emerge. Early on, he 
produces his University lectures and reviews of new books for various Irish 
newspapers. While in Ireland, his lecture topics were predominately esoteric 
philosophy, literary criticism, or personal intrusions into the cultural political field; 
his journalistic review work was almost completely devoted to literary and 
philosophical book reviews. There was an element of necessity here, as Joyce’s 
review work was at first attained through the help and influence of Yeats and Lady 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Ellmann, JJ, 151. 
92 Ellmann, JJ, 152n. 
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Gregory who wished to help him along as a writer. But this is precisely the point, the 
work Joyce set about doing, and the work Yeats and Lady Gregory helped him get, 
was directed consciously towards a specific goal. Joyce self-identified as a budding 
artist, was taken seriously in this endeavour, and helped to pursue it. The arrangement 
of materials Joyce wrote about at this time, and the form these writings took, were 
determined by their place in an imagined narrative. The teleological drive that shaped 
Joyce’s activities was openly acknowledged and accepted. Thus, these reviews are 
shaped by two competing (but not contradictory motivations). Joyce must carry out 
this work in order to receive some small pay, perhaps only a free book (which could 
be sold on), but he must also retain clarity in his public image. After all, even if he 
was coming to have some small notoriety in Dublin literary circles, these reviews 
(though many were unsigned, few were truly anonymous), were his first chance at 
wide scale publication. As such, even if many of these reviews are, in Terence 
Killeen’s words, “fairly perfunctory exercises . . . nothing in them can be read as a 
betrayal or a compromising of the stances Joyce had already enunciated.”93 The 
refusal of compromise as a fundamental Joycean principle plays an important role in 
this thesis. But here again, the word betrayal is being used to smooth over and justify 
an unnecessary or unhelpful leap. It is not so much, I contend, that Joyce was 
concerned to avoid betraying his own high principle, but that he was concerned to 
avoid compromising the future he envisaged for himself. He sets himself up as 
something like the “the subject of [his] portrait,” the protagonist of his prose-poem-
cum-manifesto-cum-personal history—John Whittier-Ferguson calls it, misleadingly, 
an “autobiographical essay”—“A Portrait of the Artist.”94 Pitched between “Their 
Bullockships” and “Their Intensities,” Joyce’s review work is either unremarkable, or 
remarkable only for its insistence on a contrary rejection of what he depicts as the 
twin pieties of Irish life. “Isolation,” he writes in “A Portrait,” is the first principle of 
artistic economy, but his literary reviews offer him the opportunity to make that 
isolation public and pointed. The real message of these reviews is not to be found in 
what they say about aesthetics, but in what they say about the public image Joyce was 
working to craft. These early reviews would have identified him as an able enough—
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though idiosyncratic—critic and reviewer. If he were to become an artist of some 
standing, this was not a bad place to start.  
It is clear, at any rate, that Joyce did not pursue these reviews for their own 
sake. Once the financial necessity of writing these pieces disappeared, so too did 
Joyce’s interest in writing them. This is similarly true, I suggest, of Joyce’s early 
journalistic pieces, but there is also a pragmatic shift in approach as Joyce leaves 
Dublin and, therefore, the “public” for which he was performing. While in Dublin, 
Joyce set about establishing his literary reputation but upon leaving he pursues, 
fancifully, a position as the French correspondent for the Irish Times. As well as “The 
Motor Derby,” OCPW includes one rejected article on the Paris carnival and one 
unsubmitted piece on a Quixotic Frenchman’s attempt to colonize North Africa.95 
These are not the topics of an aspiring litterateur; spurred on by the basic need for 
money, Joyce appears to have accepted the necessity of a career that would allow him 
to retain some degree of satisfaction. Though journalism was hardly as glamorous or 
as satisfying as literature, it did at least offer him the opportunity to write for a living. 
At least as Paris correspondent to an Irish paper he would have had the satisfaction of 
knowing that his Dublin friends, acquaintances, and antagonists were reading his 
name and Paris together; even if he would have preferred the words James Joyce and 
Paris to have appeared at the beginning of a book of his own making. This was 
writing that would pay, writing that would lead to publication, and writing that would 
profess his progression from the parochialism of Dublin. As it turned out, Joyce was 
(inevitably) rebuffed and rather rapidly left journalism behind. It would be several 
years before he tried his hand at it again. 
 
“A talent for journalism” 
Joyce, despite having a fair amount of reviewing experience behind him and a 
strong grasp of Italian, did not seek out any such work upon moving to Trieste in 
1905. While in Pola, Joyce asked Stanislaus to “look up every English review for the 
past year and see if there is an article on D’Annunzio’s ‘Figlia di Joro’. If there is not 
I would prepare an article.”96 Perhaps Joyce wished to be D’Annunzio’s champion as 
he had been Ibsen’s and Giordano Bruno’s, but he soon gave up on reviewing as his 
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attention turned to publishing stories from Dubliners.97 It was not until nearly two 
years later in 1907 that Joyce made any such attempt, and this was only after being 
invited directly by the then editor of Il Piccolo della Sera and Berlitz student Roberto 
Prezioso to correct the “errors” Joyce had complained to him about in an article on 
the death of John O’Leary. The resulting article, “Fenianism: The Last Fenian,” 
comes across not as an exercise in correction but as an attempt to lay out a more 
complete conception of the nature of politics in Ireland, its relationship to England, 
and the possibility of liberation. It is here, importantly, that Joyce first attempts to lay 
out in his non-fiction a clear case for betrayal as a necessarily constituent part of Irish 
history, contemporary Irish life, and Irish political efforts. Neither his reviews nor “A 
Portrait of the Artist” refer directly to betrayal, relying instead on the more general 
suggestion that commitment to either Church or nation in any organized way is 
anathema to the artist properly constituted. “The Last Fenian” is utterly quotable and 
accounts of Joyce’s personal and political relationship to Ireland invariably return to 
statements made in this article: that James Stephens’s construction of “cells of 
twenty-five men each” was “a plan of campaign eminently suited to the Irish 
character as it minimized the possibility of betrayal;” that “in Ireland, just at the 
crucial moment, an informer appears;” that “the Irish, even when they break the 
hearts of those who sacrifice their lives for their country, never fail to show a great 
reverence for the dead” (OCPW, 139-141). 
Joyce’s first journalistic piece in Trieste, “The Last Fenian” seems entirely 
representative of the writing he produced during this period. These pieces are 
bombastic and heavy with a rhetoric of distaste; they appear to state a position on 
Irish affairs, but generally the position is formed largely from negatives and 
generalities. When betrayal is cited as a fundamental feature of the Irish race, it 
appears to be offered as a serious analysis, yet, surely, such an analysis is patently 
absurd? Rather than argue for or against Joyce’s investment in this conception of 
Irish history, or to debate the degree to which he wished to air the grievance with 
Ireland these pieces appear to encode, I will stress an understanding of these pieces as 
quasi-literary. That is, rather than scan them, primarily, for argumentation, I will read 
them as examples of Joyce’s writing. How can we understand the process by which 
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these pieces came together and, of most relevance to this thesis, what can this tell us 
about the way Joyce thought and wrote betrayal? 
To understand “The Last Fenian” requires first restoring it precisely to the 
moment of its production. Prezioso’s offer came along at a time of peculiar sensitivity 
for Joyce. His son and first child, Giorgio, was nearly two years old; in the time since 
his birth Joyce had submitted Chamber Music to four publishers in Dublin and 
London with no success, Dubliners was still no closer to publication (Grant Richards 
had agreed to publish in 1905 but later changed his mind), Joyce’s dissatisfaction 
with Stephen Hero was rapidly reaching its denouement—he would throw it in the 
fire within three months—and Nora was five months pregnant with his second child, 
Lucia. Joyce was struggling artistically, romantically, and financially. Joyce’s time in 
Trieste had begun optimistically, after the isolation he had experienced in Pola—he 
complained to Stanislaus that he had “no-one to talk to”98—he was confident that he 
would “complete ‘Dubliners’ by the end of the year and . . . follow it by a book 
‘Provincials’.”99This positivity rapidly drains away, however, as financial realities 
begin to impose themselves. Within a few months, Joyce’s concern for Dubliners is 
reduced to the simple question: “Do you think it will make money?”100 Uncertainty 
sets in regarding not only his immediate situation but the future his “voluntary exile” 
was supposed to enable. “It is possible that the delusion I have with regard to my 
power to write will be killed by adverse circumstances.”101 These circumstances can 
be resolved only through money. “I want money. You cannot imagine I want to 
continue writing at present. I have written quite enough and before I do any more in 
that line I must see some reason why.”102 His reason for writing, not previously in 
question, is suddenly consumed by the need to finance his (rather meagre) lifestyle. 
“It is impossible for me to write anything in my present circumstances. . . . What 
really is the point is: whether it is possible for me to combine the exercise of my art 
with a reasonably happy life.”103 This is no generalized worry. After detailing to the 
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last lire his incomings and outgoings, he suggests to Stanislaus, once again, that “You 
can see how it is impossible for me to write or do anything in such circumstances.”104 
This specific concern for his finances spills over into a generalized 
dissatisfaction as Joyce rails against the country he would continue to live in for the 
next eight years. “I am damnably sick of Italy, Italian and Italians, outrageously, 
illogically sick.”  More importantly, this seemingly endless cycle of anger, 
dissatisfaction, and worry takes its toll on his imagination. It is not just that he refuses 
to write until he sees a purpose for that writing, but that the works he left Ireland to 
write begin to fade from him: “My imagination is so weak I am afraid all the things I 
was going to write about have become uncapturable images.”105 “I have the idea of 
three or four little immortal stories in my head but I am too cold to write them. 
Besides, where’s the good. . . . The other day I was thinking about my novel. How 
long am I at it now? Is there any use in continuing it?”106 Even Stanislaus, the only 
constant support to Joyce throughout this period, appeared to lose faith. Joyce 
complains wryly to Stanislaus, “You appear to be exasperated at my financial 
distress. No wonder.”107 By the end of his time in Rome, Joyce had reached a crisis 
point. The word is thrown around all too glibly at times, but there was a genuine air 
of decision in Joyce’s letter to Stanislaus on 1 March 1907—6 days before Joyce 
moved  his family back to Trieste; 21 days before Il Piccolo published  “Fenianism: 
The Last Fenian.” 
 
I have come to the conclusion that it is about time I made up my mind 
whether I am to become a writer or a patient Cousins. I foresee that I shall 
have to do other work as well but to continue as I am at present would 
certainly mean my mental extinction. It is months since I have written a 
line and even reading tires me. . . . I have answered several adverts and 
hope to be able to get some position in which I can go on with my 
writing. It seems to me better to try that line as it might bring me more 
money. . . . You seem to imagine that I should settle down to make 
myself a carrier here, beginning at 250 frs a month and ending 20 years 
hence at 450 frs a month, with all the accompaniments of such a carrier, a 
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quarter, a servant, children at school, a small bank a/c and a great fear of 
everything in me. This is what I should do but I doubt I will ever do it.108 
 
Upon returning to Trieste, the problem was, indeed, “to get money” but it was also to 
restore some sense of direction to a life and career that had stagnated. Joyce was 
resigned to “other work” but recommitted to pursuing the literary career he was too 
exhausted to carry out. When, within two weeks of resigning himself to these 
realizations, Joyce was offered the opportunity to be published and to be paid for 
writing, it was an opportunity he could not let pass. There is no sense that he had 
planned this—no evidence that he was soliciting reviewing or journalistic work—yet 
in this opportunity he found a realistic way to supplement his income tutoring in 
English without leaving his literary ambitions behind. As such, what was resting on 
this piece was not as intangible a satisfaction as stating a political opinion, but a very 
real need to turn this one-off article into a more regular source of income. Joyce was 
auditioning for a new audience. He needed to establish himself as a unique voice in a 
city that was, as John McCourt has suggested, fairly well-informed about Irish issues. 
 
Il Piccolo della Sera rarely missed an opportunity to write about countries 
which suffered under foreign domination and so the Irish question 
received a lot of coverage—even if it was usually through the filter of 
English news agencies. So when Joyce wrote his leading articles he knew 
he was writing for a readership already reasonably acquainted with 
matters Irish.109 
 
Joyce had secured the article on the basis that coverage of Ireland tended to contain 
too many errors—O’Leary had been printed “Leary”—but he could not rely on a 
slighter greater grasp of the details to secure his place as a regular commentator on 
Irish affairs. Reports could be reprinted (at a fraction of the cost) from English 
newspapers with a sufficient degree of factual accuracy. Joyce needed to spice up his 
article with a powerful, exciting narrative and a sense of authority that presented itself 
as entirely unique. He did this, I contend, by warping the material to hand into a 
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narrative of drama and betrayal. Through this structure he was able to make a 
commodity of his specific form of embattled, isolated Irishness. 
 
Writing drama, writing betrayal 
In “Fenianism: The Last Fenian,” the command of James Stephens is praised 
for organizing men into “cells of twenty-five men each,” a plan of campaign, Joyce 
suggests, “eminently suited to the Irish character since it minimized the possibility of 
betrayal”. But, just as “everything seemed to be going well,” as Joyce puts it, 
Stephens is arrested. “The reason for the collapse of so well-organized a movement? 
Simply because in Ireland, just at the crucial moment, an informer appears” (OCPW, 
139). In “Home Rule Comes of Age,” Joyce introduces an ironic biblical precedent, 
saying that the Irish Parliamentary Party “[gave] proof of their altruism when they 
sold Parnell, their master, to the pharisaical conscience of the English non-
conformists, without exacting the thirty pieces of silver” (OCPW, 144). In “The 
Home Rule Comet,” Joyce argues that Ireland “has never been a faithful subject of 
England . . . nor has it been faithful to itself. . . . It always betrayed its heroes in their 
hour of need without even earning the bounty as payment” (OCPW, 159). When 
Joyce describes Parnell’s removal as leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, he 
claims that he “was deposed by the Nationalists obeying Gladstone’s orders. Of the 
eighty-three deputies, only eight remained faithful to him.” In case the simple fact of 
his having been betrayed is not enough to win our sympathy, we are told rather 
grandiosely that Parnell’s shade will not be a vindictive one, “the sadness that 
devastated his soul was, perhaps, the profound conviction that, in his hour of need, 
one of the disciples who had dipped his hand into the bowl with him was about to 
betray him.” Further, it “redounds to the honour of [Parnell’s] fellow-countrymen that 
they did not fail” his “final desperate appeal . . . . They did not throw him to the 
English wolves, they tore him apart themselves” (OCPW, 196). 
The overall picture provided by Joyce’s Triestine non-fiction is one in which 
betrayal is an unavoidable constant in Irish history, a repeating and inevitable 
structure that sits behind or above more prosaic matters such as economics or politics. 
While Ireland’s dwindling population, the pervasive influence of the Catholic 
Church, English economic mismanagement of Irish resources, and, relatedly, the 
failure of Irish industries are all put forward as contributory factors to the ongoing 
trouble in Ireland, the perverse logic of pieces such as “Fenianism: The Last Fenian” 
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insists that the failure of Irish efforts is always, ultimately reducible to some act or 
other of betrayal. Or, more properly, that while these other matters operate logically, 
in the world of rational intention, betrayal sits behind or beyond this logic, derailing 
Irish endeavours. Joyce depicts an Ireland that has fought for various forms and 
degrees of liberation in various ways at various times under various circumstances, 
yet within this variation he asserts a single constant: “Ireland always betray[s] its 
leaders” and an informer always appears. 
I will offer a political reading of this depiction shortly. First, by returning to the 
moment of Joyce’s first Triestine article, I hope to show that the preponderance of 
betrayal in these pieces is more an issue of aesthetics than politics. Given his 
audience’s basic knowledge, Joyce did not have licence to stray too widely from the 
basic facts of the situation when writing “The Last Fenian.” Perhaps as a result, he 
seems reticent to leave the well-trodden paths of the Irish nationalist narrative: Adrian 
IV’s papal bull, Robert Emmet, James Stephens, etc. But if his account appears at 
times startlingly traditional, this tendency is balanced by his withering dismissals of 
important parts of the Fenian narrative. Joyce’s imputation of betrayal as a primal 
historical force at work in Irish affairs is startling. His Triestine audience, who may 
well have been accustomed to an image of Ireland as plagued by betrayals—this was 
hardly Joyce’s invention—would almost certainly have been surprised to see this 
propensity turned into a criticism of the Irish themselves. In describing betrayal not as 
an unfortunate fact of Irish history, but as the defining historical and racial force at 
work in the country, Joyce was certainly setting out to catch his readers’ attentions. 
An Irishman dismissing Irish efforts, even as he asserts the necessity of the attempt, 
Joyce was making a commodity out of his particular Irish perspective. An Irishman 
offering an account of Irish history might appeal to the intellect, but an Irishman 
performing the anguish of an embattled history appealed to the emotions. For all the 
aggressive rejections of Fenianism, there is cautious optimism in Joyce’s account, a 
feeling that though the resulting society may not be all Joyce would want it to be, 
independence may be achievable. In a section of about ten sentences amidst his 
negativity, he takes the time to recount the merits, guardedly, of Sinn Fein and to 
suggest that “from many points of view, this latest form of Fenianism may be the 
most formidable” (OCPW, 140). It is in the tension between optimism and pessimism 
that Joyce hopes to ensnare the irredentist Triestine audience of Il Piccolo Della Sera. 
Their interest in Ireland was largely as a point of comparison, a metaphor perhaps for 
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the concerns of Trieste. The facts on Ireland they (for the most part) had. The 
triumphalist rhetoric they had. The English distaste for physical force nationalism 
they had. Joyce was seeking to provide them with something more sophisticated, and 
in so doing to suggest that he was the only man in Trieste from whom they could get 
it. Betrayal allowed Joyce to commodify a particular performance of Irishness, to 
make his bitter exilic state a unique selling-point for his journalistic persona. In 
describing an Ireland that “had driven its spiritual creators into exile,” Joyce refers 
implicitly to his own situation, establishing a position as a commentator with a 
unique, firsthand insight into the very processes that he is describing. If you want to 
know the truth about Ireland, he seems to be saying, don’t go to an Irishman in 
Ireland, who must by necessity be defeated or worthless. Go to the exile who knows 
Ireland well enough to realize that the only sane response is to leave it forever, whose 
very exile provides a constant proof of his value—if Joyce wasn’t capable of driving 
Ireland forward to some new dawn, so the logic goes, the dark forces of Irish history 
would not have effected his removal from the scene. 
While Joyce’s attack on Irish self-destruction is emotive, the real appeal of the 
piece is his description of John O’Leary himself. Nominally an obituary, Joyce could 
be expected to offer an account of the major events of O’Leary’s life, suggest the 
influence he had on other figures, and offer a sentiment regarding what the world had 
lost. But using the most basic of facts Joyce transfigures O’Leary into an archetype of 
Ireland’s mistreatment, its betrayal of the men, and the values, that might see it to 
freedom. It is no surprise that when Joyce went in search of some dramatic narrative 
with which he could enrapture his readers he should turn first and finally to the drama 
of dedication and betrayal. With a short deadline and with his creativity flagging, 
Joyce turned to the language and the structure he understood best. The source 
material offers up very little in the way of betrayal; John O’Leary was well respected 
and well-loved after his return to Ireland. While he may not have had quite the 
revolutionary fervour with which he left Ireland, he was an influential leader in the 
Young Ireland movement, an active member of the Irish Transvaal committee, and, 
“on his return to exile was treated to universal respect.” As “the handsomest old man 
he ever saw,” Yeats later attributed that from the Young Ireland meetings he attended 
and from the books and words O’Leary gave him, came “all that he subsequently set 
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his hand to.” 110 By all accounts, O’Leary remained relatively content from his return 
to Ireland in 1885, right up to his death. In order to construct his pathetic image of the 
betrayed old man, Joyce either amends the facts or distorts their depiction. This is a 
process of careful narrativization rather than selectivity. I will quote an extended 
passage, for it is in the layering in of pathetic imagery that this piece finds its effect. 
 
O’Leary returned to Ireland after years of studious exile in Paris . . . . He 
was welcomed by his countrymen with accolades and would appear in 
public from time to time to preside over some separatist meeting or 
banquet. But he was a figure from a vanished world. He could often be 
seen walking along the river, a venerable old man dressed mostly in light 
clothes, with a flowing head of pure white hair, almost bent double with 
age and suffering; he would halt before the darkened shops of the 
antiquarian book sellers and then, having made his purchase, he would 
return along the river. He had little reason to be happy: his plans had gone 
up in smoke, his friends were dead, and very few people in his country 
knew who he was or what he had done. Now that he is dead, his 
compatriots escort him to his tomb with a great show of pomp, because 
the Irish, even when they break the hearts of those who sacrifice their 
lives for their country, never fail to show a great reverence for the dead.  
 (OCPW, 140-41) 
 
What is striking is how much work Joyce is having to do to convert the active, 
influential figure Yeats remembered with unrivalled fondness into the inert, broken, 
lonely man, Joyce requires. A simple trip to an antiquarian bookshop—a fairly 
neutral act into which could be loaded almost any emotive reading—is transfigured 
into a symbol of O’Leary’s own antiquity; he is left hanging on to the shreds of an 
old world that no longer exists, waiting patiently for death to finally confirm the life 
sacrifice that he had made decades previously. For death here is merely the long-
awaited conclusion to a life that had ended for all intents and purposes upon his exile 
from Ireland. That informer, agent of a historical imperative, had killed O’Leary long 
ago. But the informer is not singled out for any special blame, since in this 
conception of Irish history his small personal act was always already inevitable. The 
local is but the manifestation of the general. And in Ireland the general will always 
end in betrayal.   
While Parnell had the decency to, to paraphrase Joyce, “die of [his] broken 
heart,” O’Leary lived on, inconveniencing those who would otherwise have been able 
to reverence him properly in his martyrdom. For Joyce is certainly aligning O’Leary 
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with Parnell, the archetype of the betrayed. But we need not imagine Joyce carefully 
and patiently forging similarities between the two stories. The structures of 
betrayal—and its accompanying tropes and metaphors—formed such a fundamental 
part of Joyce’s writing practice, and his particular picture of Parnell’s demise formed 
such a fundamental part of his picture of betrayal, that his slightly wrong-headed 
reading of O’Leary’s life and death could have been formed without a single 
conscious comparison with Parnell. While much of Joyce’s understanding of betrayal 
ultimately derived from his introduction to a certain version of the Parnell myth, the 
machinery by which Joyce conceived of these narratives swiftly gained independence 
from its founding story. Joyce’s imagination was permanently receptive to 
opportunities to foreground betrayal as an underlying structure in human, particularly 
Irish, affairs. 
Joyce’s reliance on this set of tropes is further shown by his redeployment of 
them later on in “The Shade of Parnell.” Both O’Leary and Parnell are depicted as 
lonely and isolated men broken by the country for which they had given everything. 
Both men, similarly, are described as possessing a “broken heart,” their repayment for 
years of service, and are shown the respect they deserved only after death. Perhaps 
the belatedness of this honour and respect offers us another way of reading Joyce’s 
claim that the Irish were “the most belated race in Europe.” It is likely that Joyce had 
Parnell squarely in mind when writing about O’Leary as his criticisms of Ireland 
were rarely distanced from the fate of Parnell. But it is also the case that Joyce’s 
reliance on a relatively small set of tropes to produce his drama in these pieces shows 
a remarkable limitedness of invention. When pressed for time and eager to produce 
something dramatic that would win over an audience, Joyce fell back on the drama 
that he knew best, and the key tropes of that drama that he had learnt in his youth. 
That O’Leary should become suspiciously similar to Parnell in Joyce’s conception of 
him is indicative of the fact that while drama and betrayal were hard to separate, 
Parnell and betrayal were inseparable. 
We must also acknowledge that Joyce, feeling the pressure to be memorable, 
was capable of hamming it up a little in order to elicit a response from his readers. 
One of the long-running problems with critical approaches to Joyce’s non-fiction is 
that we struggle to contend with the idea of Joyce as anything less than a writer of the 
greatest sophistication. These pieces are full of so many quick, crude effects—the 
kind of pithy rhetoric that has made these pieces so eminently quotable—that they 
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can make strange bedfellows with Dubliners, Portrait, and Ulysses. Yet perhaps it is 
time that we acknowledge that even these fictional texts indulge in the odd cheap 
thrill and that in Portrait and Ulysses at least, betrayal is so foregrounded partly 
because it has such an immediate, primal effect. At the least, we have to become 
more comfortable in accepting the idea that in composing these pieces, Joyce 
embraced a mode of writing that relied on certain immediate rewards in the hope that 
he might reap some immediate rewards of his own. This is not to say that he “sold 
out” or that he sacrificed the internal consistency of his thinking on any particular 
matter, but that the manner in which he expressed himself was intentionally eye-
catching, occasionally to the detriment of finer sentiment. In relation to betrayal, at 
least, the cheap thrills of the non-fiction and the sophisticated analyses of the fiction 
both emerge out of and return to the same fundamental narrative understanding. 
 
Making failure a bad thing again; redefining the Irish “volkgeist” 
Care must be taken, if I am right in my analyses so far, to avoid treating Joyce’s 
attribution of betrayal as an essential Irish trait in the Trieste non-fiction writings as a 
completely sincere evaluation of the situation as Joyce saw it. Nevertheless, betrayal 
does play a powerful role in a coherent Joycean criticism of Irish revivalist 
conceptions of Irishness. The function of betrayal in Joyce’s counter-narrative is 
specifically aimed at neutering a prevalent Irish cultural discourse centred on a 
conception of failure as a spiritually satisfying and historically inevitable feature of 
Irish action. The indissoluble connection of betrayal with the figure of the Irish hero 
in Joyce’s Trieste writings on Ireland emerges out of and enters back into discourses 
on the nature and role of the hero (and artist-hero) in the future of the Irish nation, 
rejecting some aspects while embracing others. To understand what Joyce is writing 
against, it is necessary to leave him behind temporarily and to trace the development 
of a highly influential component of Irish political and cultural thought in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
The essentialized national character debates in Ireland were about a good deal 
more than the rights of representation or the propagandist national cause—though 
these were, of course, important enough. The revival in Ireland came at the tail-end of 
a Europe-wide rediscovery of national character as a possible historical force and 
political motivator. Joep Leersen has ably summarized this development, as follows: 
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[N]otions of different characters or temperaments, each particular to a 
given political-ethnic community called a nation, had been current from 
the  Middle Ages onwards; . . . each volk or nation came to be considered 
as a specific personality, each with its unique contribution to the variety 
of human culture.111 
 
This “unique contribution” is no small matter; it establishes within the panoply of 
nations a historical impetus, a historicist faith in the destiny of nations that is made 
discernible by analysis of the “character” of the nation and its reflection in the nation-
state. It is into this context that we must place any criticisms (including Joyce’s) of 
the revivalist eagerness to establish a strict definition of Irish character.  
After all, such discourses were widely accepted by the end of the nineteenth 
century, the old and established popular conceptions of the volk having been 
incorporated into more philosophically developed and robust systems of thought such 
as those of Fichte and Hegel earlier in the century, and adopted to great effect by 
various Romantic Nationalists throughout Europe as ethnically-driven independence 
movements began to take hold. To a late nineteenth- or early twentieth-century 
observer, the history of political liberation throughout the nineteenth century was 
precisely one of ethnic romantic nationalism; to achieve liberation, or more properly 
self-determination, one must determine who constitutes that nation, and what it is 
about these people that is unique (thus justifying the boundaries and exclusions of 
that nation). The nation was conceived, as Bloom wished it, as “the same people 
living in the same place,” but it fell to those artists and thinkers of the revival to 
determine what constituted “the same people” in terms that were consistent with a 
history stretching back into the antiquity of the volk. This could not be achieved 
through reference to the modern, socio-economic, geographical definitions provided 
by capitalism without rendering the conception of the volk as a mysterious but 
historically active force. Finding the volk and determining to whom it applied became 
a matter of discovering and defining a political-ethnic community that could be traced 
back into antiquity.  
For all its focus on the past, the revival’s purpose was eminently future-
oriented. It was built on that romantic tradition already described, in which Hegel’s 
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conception of the zeitgeist as a moment in which a particular people—though not 
restricted to ethnicity this invariably was filtered through those terms in the 
nineteenth century—became the active determiners of their history, leaving behind 
them the memories of the long periods in which they were merely its passengers. The 
appeal of this to the Irish mind which was for so long accustomed to thinking of 
history in terms of repetitive oppression, a “nightmare” as Stephen puts it, is clear. As 
Seamus Deane has said, for the turn-of-the-century Irish mind history was an 
“inescapable category,” something that “happened to” the subject in an endlessly 
repeating series of re-enactments of violence, disappointment, and suffering.112 The 
zeitgeist offered revivalist and nationalists an opportunity to overthrow a conception 
of Ireland as for 800 years oppressed and enslaved by history (and England), to 
become empowered within that history, and eventually to become the forgers of a 
future determined on their own terms. For all that the Revival encouraged 
parochialism and propagandized a limited conception of history, the motivations were 
reasonable within the terms of an Irish experience of disempowerment and the aims, 
overthrowing an entire system of historical experience, were anything but diminutive. 
Defining the volk was, in a very real sense, the central purpose of the revivalist 
movement, as the political and cultural aims of the revival emerged largely from this 
drive. But the effect of the idea of the volk on conceptions of Irish history, and as a 
result its future, were complex and powered by contemporary political content. It was 
not enough simply to acknowledge the need for a uniformly described people, and in 
so doing to begin the process of identification. The volk destiny of the nation must be 
accounted for within the terms of contemporary reality. If, as the romantic discourses 
suggested, the history of a nation was connected on a fundamental level with the 
character of that nation’s peoples, then any flaws or unsatisfactory aspects of that 
nation’s past and present required explanation with reference to the character of the 
nation. As Leerssen again puts it, the development of the concept of the volk reached 
a “point where each volkgeist or national character was seen as a nation’s cultural and 
moral DNA: a blueprint for each ethnic group in its historical destiny.”113 If, as seems 
undeniable, the Irish historical experience was so deeply unsatisfying, it was of the 
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utmost importance to be able to square this history with the conception of the 
volkgeist. 
Broadly speaking, the whole conception of the volk and the volkgeist offers up 
two main types of response to this problem, both providing viable routes for revivalist 
projects. The first of these responses begins by positing an idealized conception of an 
antiquated and, by being closer to the source of the volk, “truer” version of Irish 
character that has since been diluted or pushed to the fringes by any number of 
external factors. In the case of the revival, strong remnants of this originary character 
were seen to survive in the atemporally conceived outposts of Celticism (for instance, 
the West of Ireland) where, protected from the ravages of modern life, the volkgeist 
lived on in a less imperfect form. The strength of this response was in its adaptability. 
The reasons put forward for the degradation of the volk could be almost anything, and 
thus reflect the most prevalent forces acting on the group or individual expressing 
them. Miscegenation, immigration, urbanization, political change—perhaps through 
the emancipation or enfranchisement of one or more previously subjugated groups—
social shifts brought about by economic, agricultural, and industrial developments. 
Any or all of these and more can easily be blamed for the erosion of supposedly 
traditional values that are seen, once the essential character of the volk is posited, as 
the true characteristics of the nation. Indeed, once the idea of the volk is accepted, 
change itself becomes deeply suspect and a nostalgic clinging to elements of Irish 
society most assimilable into a conception of the traditional or Gaelic/Celtic takes 
hold. Due to this adaptability and assimilability into contemporary anxieties, this 
response became the most widespread revivalist employment of the volk, and would 
explain a large part of the revival’s tendency to foster a parochial and backwards 
looking idealism. Old Ireland becomes true Ireland and the ills of contemporary 
society are deferred onto the loss of that true and happy destiny, the possibility of 
which can still be discerned in the remnants of folk-culture. The job of rediscovering 
and recreating this culture is then an attempt to restore Ireland to a more fulfilling and 
triumphant racial destiny. 
The second of these responses takes the concept of the volkgeist as not only 
historically active but as being of fundamental importance to the action of history. If 
Ireland has been bound into a position of colonial oppression, economic hardship, and 
cultural suppression/eradication, then it is because this was the destiny laid out by the 
nature of the volkgeist of the Irish people. If England conquered Ireland, it is because 
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it was in their ethnic destiny to do so—in the clash of two volkgeist’s the English 
were seen to be, if not necessarily “superior”—the term does not really have a place 
in this type of system—then at least suited to overthrowing the Irish/Celtic volkgeist. 
Conceived like this, we can see how suitable this conception is to a colonizer’s view, 
decontextualizing the actualities of colonial domination into an atemporal and 
ahistorical matter of fate. Indeed, these discourses, in an altered form, were used 
widely as a way of resisting Irish claims for self-rule. The Anglo-Saxon, described 
paradigmatically by Matthew Arnold, is eminently suited to government, sober rule, 
and economic and political guidance; the Celt, for all his positive characteristics, was 
always portrayed as too “romantic,” feckless, erratic, or even bestial for governance. 
For all that this response seems completely unsuited to the revivalist project the 
revival did indeed manage to empower a version of this narrative. The English 
version posits an ideal character in terms conveniently suited to the contemporary 
conceptions of the Anglo-Saxon character and then proceeds to universalize the 
relevance of this superiority. But as I said before, the idea of the volkgeist, for all that 
it establishes local and relative superiorities, does not have any space for any ultimate 
ethnic superiority. That England conquered Ireland may reflect that the English 
character is more suited to conquering, but that is all it reflects. The attempt by 
English discourses to universalize relevance is an attempt to hide this fact, to pull the 
wool over the eyes of its colonies and to protect itself against anxieties of inferiority 
in spheres other than the economic, military, or governmental. Joseph Valente, in his 
explication of the “double-bind of Irish manhood,” has similarly shown how English 
hegemonic discourses sought to put forward Englishness as the perfect balance of the 
animal and the spiritual, the masculine and the feminine virtues. The problem for the 
Irishman, in this account, is that any attempt to prove this balance invariably 
collapses into evidence of imbalance. Eloquence, rather than being an example of 
intelligence or rationality, becomes a sign of excessive romance and femininity, and a 
lack of manly vigour. An attempt to force the matter, either through the physical force 
of the Fenians—who expressly foreswore the fine talk of parliament—or through 
political protest and parliamentary obstructionism, became a sign of uncontrolled 
masculinity or bestiality. In short, to be considered well-balanced, one had already to 
be considered well-balanced; it could not be shown by any other means.114 The trick 
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of the revival was to accept this universalization, to accept Irish material defeat at the 
hands of England as being historically inevitable, to accept that England would 
always prove superior economically, martially, and technologically. By embracing an 
English conception of Ireland as incorrigibly romantic, the revival did not find a way 
through the colonial double-bind so much as cease to acknowledge its power to bind; 
agency was discovered within the very conceptions designed to deny it. By refusing 
to argue against the terms of England’s sense of volk superiority, the revival sought 
paradoxically to find a form of empowerment that sat outside of the hegemonic 
structures of that very system. It is in this light that we must read the revivalist 
distaste for English materialism—represented by Joyce in the form of Mr. Deasy’s 
claim that the Englishman’s proudest claim is “I paid my way”—and the concomitant 
exaggeration of Irish spirituality, closeness to nature, and the purity of the peasant 
lifestyle.  
 
The heroic artist and the volk 
The best place to observe these discourses at work in the revivalist project is in 
their heroes, for as Wayne E. Hall has aptly put it, “the Irish writers of the 1890s seek 
over and over to create for their literature and nation a hero, to define his values and, 
most importantly, to determine what he is to do.”115 It is in the hero that the volkgeist 
as imagined is made concrete and established both as a lament for what has faded out 
of Irish life and as an example of what must be brought back in. What is it then about 
revivalist forms of heroism that is distinctly Irish? In the last twenty-five years there 
have been a number of studies that have attempted to describe the unique experience 
of Irish history. Luke Gibbons has described it as a form of “attrition,” an aspect of an 
“aphasic condition of colonialism” that denies the Irish subject the reassuring sense of 
“the continuity and permanence of English tradition”; an historical experience that 
meant that “even natives were considered strangers in their own land.”116 Seamus 
Deane has similarly stressed the destabilizing forces of constitutional and 
insurrectionary failures from the seventeenth century onwards. The sheer attritional 
force of these regular disappointments, especially when framed by the “hybrid” 
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semicolonial situation of being neither wholly colonial nor wholly national, has 
meant that “the idea of society and the assumption of stability have never been 
securely lodged in Irish experience.”117 One obvious response to this experience was 
the concerted attempt to “smuggle” into Irish culture the continuity it lacked through 
mythic accounts of Ireland as “the oldest nation in Europe,” a response, as shown 
above, that was also inspired by volk theories.118 In the absence of a stable present, 
nationalist leaders set about finding this stability in an idealized past. 
 
By means of a mythological repetition of the ‘past,’ the nationalist 
leaders, it may be argued, sought to redeem Ireland. Incarcerated in a 
history of colonial oppression, the evangelists of the Provisional Republic 
appealed to a prehistorical mythic power whereby their present paralysis 
might be miraculously transcended. By repeating the names and deeds of 
the ancient heroes and martyrs of Erin they sought to revive her sacred 
destiny. The only way to redeem the nation seemed to be the negation of 
present history in favour of some Holy Beginning, some eternally 
recurring Past.119 
 
But there were other less clear but equally influential developments in Irish culture 
that had a powerful role in defining the nature of Irish heroism. In attempting to forge 
a communal Irish experience, Lady Gregory offered an insight into Irish responses to 
this attritional history, pointing out that the (true) Irish poet was “in touch with a 
people … whose heroes have been the failures … who went out to a battle that was 
already lost.’”120 
This experience of history makes absurd the figure of the all-conquering hero, 
exposing all too easily such fantasies as delusions, and eventually rendering such 
triumphalism inappropriate. As such, the heroic paradigm in Ireland shifts at the 
hands of the Irish writer towards a “dark” and “tragic” man, who is constantly 
thwarted. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Deane, Celtic Revivals,10, 12. 
118 Gibbons, Transformations in Irish Culture, 137. 
119 Richard Kearney, Transitions: Narratives in Modern Irish Culture (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press), 212-13. 
120 Lady Gregory, “The Felons of our Land” in The Field Day Anthology of Irish Writing, vol. 
5: Irish Women’s Writings and Traditions, ed. Angela Bourke, et al (New York: NYU Press, 
2002), 1079. 
	   60	  
[E]xternal forces . . . frustrate his intentions and overturn his 
accomplishments. Material victories prove ephemeral and sometimes lead 
to the complete ruin of the person who has relied on action; but more 
often, ‘too good for this world,’ he gains a moral victory in his loss. The 
external defeat necessary to define his heroism also confirms the 
superiority of his inner qualities: simplicity, innocence, disciplined pride, 
spiritual intuition, and the capacity for transcendent vision. The literary 
hero, like the Irish artists in their society, cultivates failure and frustration 
as an essential part of his experience, or else he withdraws completely 
from action.121 
 
The material/spiritual dichotomy is hoisted as a weapon against English discourses of 
superiority, whose constant and ongoing material victory over Ireland is converted 
into a spiritual victory for Ireland. Defeat is thus figured as a form of spiritual 
development; while England accrues material success—in wealth, land, power—
Ireland accrues an ever-deeper sense of spiritual ascendancy, “a spiritual power 
greater in its way than British national might.”122 By an act of perspectival magic, the 
central distress of Irish experience is thus converted into its greatest strength and 
consolation. If it was the volk destiny of the Irish people to be defeated materially, so 
was it their destiny to be the eternal victors of the spirit. 
It is into these discourses of Irish superiority through inferiority that Joyce 
writes his Trieste articles and lectures, not merely as a voice of derision, but as a 
product of a similar set of cultural conditions. For Joyce’s writings make clear that he 
was particularly sensitive to this notion of history as an oppressive category, a 
reminder of endless failures. But the conversion of abject failure into resounding 
success by nothing more than a change of perspective appeared to him a mystification 
of reality. As Dominic Manganiello has put it, quoting Joyce’s own words, “Joyce 
insisted that we must accept life ‘as we see it before our eyes, men and women as we 
meet them in the real world, not as we apprehend them in the world of faery’.”123 
This emphasis somewhat overlooks Joyce’s commitment to an understanding of 
history guided by “speculative rather than positivistic methodologies.” He preferred 
“postulations of unconscious and irrational motors behind temporal occurrences and 
cultural developments rather than the operations of immutable laws or a rational or 
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purposive Providence.”124 Nevertheless we can say that when it came to Irish affairs 
Joyce was acutely sensitive to a form of mystification as consolation. Accepting the 
world “as we see it before our eyes” is not a question of veridical accuracy, but a 
desire to expose, even foreground the lowest and most contemptible aspects of 
existence, to lean towards pessimism as a route to honesty—not truth, which as a 
concept plays into the hands of oppressive and restrictive power discourses, but 
honesty, which resists consolation on the national level. Consolatory discourses 
should be valued only if they promote forward motion. As Oliver MacDonagh has put 
it, 
 
a past seen in terms of subjection and struggle, seen as a pageant or 
tournament of heroic defeat, is one of the roads towards fundamental 
distrust of or even disbelief in achievement . . . . [I]t is true that the 
characteristic Irish time-frame inclines Irishmen to a repetitive view of 
history and that such a view inclines them—perhaps in defensive 
wariness and from fear of failure—to prize the moral as against the 
actual, and the bearing of witness against success.125 
 
Joyce calls on his country in “Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages”126 to break with its 
history and be “finished once and for all with failures.” He does not mean merely that 
Ireland should stop failing—such advice would be hard to put into action—but that 
Irish cultural discourse should stop constructing failure as a good, stop seeking out 
failure as a end, and stop recalling the long history of past failures as if to legitimate 
the present. He ends resignedly, “I for one, am certain not to see the curtain rise, as I 
shall have already taken the last tram home” (OCPW, 126).  
The concept of the volk is inherent within the Trieste articles about Ireland, 
which posit the Irish tendency to betray as being the main motivating force (for the 
worse) in Irish history. Rather than a destiny of spiritual ascendancy, the Irish 
volkgeist is thus described in terms that are intrinsically resistant to conversion into 
virtues. Whether it is the treatment of Parnell first by his party and then his people, or 
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the smaller betrayals that lead Joyce to claim that “in Ireland . . . an informer always 
appears,” the will or urge to betray—oneself, one’s nation, one’s friends, etc—
becomes the only regularly defining Irish characteristic in Joyce’s work. If I am right 
in suggesting that the revivalist image of Irish history negotiates a space between two 
versions of the volk discourses of the nineteenth century—one stating that the Irish 
people suffer at the hands of oppressive forces that are too great for them to 
overcome, but are made spiritually superior as a result; and the other that only 
through a return to a more genuine Irish character can Ireland rediscover its destiny—
then we can understand Joyce’s use of these discourses in the Trieste articles as more 
tactical than is usually accepted. The betrayal narrative works to undermine the volk 
discourse from within. In conjunction with his more sober claims against the 
possibility of describing Ireland in ethnic terms (in “Saints and Sages”) the betrayal 
narrative satirizes the whole conception of the volkgeist as a meaningful description 
of the nation. The only thing in which the Irish character is united, he suggests, is its 
greatest ignominy, thus eradicating the possibility of a spiritual heroism born out of a 
failure that, far from being laudable, is here described as emerging precisely out of a 
failure of spiritual heroism. The two strands of the Irish response to the volk 
discourses of the nineteenth century come together here in the form of a narrative that 
purports to accept its premises but deny its conclusions.  
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Chapter Two: Betrayal in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
 
The “thrill” of the “spoken word:” The language of betrayal 
During Christmas dinner, shortly after Parnell’s death from exhaustion in 
October 1891, Stephen looks on confused as his father Simon—ably assisted by his 
friend Mr Casey—engages in an increasingly bitter and vociferous argument with 
Stephen’s aunt Dante. They are split over the role of the Catholic Church in Ireland, 
particularly regarding Parnell’s fall from power and grace (several prominent bishops 
and many local priests had campaigned against him on the moral grounds that a man 
who had carried on a long term relationship with a married woman was not fit to lead 
Catholic Ireland). Simon, no longer able to control himself, explodes into a rhetorical 
account of the many wrongs done to Ireland by the Catholic priesthood. 
 
Didn’t the bishops of Ireland betray us in the time of the union when 
Bishop Lanigan presented an address of loyalty to the Marquess 
Cornwallis? Didn’t the bishops and priests sell the aspirations of their 
country in 1829 in return for catholic emancipation? Didn’t they 
denounce the fenian movement from the pulpit and in the confession box? 
And didn’t they dishonour the ashes of Terence Bellew MacManus? 
(P, 43-4) 
 
Simon reels off a litany of offences against the Church that was fairly typical in the 
aftermath of Parnell’s fall from power.127 More interesting than the content of 
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Simon’s speech is the specific effect it has on the young Stephen, who only partially 
understands the argument taking place. “His face was glowing with anger and 
Stephen felt the glow rise to his own cheek as the spoken words thrilled him” (P, 44. 
Italics mine.). Stephen does not respond so much to the historical or even rhetorical 
content, of which he struggles to make sense (“Who was right then?” [P, 40]), but to 
the rhetorical form in which this content is delivered: the “thrill” of the “spoken 
words.” Language properly arranged and passionately delivered: these are the 
components of Stephen’s early inculcation into Irish politics. It is anaphora and 
erotema not argument that wins the day.	  
Long before he is capable of constructing an involved political consciousness, 
Stephen is marked out as an anti-Church Parnellite by his emotional responses to the 
narratives, tropes, and language that constitute his father’s bitter lament. His thoughts 
are confused and conflicted, but his aesthetic sense is less easily muddled. Stephen is 
marked out, more properly, by an inclination towards a certain kind of language, a 
certain kind of heroic martyrdom, and a certain kind of dramatic narrative. The flush 
of his cheeks—which, though inspired by language and speech, is importantly non-
verbal—cannot lie. Even when Stephen attempts to apply his Jesuit logic to the 
sudden dichotomy he is presented with—the Church or Parnell?—his thoughts 
devolve inevitably into a judgement based on a purely imaginary and empathic 
image. 
 
Who was right then? And he remembered the evening in the infirmary in 
Clongowes, the dark waters, the light at the pierhead and the moan of 
sorrow from the people when they had heard. 
(P, 40) 
 
The image Stephen recalls refers to the arrival of Parnell’s corpse to be buried in 
Ireland. But of course, Stephen was not there; he remembers instead a fever dream he 
had while lying sick in the infirmary in Clongowes. Steeping in his sense of ill-use 
(he was pushed into slimy water by Wells) and the satisfaction of his moral 
superiority (he refuses to “peach”), Stephen takes great satisfaction in envisioning the 
mourners at his own funeral. This image then slips seductively into a vision of the 
crowds hearing news of Parnell’s death. The “real,” the solid, the mundane is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
would fragment into ineffectualness. The fallow decades following Parnell’s death fuelled 
much of the Parnellite mourning Joyce captures in Simon Dedalus. 
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surpassed by the emotive power of the fictional, which Stephen experiences as 
profoundly and improbably personal. When Dante says “hotly” that Stephen will 
“remember all this when he grows up . . . the language he heard against God and 
religion and priests in his own home,” the comment is doubly ironic (P, 42). Firstly 
because Dante’s prediction will backfire as Stephen grows up to be firmly set against 
the values she stands for, and, secondly, because it is precisely the “language he 
heard” that will remain most powerfully with Stephen. It is the drama of Parnell’s 
fall, rather than the political realities of his rise, that enchants Stephen. 
 
Narrativizing the self, narrativizing betrayal 
Stephen’s acute and developing sense of the “beautiful” or beguiling latches on 
to betrayal and martyrdom as nexus points for a literature rich in tragedy and high in 
emotional content. To put it simply, Joyce makes clear throughout Portrait that 
Stephen’s “tastes” lean heavily towards a literature formed in betrayal and 
martyrdom. When Stephen envisages his own death wrapped up in Parnell’s, he is 
drawn above all to the beauty of the imagery of tragic death and drawn similarly to 
the possibility for envisioning his own life in such terms.  
 
He wanted to cry quietly but not for himself: for the words, so beautiful 
and sad, like music. The bell! The bell! Farewell! O farewell! 
(P, 26) 
 
For Stephen the language of tragedy is so beguiling that he is driven to desire his own 
dramatization; he wishes to be made both more and less than real through language—
language made beautiful. It cannot be a coincidence that Stephen’s fever-dream 
represents some of the most quietly crisp and poignant language in the novel. Portrait 
appears, moreover, to respond consciously to its own status as arranged narrative (i.e. 
a novel). It opens, after all, with Stephen embedded in another narrative altogether: “a 
moocow [coming] down along the road” (P, 1) From this point on, Stephen will fit 
himself into different developmental narratives as he seeks one by which he can 
finally find satisfaction. Stephen simply does not know how to live without a sense of 
enclosed narrative momentum to give shape to the quotidian chaos of his life. 
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There is a long though not always distinguished strain in Joyce studies (the 
“lunatic fringe”)128 that seeks to understand Portrait and Ulysses (even Exiles and 
Finnegans Wake) as having emerged from the pen of Stephen Dedalus himself. Max 
Saunders has offered the most recent and most sustained construction of this position, 
suggesting that Portrait is “an entirely fictionally authored book . . . a book not only 
including Stephen’s writing, but possibly entirely written by him.”129 Saunders is 
understandably cautious in making this claim—“possibly” and “perhaps” repeat 
throughout the chapters—and ultimately the results of his arguments are more 
suggestive than convincing. But that such conceptual contortions have appeared 
necessary to critics down the years is telling about the pressures Joyce’s 
autobiographical fiction puts on the analytical reader. More precisely, this strain of 
criticism seems to be responding to pressures of narrativization that are present within 
the texts themselves. So much weight is placed on Stephen’s attempts to find a way to 
adequately narrate his life that Portrait comes to be seen as precisely that 
narrativization. As will become clear as the chapter progresses, I see such a step as 
unnecessary and erroneous. Joyce is in control of a fiction that keeps an ironic and 
knowing awareness of Stephen’s role in his own self-making. Portrait, rather than 
Stephen’s self-validating account, is an account of self-validation. It is a narrative 
about narrativization, a story about Stephen’s growing ability to tell stories about 
himself. As I will suggest, Portrait maintains a distance from Stephen’s 
narrativizations even as it insists on their necessity. 
I have spoken already about the introduction to the workings of the narratives 
of betrayal Joyce received at his father’s side. In Portrait, Stephen is similarly 
introduced to betrayal in this way as Joyce offers an account of the processes by 
which such a narrative could take root in an impressionable mind. On the night of yet 
another family move—on this occasion, from Blackrock to more humble 
accommodation in Dublin—Stephen sits “on a footstool beside his father” who, 
evidently feeling sorry for himself, begins “a long and incoherent monologue.” There 
is no direct quotation and, since Stephen understands “little or none of it” we are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Max Saunders, Self-Impression: Life-Writing, Autobiografiction, and the Forms of 
Modern Literature (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 315. 
129 Saunders, Self-Impression, 299. This is the first place Saunders makes this claim, but it is 
the general thrust of his argument throughout chapters seven and eight of the book (291-370). 
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privy only to Stephen’s response to his father’s words. He becomes “slowly aware 
that his father had enemies and that some fight was going to take place” (P, 77). Just 
as at the Christmas dinner table, Stephen responds not to his father’s logical 
argument, but to a dramatic or narrative appeal. His father’s enemies are necessarily 
vague (for they are non-existent), but to disbelieve his father at this point would 
represent a significant break with that authority, a (painful) acknowledgement that the 
father is capable either of significant error or falsehood. It is unsurprising then, that 
Stephen should accept his father’s garbled explanation for his struggles, since 
invested in this belief is, essentially, the entire status of his father as paternal 
authority. Loyalty to the father (the maintenance of a “natural” bond between them 
that is increasingly under threat as Stephen matures) becomes deeply intertwined with 
the observation of Simon’s semi-mystical narratives of persecution and betrayal. 
Stephen accepts his father’s narrative as a description of the world, but he also 
feels “that he [is] being enlisted for the fight, that some duty was being laid upon his 
shoulders.” His heart becomes “heavy” and he has “an intuition, a foreknowledge of 
the future” (P, 78). Stephen is not just made aware of the purported plots against his 
father, he is drawn into the conflict that they represent. His experience of himself as a 
product of a primary filial relationship is also an experience of himself as destined to 
be betrayed and persecuted. More importantly, Stephen’s growing sense of himself as 
possessing a destiny is also tied up with the battle he will have to undergo against 
those forces. Little does Simon know in this moment that he is shaping his son’s 
sense of reality, that in the future Stephen will pay more heed to his own readings of 
malevolence behind events than to the events themselves. Many years later, Stephen 
tells Cranly that he “imagine[s] that there is a malevolent reality behind those things” 
he fears (P, 304). “[R]eality,” for Stephen, becomes that thing “behind” the thing 
itself. Because this reality is unknowable through the senses, the space of the 
imagination is given full speculative reign.130 
It is remarkable how many of the moments of closeness between Stephen and 
Simon, and between Joyce and John Stanislaus, relied on or drew upon betrayal and 
persecution for their bonding power. As well as the episodes that Joyce drew on for 
his fiction (such as those already described) Joyce displayed an insistent desire to 
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move John Stanislaus to the centre of his decision to leave Ireland. Ellmann gives a 
brief account of Joyce’s surprising amendments to the proofs of Gorman’s biography 
in the wake of John Stanislaus’s death. “Mr. Joyce’s father (this should be inserted 
somewhere) was coming to the conclusion that his son’s literary intransigence was up 
against an insurmountable barrier in reactionary Dublin and in fact later advised him 
to seek a freer atmosphere in which to live and work according to his own ideas.” 
When Gorman wrote a rhetorical question, “Of whom was he the spiritual son and 
where would he find the Mystical Father?” Joyce inserted with evident impatience, 
“His spiritual father is Europe, to which his natural father constantly urged him to 
go.”131 The insertions are remarkable, if only because they divert so far from what 
actually happened. In contrast, in the last interaction Stephen has with his father, 
Simon asks why “he did not join a rowing club” and tells Stephen he “wants [him] to 
read law” (P, 250). Joyce, similarly, was encouraged to stay in Ireland to study law, 
not to “seek a freer atmosphere” to think, to write, or to otherwise. But Joyce, 
particularly in the months after his father’s death, sought a reconnection that, since it 
could no longer happen in life, must happen in text. To do this he reversed the silent 
agreement through which he has Stephen enlisted into his father’s battles, and 
retrospectively enlists his father into his own. Simon’s declaration in Portrait, “We’re 
not dead yet, sonny,” haunts, not unpleasantly, this act of filial recuperation. 
 
“The end he had been born to serve” 
In Stephen, Joyce offers an account of how a young mind might turn towards 
betrayal. But rather than observe this turn as a quirk of character, Joyce establishes 
Stephen’s self-narrativization through betrayal as key to his artistic development. The 
degree to which Stephen can develop into an artist at all is seen to be determined by 
his capacity to narrate himself through betrayal. To understand this better, we must 
consider first the kinds of development privileged by the Künstlerroman in general 
and by Portrait in particular. For both the Bildungsroman and Künstlerroman, the 
telos of the novel is relatively clear: the, usually eponymous, protagonist is headed 
always towards some special state of freedom, morality, insight, or ability that gives 
all the events of his/her life significance. As a form concerned with the “Bildung,” or 
formation, of a protagonist, there is always a final “form” towards which the novel is 
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directed; the bildungsroman charts a difficult process of making, but the end of that 
process is usually not in doubt. For the reader of Portrait, this sense of forward 
motion is provided not only by the generic expectations of the Künstlerroman but by 
the title of the novel. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man posits the existence of 
an artist as an old(er) man whose early life this novel depicts. Even if one wants to 
retain an ironic distance from Stephen’s journey—or to hold off on making 
judgements about the nature and extent of his development until the end of the 
novel—one is propelled unavoidably along by this sense of expectation.  
But while Stephen’s destiny appears at times to be the central donnée of the 
novel, for Stephen himself, this sense of narrative destiny must be constantly 
constructed, adjusted, and supported through a process of adaptive self-narration. 
While the reader of Portrait can be fairly certain that all the events recounted in the 
novel contribute in some way towards a narratively satisfying conclusion, Stephen 
must live his life with no clear sense of the significance of any given event.132 This 
uncertainty appears to be deeply uncomfortable for Stephen, who is caught always 
between the grandiosity of his aspiration and the modesty of his quotidian reality. It is 
for this reason that Stephen is so eager to manufacture some of the narrative certainty 
that the reader takes for granted. Take, for example, the period of elation into which 
he enters shortly after receiving the good news that he has been accepted to “The 
University!” (P, 165). His nerves had clearly been frayed, as “for a full hour he had 
paced up and down, waiting.” He paced “from the gate of Clontarf chapel to the door 
of Byron’s public-house and then back again to the chapel and then back to the 
public-house” where his father had entered with “Dan Crosby, the tutor, to find out 
something about the university” (P, 164). Upon receiving the good news, the second 
thing Stephen does (I will discuss the first a little later) is to enter this new 
information into an ongoing narrative that, though it is unfolding unpredictably, has a 
definite sense of direction.  
 
The end he had been born to serve yet did not see had led him to escape 
by an unseen path and now it beckoned to him once more and a new 
adventure was about to be opened to him. 
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(P, 165) 
 
In short, Stephen prefers the consoling certainty of the Künstlerroman—which 
transmutes insignificant event into potentially significant narrative—to the 
overwhelming uncertainty of life as lived. As such, he attempts to turn his own life 
into literary narrative. The road remains uncertain—an “unseen path”—and the 
destination unclear, but in claiming for himself a narrative, Stephen can transform 
hardships into “challenges” to be “overcome.” In completing one task, he is given 
access to the next stage of his narrative, “a new adventure.” 
 
Betrayal and the Joycean “family romance” 
I focused above on the sense of direction Stephen’s self-narratives provide. But 
perhaps more important than the rather vague destination (destiny) this narrative 
posits is what this narrative attempts to leave behind. Stephen constructs a loaded 
conception of “boyhood” or “childhood” that seems to bear the brunt of this load. In 
the scene described above, the narrator suggests that “he had passed beyond the 
challenge of the sentries who had stood as guardians of his boyhood” (P, 165). This is 
not merely those who guarded him when he was a boy, but those who sought to keep 
him, metaphorically, youthful; by seeking to keep him as a child these guardians are 
attempting to resist his entry into the maturity that his narrative demands. Thus, these 
“guardians” are seen as resisting the telos of the Bildungsroman itself. The “mists of 
childhood and boyhood” are constructed as a time of dangerous fragility through 
which Stephen has passed only because his destiny has more narrative force behind it 
than those that seek to resist it: “the end he had been born to serve and had been 
following” (P, 169). Rather than just the time before adulthood, “boyhood” is seen as 
an artificially maintained state of ignorance through which the repressive forces of 
authority maintain control. The entry into maturity that Stephen sees himself 
accomplishing is seen then as the defining battle for the aspiring artist in Ireland: 
“Where was his boyhood now? Where was the soul that had hung back from her 
destiny” (P, 171).  
But this notion of boyhood remains rather vague. To understand what exactly 
Stephen means by his “boyhood” in Portrait—and why it takes on such a negative 
connotation—it is worth considering the idea in relation to Freud’s discussion in 
“Family Romances” of the “formation” of functioning individuals. In this account, 
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the child develops individuality and independence through a series of breaks with the 
family—it is this focus on severance in Freud that makes it such a fitting comparison 
to Joyce’s construction of maturity in Portrait and later Ulysses. The development of 
Stephen into an artist-hero (at least, an artist-hero-in-the-making) is not of a different 
sort but of a different intensity to the development of any other child. We can trace in 
Portrait, with surprising ease, the events that Freud describes as necessary to the 
development of the individual in relation to its parents. The book opens with Stephen 
as a small child, literally dancing to the tune his mother plays for him, spouting 
information gathered from his parents, who are, in Freud’s terms, Stephen’s “first and 
only authority.”133 His desire to marry the protestant Eileen Vance when he grows up, 
while it points towards his later willingness to break taboos, is nevertheless an 
attempt to replicate, to become, his parents—“the most intense desire of these early 
years”.134 Later, Stephen is sent off to school with the advice of his parents circling in 
his mind—his mother’s warning “not to speak with the rough boys in the college” 
and his father’s advice “never to peach on a fellow” (P, 7). But the central events of 
this early section all require Stephen to engage, confusedly and therefore painfully, 
with both these parental instructions. Indeed, it is the necessity of engaging critically 
with this vague yet absolute command that enables and drives the development of 
individuality in these terms. Respectively, his decisions not to “peach” on Wells, who 
pushed him in a ditch, and to go to Father Conmee when he is unfairly punished by 
Father Arnall are both preceded by pages of worried analysis and equivocation. 
Lacking the security of his parents’ authority, Stephen has to construct a moral world 
built on the few words of instruction he has been given. As a result, his father’s 
authority is not directly challenged, but in practising a kind of investigative, creative 
morality, the young Stephen enters into a form of proto-individuality whereby that 
authority may come to be understood as provisional. The absolute authority of the 
parent becomes suddenly and irrevocably contingent. 
The profundity of this moment in the development of Stephen as an individual 
can easily be overlooked, given the light comedy these scenes contain. But while the 
affair is comical, it is also fundamental to the development of individual character. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Sigmund Freud, “Family Romance,” The Penguin Freud Reader, ed. Adam Phillips 
(London: Penguin, 2006), 422. 
134 Freud, “Family Romance,” 422. 
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From this moment on, Stephen’s story will alternate between the taking on and 
casting off of various sources of authority (the parent, the church, the university) until 
his advanced individuality, his refusal of all external authority, comes to be the 
feature by which he defines himself. This is an important point, for, whereas in a 
normal child the “separation of the individual . . . from the authority of the parents” is 
only a matter of developing basic individuality (a sense of the self as separate from 
the mother and other “others”), in the narrative of the developing artist, this forging 
of individuality takes on a far greater symbolic importance. If Stephen is to become 
the artist-hero, “forging the conscience of his race,” he must first make the 
acknowledgement of the contingency of external authority a conscious and performed 
constituent of his character. The “normal” child experiences the degrading of their 
parents’ authority as a series of traumatic events (as does Stephen), but s/he soon 
seeks out new sources of authority to fill the void left by the parents, rarely 
acknowledging on a conscious level that any change has occurred. Stephen, by 
contrast, moves through different forms of authority only to cast them off, gradually 
developing to the point where this rejection of authority is performed as a conscious 
(and self-conscious) act. 
Patrick Parrinder first suggested Freud’s “Family Romances” as a model for 
understanding Stephen’s development in Portrait thirty years ago. But whereas 
Parrinder treats Stephen as undergoing a rather textbook search for “fantasy-
compensation for the inadequacies of the actual family,” Stephen’s development is 
anything but typical. Portrait takes the logic of development encoded within the 
family romance and makes it the defining, problematic feature of Stephen’s artistic 
becoming.135 Severance from the family is seen then as necessary for the achievement 
of individual authority (freedom) in the Freudian sense, but it also acts as the ultimate 
metaphor for communal authority, what Said refers to as “filiation.”136 As Bradley 
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Buchanan has suggested, “Joyce’s early fiction posits individuation from the mother, 
a severance of all possible incestuous bonds, as the key to attaining full human 
status.”137 Joyce goes further than Parrinder allows in that Stephen does not merely 
break with parental authority—a negotiation that allows for the production of an 
amended, mature bond—but constructs severance as an ultimate, though problematic 
good.138  
I suggested earlier that the second thing Stephen does upon finding out that he 
has been accepted to the University is to work this information into an ongoing self-
narrativization. Before he does this, however, his first thought is to use this new 
development to enact a partial, temporary break with his family.  
 
[H]is mother was hostile to the idea [of his attending university], as he 
had read from her silence. Yet her mistrust pricked him more keenly than 
his father’s pride . . . . A dim antagonism gathered force within him and 
darkened his mind as a cloud against her disloyalty and when it passed, 
cloud-like, leaving his mind serene and dutiful towards her again, he was 
made aware dimly and without regret of a first noiseless sundering of 
their lives. 
(P, 164-65, emphasis mine) 
 
Where I have been talking about “severance,” Stephen thinks here in terms of 
“sundering,” but the effect is broadly the same. Stephen is making a clear equation at 
this point between his own self-making—his narrative forward motion—and a break 
with his mother. We start too to see the role that betrayal plays in this process: 
Stephen’s mother is “disloyal” for desiring something other than the imagined good 
he desires for himself. This conflict is inevitable, since what Stephen’s mother desires  
most is the maintenance of their filial bond and what Stephen desires most is to 
loosen or break that bond. An overlooked element of the amor matris that will haunt 
Stephen in Ulysses is that mother love, as the “one true thing in life”—counter to the 
“legal fiction” that is “paternity”— cannot be easily shifted into another form. In 
Ulysses it is seen to have a rigid, non-contingent reality. There is no compromise 
available between Stephen’s position and May Dedalus’s; the bond either survives in 
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its current form (even if that survival is bitter, hateful, and distant), or it is rejected 
wholesale. 
Stephen’s construction is therefore telling, since it establishes a form of “bad 
faith” in the family relationship that will, ultimately, excuse his own disloyalty, his 
decision to reject his biological heritage in favour of a narrative destiny built on a 
metaphorical heritage (Daedalus). While one may “dedicate” or “commit” oneself to 
a friendship, a cause, or lover, the amor matris is seen to precede one’s existence as a 
being capable of consciousness. One is committed to the bond before one is able to 
make that commitment; it is not volitional, but it is binding. This counters the logic of 
development we find in Freud, where the parent is made contingent when the child 
imagines an alternative, “true” genealogy for themselves. But Stephen does not do 
this here. He accepts the reality of the maternal bond, but seeks to break it in another, 
more difficult and, ultimately, more painful way. 
Though Freud does not use the term himself, we can see his construction of the 
family romance as a series of what Joyce would recognize as minor betrayals. In the 
early stages of development, the child experiences an apparently immanent 
connection with the mother, whose singular love is not questioned. But as the child 
emerges into consciousness of itself, s/he is faced with the knowledge that this 
immanence is false; the mother loves others—the father, other children—in a way 
that does not include, and is inaccessible to, the child. While this experience of 
sudden severance is necessary, since it makes the child aware that they are, on a 
fundamental level, an individual, it is nevertheless extremely painful. The alternative 
genealogies the child constructs are ultimately, Freud suggests, an attempt to 
“preserve, under a slight disguise, the child’s original affection for the parents” in the 
form of fantasized personages better able to live up to the impossible demands the 
child places upon them.139 But these narratives also shield the child from the deep-
ridden guilt that arises from their attempt to distance themselves from the primary 
filial bond: the family. These bonds come into being at the moment of birth (perhaps 
earlier) and bring with them a historical chain of associated responsibilities that 
stretch back into antiquity. In moving him or herself into another imagined family, 
the child can, temporarily and symbolically, cancel their inherited (non-elective) 
responsibilities to the genealogical family. Since the child’s responsibilities to its 
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parents appear contingent, his/her attempt to leave that family behind are made less 
painful. In Portrait, Joyce dramatizes Stephen’s growing awareness of these 
pressures, but in insisting on complete, conscious severance from the family, he does 
not allow Stephen the easy consolation of an imagined family. Stephen can feel 
“hardly of one blood” with his family, a “fosterchild,” but, ultimately, he knows that 
he feels alienated not from his own family, but from family itself (P, 98). 
 
“Boyhood” as “death” 
Before attempting to understand how Stephen’s understanding of the logic of 
betrayal works as a consolatory narrative in Portrait, I wish to consider how and why 
complete severance from the family comes to be seen as necessary. Rather than 
seeing Stephen as aggressively opposed to family life—as constitutionally disgusted 
by its comforts—we need to understand the role that family comes to play for him as 
the central repository for social stagnation. It is not that Stephen is immune to the 
appeal of a loving family, but that in this comfort he sees also a form of spiritual 
“death” counter to the “life” it is his destiny to seek. Stephen’s conflation of boyhood 
with death is connected with, though may not proceed from, his understanding of 
social conformity (obedience to external authority) as the prime source of Irish 
stagnation (on a national and individual level). In this sense, Ireland taken as a whole 
is caught in an unending childhood that Stephen seeks to mature beyond. They are 
“the dead” in that they are immune to (and antagonistic towards) the “call of life” that 
he hopes will mark his “deliverance” from “the world of duties and despair” (P, 170). 
The life Stephen yearns for is conceived of as a kind of radical creativity and freedom 
envisaged in opposition to conformity and social observance. But Stephen’s pursuit 
of this life also relies on being freed of the duties (bonds of responsibility) that come 
with filial social ties. Life, taken as a self-evident good, is seen then to require a break 
with filial ties; individuality (“full humanity”) is seen to require a rejection of 
communality (severance through an extended form of the family romance); and 
creativity (the ability to produce things of worth) requires an access to “life” mediated 
only by the individuality achieved by those methods. Before leaving for Paris, 
Stephen writes in his journal that he would “[l]et the dead bury the dead. Ay. And let 
the dead marry the dead” (P, 248). Dead Dubliners marry dead Dubliners while 
mourning other dead Dubliners. In replicating the structures of society and family 
that constrain them, these Dubliners merely reinforce their own servitude. The self-
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imposed exile from Ireland towards which Stephen narrates himself is constructed 
also as an exile from presiding structures of community and morality. Where Padraic 
Pearse found revolutionary potential in the legacy of the heroic dead—“life springs 
from death and from the graves of patriot men and women spring living waters”—
Stephen finds, ultimately, only a self-replicating stagnation. If Stephen must abandon 
the family to achieve maturity, he must abandon also the nation, which is merely an 
extension of that family. 
 
“Is the mind of youth medieval that it is so divining of intrigue?” 
One of the further benefits of the family romance as a model for Stephen’s 
developmental struggle in Portrait is that it keeps always in mind that the child’s 
severance from the family is painful (an acknowledgement of profound loss), anxious 
(a response to an uncertain new world emerging from that loss), and ridden by guilt 
(the child reads their own desire for severance as a betrayal, disloyalty). As I have 
said, the “romances” the child contrives are specifically formulated to lessen these 
discomforts. Since Stephen breaks not only with his family, but with filiation 
altogether, he requires a consoling narrative of a different sort. In betrayal, towards 
which he is already predisposed, Stephen finds a way to justify his extreme 
severance, while assuaging the powerful sense of guilt that this brings with it. We 
have already seen some of this in Stephen’s “first noiseless sundering” with his 
mother. As I suggested in the previous chapter, betrayal was useful to Joyce since it 
allowed him to encode a large number of specific criticisms of Ireland into a form 
that was still narratively satisfying. While in his non-fiction, betrayal offered a way of 
maintaining his principled exile, in Portrait it offers Stephen the route to that exile. 
The clearest example of Stephen’s reliance on betrayal comes in his final 
sundering, a moment of decision that convinces him the time has come to leave 
Dublin. J. F. Byrne, who would form the basis for Cranly in Portrait and Ulysses, had 
been an acquaintance of Joyce’s since their time at Belvedere, and fast friends since 
Joyce joined Byrne at University College Dublin—as Byrne put it: Joyce “cleave[d] 
to me.”140 Their friendship blossomed after Joyce published his article on Ibsen. 
Joyce's “relationship with his few associates,” Byrne suggests, “became impaired by 
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either their jealousy or sycophancy; and so it happened that Joyce was forced during 
the next couple of years to rely more than ever on me for companionship.”141 Along 
with Stanislaus, Byrne became Joyce’s most trusted confidant in this period, both a 
valued reader of his poetry and an audience for Joyce’s serial confessions, aesthetic 
theories, and self-analyses.142 While Joyce was in Paris, however, Byrne, flushed to 
have received a postcard from Joyce with a newly penned poem on it, bragged to 
Vincent Cosgrave that “no man in Dublin knew more about Joyce than he did.” 
Cosgrave, relishing the opportunity, brought out his own postcard from Joyce—this 
one containing salacious details about Paris prostitutes—and said, “Perhaps that’s 
something you didn’t know.” Embarrassed at his own behaviour, disappointed in 
Joyce’s crudity, or hurt that Joyce should confide in someone other than himself, 
Byrne handed over his postcard to Cosgrave with a brusque, “You can have this one, 
too.”143 Byrne was cool with Joyce on his return from Paris and their relationship, so 
close beforehand, never recovered. Surprised by the sudden breakdown, Joyce 
searched “in vain for any foundation [for] his feeling that Byrne’s change in attitude 
towards him was a betrayal.”144 But rather than dissuade him, this failure imbued the 
event with an even greater significance. Joyce’s suspicions were more troubling for 
not being fully confirmed and thus fully known (certainty is a more peaceful state 
than uncertainty, as we will see in Exiles) and Byrne’s change towards him would 
later seem to him but the first of many times that “this brusque and unexplained 
[change of] attitude of certain admirers” towards him would occur.145  
Ellmann’s conviction that Joyce failed in his attempts to transfigure Byrne’s 
actions into an act of betrayal can only be meant locally. On 24 August 1904 (a little 
over a year later), Joyce wrote to Nora: “When I was younger I had a friend to whom 
I gave myself freely—in a way more than I give to you and in a way less. He was 
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Irish, that is to say, he was false to me.”146 Any blame Joyce felt for the breakup of 
his relationship with Byrne is deflected away and transfigured into an indictment 
against both his friend and Ireland. As we will see most clearly in Exiles, for Joyce, to 
give oneself “freely” is to give someone else power over you. If this relationship is 
properly formed, then each is dedicated to the other, each open to harm by the other’s 
hand. For Joyce, embracing this risk—presented as the greatest of all risks, for it aims 
for the complete exposure of the self to another (an “other”)—is either the ultimate 
expression of human love (romantic or platonic) or human stupidity. Implicit within 
any such relationship is the possibility that the other (who is always a threat because 
always unknowable) may take advantage of your vulnerability—that they will betray 
you. This is part of what Stanislaus meant when he referred to Joyce’s interest in the 
“tragedy of dedication and betrayal.” I want to see Joyce’s transfiguration of the 
breakdown of his relationship with Byrne not, as Ellmann appears to do, as yet more 
evidence of Joyce’s delusional self-importance. Rather it is a testament, first, to the 
importance he placed on this relationship, and, second, to the centrality of the 
mechanics of betrayal to Joyce’s mental machinery. For all that he cultivated a 
willing “isolation,” Joyce relied throughout his life on intense relationships modelled 
on this early one with Byrne. But while Joyce is conscious of his need, or at least his 
desire, for these relationships, he is also acutely conscious of their implicit danger. 
Byrne’s boast that no man knew more about Joyce than he did would have sounded 
uncomfortably to Joyce’s ears. For the more Byrne knew, the more power he had to 
misuse that knowledge, to betray Joyce in the most Irish of senses: to “give him 
away,” to expose him for personal gain. 
Byrne’s “falseness” suggested to Joyce a way of justifying Stephen’s eventual 
flight from Dublin. 
 
Away then: it is time to go. A voice spoke softly to Stephen’s lonely 
heart, bidding him go and telling him that his friendship was coming to an 
end. Yes; he would go. He could not strive against another. He knew his 
part.  
(P, 307) 
 
In shortening his novel from Stephen Hero to Portrait, Joyce chose to present this 
relationship in its final throes only, as if all that mattered was its dissolution and not 
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its formation. As happens throughout Portrait, the beginning prefigures and 
prophesies the end and we are being given hints from our first introduction to Cranly 
that Stephen has reason to be cautious. When we first hear of him he is connected 
with some of the things that Stephen most fears and distrusts. 
 
It was a priest-like face, priest-like in its pallor, in the wide winged nose, 
in the shadowings below the eyes and along the jaws, priest-like in the 
lips that were long and bloodless and faintly smiling; and Stephen, 
remembering swiftly how he had told Cranly of all the tumults and unrest 
and longings in his soul, day after day and night by night, only to be 
answered by his friend’s listening silence, would have told himself that it 
was the face of a guilty priest who heard confessions of those whom he 
had not power to absolve but that he felt again in memory the gaze of its 
dark womanish eyes. 
(P, 219-220) 
 
Priests and women, Stephen has already battled with and thrown off the first and, 
through Cranly’s intervention, will soon be forced to cast off the second. Cranly is 
physically priest-like, but we get the sense that this physical resemblance is more than 
anything else a response to his role as chief confessor for Stephen’s sins. But Cranly 
is not merely a priest, he is a “guilty priest” who cannot or will not fulfil his function 
(absolution). The lack of reciprocity in their relationship—Stephen speaks, Cranly 
listens—becomes threatening. Cranly’s apparent failure to return exposure with 
exposure creates an imbalance in power between the two men. The experience of 
exposure without guarantees of safety—this is the Joycean relationship—becomes 
uncomfortable for Stephen as he comes to see himself as vulnerable to Cranly’s 
moods.  
Experiencing a growing discomfort, Stephen writes himself into a Parnellian 
narrative of betrayal. A dominant force in his social circles, Stephen now complains 
ironically that Cranly is the new “shining light.” His protestations that “I discovered 
him. I protest I did. Shining quietly behind a bushel of Wicklow bran” establish his 
relationship with Cranly as one between the master and his disciple (P, 313).147 In 
Joyce’s writings, the disciple inevitably betrays and supersedes the master, it is a 
narrative law. As Parnell was, in this configuration, betrayed by the lesser Tim Healy, 
so too will Stephen be betrayed and superseded by the lesser Cranly. If Cranly is to 
continue his rise, how else can he do it but by going through Stephen? But since 
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Stephen is primed for this occurrence, he can observe Cranly as he positions himself 
for betrayal. This, at least, is how Stephen sees what is happening (the distinction is 
important). Stephen observes the “slight flush on Cranly’s cheek” that follows his 
greeting to E. C. and wonders whether this would “explain his . . . listless silence, his 
harsh comments, the sudden intrusions of rude speech with which he had shattered so 
often Stephen’s ardent wayward confessions” (P, 289); Cranly is later spotted 
drinking tea with E. C. in “Johnston’s.” Cranly’s “angry” step and “angry abrupt 
gestures,” which appear to be a result of his comical distaste for Temple—Cranly 
chases him off, only half-joking, with Stephen’s ashplant—appear to Stephen to have 
some darker cause and he begins to fear physical violence against himself. As 
Stephen pulls him away, already nearing the point of realization that Cranly’s rise 
must force him to leave Ireland, the “bird call from Siegfried whistled softly followed 
them from the steps of the porch” (P, 297). The operatic allusion suggests betrayal, 
since the bird attempts to warn Siegfried of Mime’s treacherous plans. Siegfried 
triumphs without being able to understand the bird’s warnings, and Stephen similarly 
needs no help in divining his friend’s intentions. Siegfried leaps gaily into battle, but 
Stephen will not “strive against another,” choosing instead to retreat nobly into 
“silence, exile, cunning.” 
Robert Martin Adams has commented, with some exasperation, that “[t]he most 
distinct but illogical betrayer of Stephen Dedalus is Cranly in the Portrait. . . . 
Stephen’s suspicions of betrayal are pretty dimly founded,”148 But this is precisely the 
point. We are not privy to a single piece of evidence for Stephen’s suspicions. Joyce 
carefully deprives us of anything that might confirm Cranly’s bad faith and ill 
intentions. For Adams, this makes Stephen (and perhaps Joyce) appear ridiculous. 
But what he fails to acknowledge is that it is precisely Stephen’s capacity to read 
Cranly as having betrayed him—no matter how inconclusive the evidence—that 
empowers his flight from Dublin. To put it another way, the narrative conclusion of 
the novel—Stephen’s flight from Dublin—cannot come about without Stephen first 
producing the conditions for that narrative himself. What Adams finds so perplexing, 
is that Joyce should not have given us a more convincing vision of betrayal with 
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which to drive Stephen from Ireland. But Portrait is not, ultimately, about the 
betrayals that Stephen suffers, it is about the betrayals he creates.  
One of the major shifts between Stephen Hero and A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man is that in Stephen Hero Joyce cannot resist the temptation to break into 
the narration with “distancing phrase[s]” whenever Stephen’s “uncompromising side  
. . . becomes absurd.”149 So, Stephen is the “fiery-hearted revolutionary” and the 
“heaven-ascending essayist” (SH, 67). Hugh Kenner has astutely observed that we 
find “more and more of these excusing clauses . . . slithering between detachment, 
irony, and anger” as the novel goes on. Whenever Joyce becomes “uncertain of 
Stephen’s convincingness,” one of these phrases appears.150 Joyce certainly appeared 
to worry that his readers would remain unconvinced by Stephen’s propensity to see 
betrayal everywhere he looked, for in both “A Portrait of the Artist” and in Stephen 
Hero he asks: “is the mind of youth medieval that it is so divining of intrigue?” (SH, 
39). Yet Joyce is not making Stephen more believable or relatable; he is merely 
hammering home his own distance from Stephen’s excesses. The effect is to move 
the reader further from Stephen but to let them know they do so with the author’s 
permission. In Portrait, Joyce takes a very different tack. The artist retreats fully into 
the background, “paring his fingernails.” Stephen’s absurd self-narrations are allowed 
to stand or fall on their own merits and the reader is not allowed recall to an authorial 
(an authorized) perspective. By resisting the temptation to remind the reader that 
Joyce can see Stephen’s absurdities, he allows those absurdities a little more room to 
stand or fall on their own merits. Stephen’s ability to “divine intrigue,” rather than 
being killed by a heavy-handed irony, is permitted to justify itself. 
 
“Did he bring his crocodile?” 
Richard Ellmann comments astutely that in Joyce’s “writing more is at stake in 
the friendship of Stephen and Cranly than in the relationship of Stephen and Emma.” 
This focus allows Joyce to make “the theme of broken friendship” represent 
“Stephen’s broken ties with Ireland and the world.”151 Cranly’s betrayal, already 
connected thematically with the betrayal of Parnell by Tim Healy, becomes the final 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Hugh Kenner, “The Portrait in Perspective,” in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: A 
Casebook, 29. 
150 Kenner, “The Portrait in Perspective,” 30-31. 
151 JJ, 116. 
	   82	  
confirmation of a putative Irish tendency that Stephen had railed against to Davin 
earlier in the chapter.  
 
No honourable and sincere man, said Stephen, has given up to you his life 
and his youth and his affections from the days of Tone to those of Parnell, 
but you sold him to the enemy or failed him in need or reviled him and 
left him for another. And you invite me to be one of you. I’d see you 
damned first. 
(P, 252) 
 
The historical force of betrayal that Joyce asserts and describes in his non-fiction is 
available to Stephen as a way of making his exile necessary and narratively 
satisfying. Ireland becomes for Stephen an inherently problematic construction—he 
wishes he could devote himself to it (he longs constantly for the release that devotion 
would provide) but fears it would suffocate him. Whereas betrayal by an individual 
will cause him great harm, the betrayal that his nation has the power to enact upon 
him will stifle his “soul.” Stephen’s famous manifesto—“When the soul of a man is 
born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to 
me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets.” (P, 252)—
embodies his attempt to sever himself completely (and therefore impossibly) from his 
nation. Stephen does not give himself to things half-heartedly. Since he would not be 
subsumed by the Church, he had to break from it completely; since he would not be 
subsumed by his nation, he has to break from it completely—the inevitability of 
betrayal is both a construction that provides the justification for this break and an 
element of the psychological framework that makes this break necessary. 
Joyce once divided the “seven deadly sins” among the nations of Europe—
Ireland’s was “envy” (JJ, 382). While this was largely tongue-in-cheek, it spoke to 
Joyce’s desire to read the history of Ireland as if it were a singularly constituted 
individual possessing a consciousness and motivations, as if it were an “other” into 
which he feared to let himself be subsumed. As the “sow that eats her farrow,” 
Ireland consumes her children through the very stifling processes that Stephen wishes 
to “fly by” (P, 252). Cranly’s role as “priest-like,” “womanish” betrayer emphasizes 
and crystallizes the inevitability of Ireland’s betrayal and reveals him to be a 
particular expression of a general principle. By associating him with the priests, Joyce 
is trying to make concrete the connection between Cranly and those very forces of 
subjection that Stephen is attempting to resist. It is for this reason that Stephen 
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associates Cranly bitterly with the crocodile from Cranly’s own “problem” (“did he 
bring his crocodile?”): “A crocodile seized the child. Mother asked it back. Crocodile 
said all right if she told him what he was going to do with the child, eat it or not eat 
it” (P, 313). The problem is a double-bind; once the crocodile’s malevolent intention 
is set, there is no way that the woman can answer the question that doesn’t result in 
the crocodile eating her child. Cranly is transfigured into the embodiment of this 
restrictive process, a figure for Ireland’s devouring of its children. In Stephen’s 
heightened family romance, he must leave childhood behind altogether, and with it 
the bonds of filiation that childhood represents. 
 
Stephen as Ireland: Figuration, prophesy, and the conflation of the communal 
with the individual 
Towards the end of the Christmas dinner at Bray in which Simon has 
introduced Stephen to the thrill of a certain type of bitter language, Simon laments to 
his friend, Mr Casey, “We are an unfortunate priest-ridden race and always were and 
always will be till the end of the chapter” (Portrait, 42). Mr Dedalus’s choice of 
expression seems unavoidably loaded; its reference to chapters draws attention to the 
fictiveness of the world in which it is expressed, collapsing to some degree the close 
realism of the piece. One of the ways fiction differs from “reality” is that all events 
are truly pre-ordained (you can flip forward in a book to see what is going to happen) 
and it is therefore possible to gesture forward to events that have yet to happen. What 
is for Simon an offhand (though heartfelt) remark can be understood by the reader as 
a strange act of inadvertent prophecy. The Stephen of the first chapter (in which 
Simon’s comment is made) is a pious believer surrounded by Jesuit priests (priest-
ridden?) most of the year at Clongowes, while the second chapter begins with 
Stephen removed from Clongowes and its priests altogether and suddenly lacking in 
“piety” (P, 72)? Joyce seeks to foreground a conflation between the individual 
(Stephen) and the communal (his “race”) that runs problematically throughout 
Portrait. When Simon’s inadvertent prophecy for the Irish race is seen to come true 
in the form of Stephen it is because Stephen represents Ireland. More properly, he 
represents the possibility of Ireland’s transformation; the fact that Stephen has 
escaped the influence of the Church does not have material consequences for the rest 
of Ireland, but in the symbolic space of the novel his personal overcoming gestures 
outwards to the general and the communal. Stephen is not merely a model for other 
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young Irishman, he is made to bear within the symbolically loaded space of the novel 
the burden of representation. He succeeds or fails for Ireland. Given the novel’s 
emphasis on severance, this metaphorical bringing together is important: it allows 
Stephen’s often bitter pursuit of absolute separation to be understood, paradoxically, 
as being for the community he leaves behind. 
Joyce is tapping into a tendency towards allusive referentiality in Irish writing 
at the time. Whereas Revivalists mapped Ireland onto figures such as Cathleen Ní 
Houlihan and Róisín Dubh, the 1890s writers in particular also sought to develop a 
series of heroes (built similarly around mythological figures such as Cú Chulainn) 
capable of redeeming the fortunes of their race.152 Colm Tóibín has commented on 
the lack of communalism in Irish history as a whole: “Those central moments in 
French history are communal and urban” while in Ireland there is “personal sacrifice 
as a metaphor for general sacrifice.”153 Stephen is loaded with this same 
referentiality. This is a matter of Joyce’s style throughout his work; as Dominic 
Manganiello argues in Joyce’s Politics, “for [Joyce] there is no discontinuity between 
individual and communal life.” Moreover, “what is evinced in a situation describing 
love [for instance] becomes a paradigm for the Irish political scene” (Manganiello, 
94). The Künstlerroman, which appears to be focused on the individual and to 
eschew the nation, turns out to be of great importance to the national and communal 
as synecdochic representation of the (projected) aspirations of the whole.  
The conflation of Stephen (as individual) with his race (as communal) is not 
without its problems. It is almost as if Stephen feels this associative narrative 
pressure; he is continually concerned with identifying, understanding, and later 
“forging the . . . conscience of [his] race,” as if he were aware of his own importance 
in this process. His artistic concern returns time and again to what he can do for the 
“bat-like soul” of his race “wakening to consciousness of itself in darkness and 
secrecy and loneliness” (P, 226). While Portrait encourages us to try to map a 
narrative of Ireland onto Stephen’s narrative, so that his overcoming or otherwise can 
be read as Ireland’s more generally, Stephen does a similar thing, reading himself into 
Ireland. “[D]arkness and secrecy and loneliness” are his domains and he extrapolates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 See Hall, Shadowy Heroes for a discussion of this element of Irish writing. 
153 Colm Tóibín, introduction to The Penguin Book of Irish Fiction, ed. Colm Tóibín 
(London: Penguin, 2001), 12. 
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from his tortured conception of his own identity a shared racial experience, an 
experience that can be detected with his powerful artistic vision in those who cannot 
detect it in themselves. This conception of the soul as in an important sense 
communal, national, and racial invites an ongoing tension for Stephen between his 
sense of his capacity for individual growth and overcoming and that of his race. For 
Stephen is only partially of this community; while he feels “the thoughts and desires 
of the race to which he belonged flitting like bats across the dark country lanes, under 
trees by the edges of streams and near the pool-mottled bogs,” he is also acutely, 
painfully aware that he is cut off from this community (P, 297). He thinks of the 
woman who had inspired his vision of the soul of Ireland, a woman who “had waited 
in the doorway as Davin had passed by at night and, offering him a cup of milk, had 
all but wooed him to her bed.” “But him[self],” he thinks, “no woman’s eyes had 
wooed” (P, 298). Stephen’s rejection by Ireland (embodied in this representative 
figure) is configured as necessary, for he cannot save, redeem, or (re)form the 
conscience of his race from fully within. To stand above and beyond it is also to stand 
outside it, heroically martyred by one’s own crushing isolation. The “isolation” 
sought by the protagonist of “A Portrait of the Artist” as a form of “artistic 
economy,” is expanded into a more general pose. Stephen experiences his 
antagonistic relationship to his natural community as a hardship but also as a source 
of pride, leaving “the ground chosen to his disadvantage” in favour of the “highlands 
. . . his ground” where he flings “disdain from flashing antlers” (PSW, 212). 
Stephen’s commitment to a narrative of ever-threatened betrayal is fundamentally a 
rejection of community on the grounds that community is inherently opposed to the 
individual, that it imperils the self. But this rejection of community is in turn seen as a 
form of heroic embrace of that community, for it is only through a form of acute 
separation that that community may be redeemed. Like Moses (and, with bitter irony, 
Parnell), Stephen envisages himself as leading his people to a promised land that he 
may never enter.  
Stephen’s psychically satisfying exile relies on his capacity to envisage Ireland 
as having already broken the bond that he seeks to break. The conception of Irish 
betrayal found in Joyce’s non-fiction and enunciated by Stephen in his discussions 
with Davin—that is, betrayal as a structural necessity of Irish history—allows for a 
slackening of the normal rules of cause and effect. The inevitability of Stephen’s 
constructions mean that he is always already betrayed. Stephen is paradoxically both 
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too connected and too disconnected from Ireland to remain a part of it. If he is to 
redeem it, he must leave it behind, but this departure is made easier by the fact that 
Ireland has already chosen not to embrace him. Stephen’s escape from Ireland 
becomes also an escape for Ireland and his sense of guilt at his betrayal of his 
“natural” ties to country and race are consoled. It is a betrayal for the good of the 
betrayed, and thus no betrayal at all.  
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Chapter Three: “A nation exacts a penance”: Platonic Betrayal and the Return 
from Heroic Exile in Exiles 
 
Exiles has a unique and important place in the narrative I am tracing in this 
thesis. It represents, first of all, the purest literary distillation of Joyce’s theoretical 
perspective on betrayal—Joyce effectively set his stall out as clearly and as directly 
as he could. Betrayal is given a schematic centrality that is not found elsewhere in 
Joyce’s writing. But Exiles is also the first of Joyce’s works to bring together, 
consciously and carefully, the two main aspects of his structural understanding and 
analysis of betrayal. Stephen, as I have already suggested, is almost constitutionally 
incapable of experiencing romantic love in any real-world, quotidian sense and thus 
his love-life is never more than an unconvincing subplot in his Künstlerroman 
narrative. I have read Stephen’s pursuit of E. C. largely for its role as a convenient 
spur to his pre-decided exile, while Stephen’s only other significant romantic 
experience is with the idealized vision of Mercedes. In this sense, Stephen’s only real 
understanding of the pain of romantic love (and, more importantly, betrayal) is his 
understanding of it as a source of powerful fictional denouement. Even during the 
irony debates of the 1960s that surrounded Portrait, few, I think, would have been 
keen to accept the purity and fullness of Stephen’s love for E. C. at face value. From 
the off, Stephen’s pursuit of E. C. is little more than a pose, an attempt by the teenage 
Stephen to remake himself in the image of the great and, eventually, spurned artist-
lover. He doesn’t experience any of the epistemic anxiety or sense of ontological 
instability that Joyce nurtured in his other, fuller descriptions of romantic betrayal. 
Stephen must leave Ireland or risk betrayal. That the betrayal that precipitates his exit 
comes in the form of a romantic rival is convenient rather than necessary; sexual 
betrayal and platonic betrayal do not undergo any meaningful theoretical, thematic, or 
emotional comparison as a result of this conflation. 
Both these modes do share important structural similarities in Joyce’s thinking, 
while remaining different in ways that Joyce was increasingly coming to recognize as 
important. Stephen concerns himself with an abiding fear of what we might call, with 
acknowledged irony, “platonic” betrayal. He fears the harm that might be done to him 
by his friends, his family, and his nation. Relationships of trust (even of the most 
basic kind) are sites of great existential uncertainty, for a contract is in its essence an 
act of mutual exposure; how can I know that you are as exposed as I am? In writing 
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Irish history as a history of constant betrayals, Stephen is really expressing and 
justifying his refusal to risk this exposure, to the nation, the race, the family. 
Exiles marks a development, then, in that its central character is consciously 
aware of himself as potential victim of both amatory and platonic betrayal. The 
sources of each betrayal are not precisely the same (though Robert is a potential 
source of both) but it is clear that while unconnected on a literal level, they are 
metaphorically, perhaps metaphysically adjacent. This chapter seeks to unpick the 
logic at the heart of this play and to establish its position as a necessary stepping 
stone between Portrait and Ulysses. In dealing with this logic I will make use, as 
much as possible, of the language that Joyce himself provides. But I will also need to 
draw on the “ethical turn” in Joyce studies in order to better represent Joyce’s 
analyses of betrayal. As I suggested in the introduction to this thesis, the language 
introduced into Joyce studies by critics such as Marian Eide is invaluable both as a 
tool for decoding Joyce’s approach to interpersonal dynamics and as a way to 
describe those dynamics as they feature in his texts. But the tendency of these studies 
to attribute a system of ethics to Joyce is at times excessive and misleading. As far as 
this thesis is concerned, such an insistence on Joyce’s inherent concern for ideal, 
theoretically grounded interrelations occludes the more dynamic force of his own and 
his character’s radical narcissism. This narcissism, rather than simply a character fault 
that is laboriously and subtly exposed across Joyce’s fiction, is highly generative, 
being the fundamental source of his understanding of the very interpersonal dynamics 
the “ethicists” wish to read, optimistically, as marking out a more or less conscious 
ethical position on interpersonal relationships.154 Joyce’s understanding of betrayal is 
then, inherently concerned with a logical structure centred on the “I.” Whereas Eide, 
for example, insists that Joyce sets out to “construct a literary ethics. . .” I insist that 
Richard Rowan’s fear of the other, rather than dissolving into an ethically positive 
acceptance of radical difference, remains fundamentally active in his insistence on the 
very logic the “ethicists” seek to applaud. While Exiles is, I will argue, a play 
designed to see Joyce’s theoretical considerations through to their conclusions, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 As far as I am aware, this term has not been used at all in relation to Joyce studies or 
literary studies more generally, and those whom I describe do not group themselves under 
such a designation. I use it, however, to denote any of the varied approaches characterized by 
the desire to bring a more or less Levinasian perspective to Joyce studies. 
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also a play about the failure of this very process of theoreticization. The play insists 
that while the logic Joyce had pursued and explicated in his writing to that point is 
sound, Richard’s solution is too inhuman, too contrived to succeed.  
 
From Stephen to Richard, through Joyce  
I have given significant space so far in this thesis to determining exactly how 
Joyce’s personal circumstances shaped and directed his literary projects, arguing for a 
complex view of the autobiographical aspects of Joyce’s fiction and non-fiction. 
Joyce’s fictional process (“intellectualization,” as he called it) sees him draw from 
closely observed autobiographical events. But the fictional text is not justified by 
these events; nor does the fictional text in turn justify the events that inspire them. 
While such a justificatory connection between text and life is not present for Joyce, 
he was clearly adept at manipulating the (understandable) tendency of his readers to 
assume such a connection and, in his life, profiting where possible from the 
association. As I discussed in my chapter on Joyce’s non-fiction, Joyce carefully 
cultivated the air of an exilic artist, driven out of a barbaric backwater, even as, in 
Stephen Hero and, later, Portrait, he captured the often preposterous contrivance of 
this position. 
This connection between artistic argument (the “message[s]” carried by the 
text) and artistic life is particularly problematic in relation to Exiles. The central 
character, Richard Rowan, is a serious, avant-garde writer who, at about Joyce’s age 
at the time of composition, returns to Ireland after years of self-imposed exile. He is 
not legally married, but cohabits with the mother of his young son, Archie. The 
autobiographical parallels are obviously enticing, and raise the same questions as 
Portrait. First among them: did Joyce expect his audience(s) to pick up on any of 
these correspondences? And if not, why are they there? As I argued in my chapter on 
Portrait, even for those with no specific knowledge about Joyce the man, his writing 
encouraged startling assumptions about the autobiographical basis of the narrative, 
tone (one might say “argument”), and perspective. It is as if the specific national 
charges that they contain announced themselves as personal grudges rather than 
detached observations. This, Portrait seemed to say, is the writing of a man who 
suffered for his art as Stephen does. The sheer depth and detail of Joyce’s 
psychological realism, similarly, led numerous early reviewers to assume, not 
unjustly, that Portrait was simply a poorly disguised autobiography, depicting not 
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merely the growth of an artist but the artist whose work it is. I argued, in counter to 
this strain of thought on Portrait, that the novel offers instead an analytical account of 
the performative processes that lead Stephen to a much-sought exile. This allows both 
for the depiction of Irish failings and for the clear-eyed analysis of the mindset 
required to escape them. Exiles, similarly, performs a dual function: the restoration of 
the “necessary” distance between Joyce and Ireland—necessary in that Exiles renews 
the logical necessity of the separation of principled, modern artist and vampiric, 
smothering, self-defeating motherland—and the analysis of the flaws—human and 
analytical—implicit in that logical procedure. The question remains, however: to 
what extent can Exiles be seen as an earnest pronouncement on the fate of the artist 
returning from exile, or the lover contemplating his partner’s fidelity? The debate that 
raged over the requisite level of “irony” in Portrait had been settled to such a degree 
that Seamus Deane could write in 1992 that “it is such a cliché of commentary . . . 
that Stephen’s position is ironized by Joyce that it must be considered.”155 Yet such 
consideration has at least allowed for the production of more nuanced evaluations of 
the exact nature of Joyce’s irony in regards to Stephen. Exiles has presented a far 
greater problem for critics, in that its fundamental humourlessness either renders 
whatever irony that is present not worth bearing—such irony would render the 
business of Richard’s heroism a waste of time—or displaces it into a form of 
authorial distance that does not register as irony in any significant sense. It is 
difficult, to put it simply, to read Exiles without reading its sense of suffering heroism 
back onto Joyce (this is true to an even greater extent than it is of Portrait), either as a 
validation of his own principled stance on Ireland and on Irish morality, or as a self-
regarding document of the artist’s (justified or unjustified) self-pity. As Vicky 
Mahaffey put it, “[i]t has never been clear . . . whether Exiles is ironic, or whether . . . 
its ironies are earnest ones.”156  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Seamus Deane, introduction to A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man by James Joyce 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), xlii. 
156 Vicki Mahaffey, “Joyce’s Shorter Works,” in Cambridge Companion to James Joyce, ed. 
Derek Attridge (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), 201. Mahaffey also notes that “the objective, even 
clinical mood of Exiles yields to self-pity and hallucination” (187). It is perhaps this 
indeterminacy of tone within the play that has made analysis of it so difficult and rejection of 
it so easy. 
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Joyce’s audience/Joyce’s Ireland 
Though it is difficult to discern the specific nature or extent of irony in Exiles, 
the play nevertheless performs a dual function that becomes clear when considered in 
light both of Joyce’s developing theories of betrayal and the specific context out of 
which the work emerged. As with the non-fictional Triestine writings, Exiles must be 
understood as the product of Joyce’s ever developing understanding of the inevitable 
logic of interpersonal relationships. But, since his process of artistic production relied 
on his extrapolations from closely observed and analysed personal experiences, we 
must also understand Exiles as a product of the economic and artistic situation in 
which he laboured. This is particularly interesting in relation to Exiles as the 
conception and completion of the play spans a period of immense and fundamental 
change in Joyce’s artistic and, eventually, domestic circumstances. The wavering and 
sometimes failing confidence in his artistic vocation that contributes to the content 
and form of Joyce’s non-fiction gives way, as Joyce prepares Exiles, to the most 
consistent and rapid period of improvement in Joyce’s writing career.  
The Trieste period, by and large, was characterized by failure. The more Joyce 
was rejected by publishers, exhausted by poorly remunerated and unfulfilling work as 
an English teacher, and worn down by inveterate poverty, the more he came to see 
journalism (at least a form of journalism) as a realistic, yet sufficiently high-minded, 
alternative destiny. Joyce’s non-fiction is then marked by this careful negotiation 
between principle and pragmatism. The preponderance of betrayal in these writings is 
thus similarly split in purpose; it is both pragmatic—Joyce understood the workings 
of betrayal so well that he trusted it implicitly as an emotive tool—and principled—
the betrayal narrative allowed Joyce to maintain his spirited criticism of Ireland as 
self-destructive and sub-consciously malicious. Similarly, such journalism provided a 
vehicle through which he could continue to develop his ideas (not least among them, 
his theories of betrayal). In writing his imaginative histories, he could deconstruct and 
reconstruct reality according to a principle of betrayal that was as metaphysical as it 
was psychological. Simply put, Joyce’s use of betrayal in these pieces is 
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representative of the complex negotiation he underwent between his desire to be 
successful and the nature of the success he wished to achieve.157 
The context in which Exiles was conceived and written was markedly different, 
coming at a time of almost revolutionary change in Joyce’s circumstances—both 
artistically and financially. Indeed, the composition of Exiles spanned this moment of 
transition. When Joyce began sketching ideas for the play in Autumn 1913,158 he had 
all but given up hopes of publishing Dubliners159 having faced a dispiriting year of 
rejections and false dawns. The drawn out affair with George Roberts finally came to 
an end with the destruction of all the printed sheets on September 11 1912. Joyce left 
Dublin that day for the final time, stopping in London to offer the book to English 
publishers on the 12th. This attempt also proved fruitless: Joyce was rejected by 
Martin Secker in December 1912 and, eventually, by Elkin Matthews in April 1913. 
Matthews’s rejection was all the more dispiriting since Joyce had offered to defray all 
printing costs. Though Dubliners was of course published little more than a year after 
Matthews’s rejection, Joyce never offered the manuscript to another publisher. 
Joyce’s willingness to accept considerable losses to secure publication is indicative of 
how desperate he had become at this point. Not merely to be rid of the book (he had 
the reformed and more or less complete Portrait equally short of takers at this time), 
but to achieve publication in book form and, in so doing, attempt to establish himself 
as a writer of literature. After years of fruitless, sapping effort, he had no choice but 
to accept the failure of Dubliners and limited hopes for Portrait. 
It is remarkable, perhaps, that under the circumstances Joyce should have any 
desire to write at all. Yet, despite his struggles he had found a renewed energy, 
composing Giacomo Joyce—which may have been all the more satisfying a project in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Note that I am not offering a psychoanalytic reading of Joyce’s writing at this point. In 
shaping his journalism and criticism in the way that he did, Joyce was largely in control of 
the image he sought to produce and was conscious of the uses to which betrayal was being 
put. 
158 The extant notebook, held by the University of Buffalo, contains entries approximately 
two thirds of the way through dated 12 and 13 November. The first draft of Act I appears to 
have been completed by this point or shortly after, and the last third of the notebook is 
devoted to sketching out ideas for the rest of the play. 
159 At least in the near future; Ellmann suggests Joyce had professed some hope for it longer 
term. 
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that publication was never its intention; the writing was its own reward—beginning 
preparations for both Exiles and Ulysses, and publishing a poem. In addition, from 
November 1912 to February 1913 Joyce gave a series of twelve lectures on Hamlet 
for the Università Popolare in Trieste to add to the two lectures on Defoe and Blake 
he had given earlier in 1912. It was in this mixed atmosphere of failure and success 
that Exiles was first conceived and the first act drafted. In short, Joyce was writing 
but still not publishing. His career as a literary critic was probably at its peak, yet, 
given it had been almost five years since his first (and, until his Defoe lecture, last) 
public lecture in Trieste,160 even this comparative rush of work hardly promised to be 
a source of income steady or serious enough to transform Joyce’s fortunes. Though 
Joyce could be trusted to have both ambition and faith in his abilities, he could not 
have seriously expected that a series of lectures in Trieste would suddenly catapult 
him into a position of prominence on any European level (or, perhaps, even on a 
Triestine level). Moreover, it is clear that Joyce was at best ambivalent about the 
appeal of professional literary criticism, producing it predominantly as a source of 
income or as a gateway to greater things. It can be no accident that, in contrast to so 
many of the other great modernist writers of the time—Woolf, Pound, Eliot, most 
notably—Joyce’s small output of what we might call critical writings (be they his 
notes on aesthetics or his handful of reviews for the Daily Express), dries up to 
nothing as soon as he establishes himself as a writer of fiction. Joyce published “Il 
miraggio del pescatore di Aran: la valvola dell’Inghilterra in caso di guerra” (“The 
Mirage of the Fisherman of Aran” in Il Piccolo della Sera on 5 September 1912.161 
After that he produced no journalistic or critical writing for public consumption bar, 
possibly, a short sub-editorial on “foot and mouth disease” for the Freeman’s 
Journal, which appeared just a day later on 6 September 1912. The life of the essayist 
was, bar moments of fleeting interest, clearly appealing to Joyce primarily as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 The lecture was of course “Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages.” Joyce had originally been 
asked to present three talks but the other two lectures, one on James Clarence Mangan and 
the other on the Irish Literary Renaissance, were never given, though versions of both are 
gathered together in Kevin Barry, OCPW, 127-36; 137. The Mangan essay is more or less 
complete, but of Joyce’s proposed talk on the Irish Literary Renaissance only a single 
unnumbered holograph leaf from a notebook remains. 
161 OCPW, 201-205. 
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potential source of income and exposure. So, while we should, as I have argued, take 
Joyce’s efforts at journalism seriously, we must do so with Joyce’s own serious 
reservations in mind. The pointed separation made in the character list for Exiles 
between “Richard—A writer” and “Robert—A journalist” is revealing of the 
separation Joyce appeared to make in his own life. The experiment with journalism as 
something for which he may have “a talent” gave way to his distrust in rhetoric. 
While Richard devotes himself to the integrity of his own soul, Robert acts as an 
opinion-former whose opinions are self-serving, a crafter of effective phrases rather 
than an exposer of complex truths. He has the power to condemn and confirm, he 
claims, Richard’s public image and, as a result, has a power over his fortunes that is 
not founded on superior merit.162 The journalist, in short, is denounced, while the 
“writer” exalted.  
So, Exiles began its life during a period of ambivalence—Joyce was treading 
water financially, yet energized artistically—but it was completed in a period of 
exciting forward motion. Joyce appears to have conceived of the bare bones of the 
play, drafted the first act, and begun taking disparate notes on future scenes and 
redrafts by the autumn of 1913; the only dated notes in the extant notebook for Exiles 
are from November 12 and 13 and in the subsequent notes, Joyce writes as if the first 
act were already drafted.163 At this point, Joyce was still in a position of defiant 
failure. Yet, on November 25, Joyce received the first of two unexpected letters that 
would change his circumstances for the better. Grant Richards, with whom Joyce had 
had a protracted and somewhat bitter fight over the publication of Ulysses, wrote to 
Joyce indicating that he would be eager to take another look at Dubliners. In private, 
Richards admitted to feeling some remorse over his treatment of Joyce and his book, 
considering Joyce’s anger with him to have some justification (JJ, 349). Taken alone, 
this softening on Richards’s part would not have buoyed Joyce’s spirits overly much; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Matthew Bevis has discussed Joyce’s distrust of misdirected “eloquence”: “Joyce’s 
Breathing Space,” in The Art of Eloquence, 204-269. Patrick Collier has provided an account 
of the complex antagonism felt by many modernist authors towards the press: Patrick Collier, 
Modernism on Fleet Street (Farnham: Ashgate, 2006).  
163 This notebook is held by the State University New York at Buffalo Library. All references 
to it in this thesis are taken from the transcription printed in James Joyce, Poems and Exiles, 
ed. J. C. C. Mays (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), 342-354.  Hereafter cited in the text as 
Mays. 
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Joyce had suffered enough disappointment over Dubliners to be wary of new dawns, 
even if Richards’s experience with the book suggested this was no idle request.164 But 
if Joyce remained cautious about the prospect of publishing with Richards, the letter 
received from Ezra Pound two weeks later (15 December 1913) could leave him in 
little doubt that his fortunes were improving. 
Pound’s letter is typically direct, offering Joyce a clear route to publication in 
several forms and on several continents. Pound rattles off the magazines, journals, 
and “papers” with which he has influence of one kind or another: The Egoist and the 
Cerebrilist (“which means God knows what”), “the only organs in England that stand 
and stand for free speech and want (I don’t say get) literature”; “two American 
magazines which pay top rates”; “‘The Smart Set’ wants top notch stories. ‘Poetry’ 
wants top notch poetry”; “Essays etc. could only go into the ‘C’ (Cerebrilist) or ‘E’ 
(Egoist).”165 For Joyce, who had not only been struggling to publish his problematic 
novel and book of short stories, but to establish himself at all as a literary voice, 
Pound’s offer represented not only an opportunity but a lifeline.166 Admittedly, Joyce 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Had Joyce not remained dubious about the prospect of Richards finally publishing 
Dubliners, it is unlikely that he would have allowed Pound to publish his faintly 
inflammatory “Curious History” in The Egoist in January 1914. Joyce was still waiting for 
Richards’s decision and while the piece may have acted as a prompt to Richards, it could as 
easily have acted as a final burning of bridges. The Egoist piece was intended, of course, to 
drum up interest in his cause and, one presumes, to find him a publisher, but it offered no 
guarantees that it would attract one. If Joyce had had any confidence in Richards’s 
seriousness, then the move would have to be viewed as foolhardy to say the least. 
165 Quoted in JJ, 349-50. All further references to this letter are taken from here. Ellmann 
puts a similar stress on this letter as a turning point in Joyce’s career. As he says, “the temper 
of Joyce’s life changed.” 
166 It is notable that Pound’s interest in Joyce came through Yeats, who retained a rather 
general appreciation of Joyce on the basis of the impression he had made in Dublin, as well 
as a few fragments of poetry he had read since (Yeats soon after gave Pound Joyce’s “I Hear 
an Army” to read). Were it not for this relatively insubstantial connection, Joyce may have 
remained largely unpublished and almost entirely unknown to the literary communities in 
England, Europe, and America for far longer than he did. While Joyce may well have been 
touched by Pound’s declaration that it was “the first time that [Pound had] written to anyone 
outside [his] circle of acquaintance” (which was considerable), the subtext is that to be a 
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was not being offered publication directly; Pound stressed that while he was the de 
facto editor of The Egoist and Cerebrilist, he could not “promise publication” in the 
American magazines as he had “no absolute powers for accepting mss” and, as he 
says to Joyce, “[a]s I don’t in the least know what your present stuff is like, I can only 
offer to read what you send.” But, with this scent of opportunity, Joyce could trust to 
his ability and the quality of his writing to take advantage. Pound expresses his desire 
for “markedly modern stuff” and offers Joyce room to “speak [his] mind on 
[anything] the Spectator objects to”; the problems that had beset Dubliners were 
unlikely to arise here. Pound was (quite explicitly) offering Joyce the opportunity to 
not only make money from his writing—“pay top rates”; “they pay 2 bob a line”—
but to make a name for himself among the literary circles on two continents, all 
without making any of the significant textual alterations that book publishers had 
demanded of him. As Pound advises Joyce, “The Smart Set” and “Poetry” offered 
him the opportunity to be published alongside “most of the best people,” while 
“[a]ppearance in the Egoist may have a slight advertizing value if you want to keep 
your name familiar”—one might rather say of Joyce at this time, make your name 
familiar. 
If Joyce had maintained any doubts about Pound’s seriousness, they 
disappeared a few days later when, before Joyce had even replied to Pound’s initial 
letter, he wrote again to say that Yeats had given him Joyce’s “I Hear an Army.” Both 
Pound and Yeats were highly impressed by it and wanted to use it in the now famous 
anthology of “Imagism,” Des Imagistes. Not only was Pound eager to use the poem, 
but eager to pay for it. By mid-January, Joyce had put the finishing touches to 
Portrait and sent it and Dubliners to Pound. Just four days later (January 19 1913), 
Pound responded to Joyce, describing Portrait as “fine stuff” and declaring his 
intention to have it published in The Egoist. He was less sure about the prospects for 
Dubliners but sent three of the stories off to H. L. Mencken at The Smart Set anyway. 
If Joyce had any more verse, particularly along the lines of “I Hear an Army,” then 
Pound would send it to Poetry. 
It is no real exaggeration to say that in the space of a month, Joyce had 
managed through Pound to go from outsider, living and working on the edge of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
writer outside Pound’s circle of acquaintance at this time was a rather cold and lonely place 
to be. 
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European culture, to insider, in touch with the major avant-garde movements of 
literary culture on two continents. Pound, who Ellmann nicely describes as “the most 
active man in London” during this period, could bring Joyce into contact with 
flourishing networks of activity and cordiality (JJ, 350).167 Joyce did not just become 
publishable (and published) almost overnight, but he had the opportunity to be known 
by those who mattered. Through Pound, Joyce had the good will of Mencken and 
Monroe in the U.S., Ford Madox Ford and the Egoist in the UK, and Henry Davray of 
the Mercure de France (to name but a small and influential few). Ellmann sums up 
the transformation in Joyce’s fortunes with characteristic elegance. “In Ezra Pound, 
as avid to discover as Joyce was to be discovered, the writings of Joyce found their 
missionary” (JJ, 350). And if Pound’s sudden aid wasn’t enough, on January 25 1914 
Grant Richards wrote to inform him of his intention to publish Dubliners. The first 
serial instalment of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man was published a week 
later on February 2 (Joyce’s 32nd birthday) and Dubliners was finally published in a 
run of 1250 copies on June 15 that year.  
My attention to this turnaround in Joyce’s fortunes should not be seen as the 
grounds of any psychoanalytic reading of Exiles. By no means am I suggesting that 
the changes in Joyce’s fortunes should be understood as decisive in determining the 
tone or prominent themes of the play. But, as I have already argued, it is important to 
find a way to discuss the role that Joyce’s personal circumstances had on shaping his 
self-consciously “impersonal” texts.168 Keeping in mind the circumstances I have 
described, I will offer a reading of the play’s central discussion of betrayal, primarily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Joyce’s immediate adoption into “imagism” is evidence enough of the speed such a 
transformation could occur.  
168 The idea of Joyce’s writing, and the great texts of High Modernism more broadly, as 
“impersonal” and self-effacing has a long critical history dating back at least as far as Eliot’s 
description of “the progress of an artist” as “a continual extinction of personality” in 
“Tradition and the Individual Talent.” This idea is evidently not without problems in 
modernism and the notion appears to ring a particularly false note in regards to Exiles, purely 
because the humourlessness of the play seems to reveal the author sitting behind every line. 
Tim Dean provides an interesting account of the major issues in this discussion and offers an 
interesting case for Joyce’s fundamental separation from Eliot on the matter of impersonality: 
Tim Dean, “Paring his Fingernails,” in Quare Joyce ed. Joseph Valente (Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1998), 241-72. 
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(more first than foremost) as a continuing development of Joyce’s analysis of the 
artist’s (and artist hero’s) necessarily antagonistic relationship to Ireland. From here, 
however, I will show the shift in Joyce’s interest in betrayal from the grand, heroic, 
and historically inevitable, to the quotidian through his continuing analysis of 
interpersonal betrayal as a necessary constituent of any relationships (at least any 
relationship of value). 
 
“A nation exacts a penance” 
In Dubliners Joyce offered a detailed, multi-layered diagnosis of the paralysis 
that he saw at the heart of Irish society at the beginning of the twentieth-century. In 
Portrait, Joyce captured the necessary, generative delusions required to evade this 
paralysis by capturing the struggle of one heroic individual. If Dubliners was an 
account of myriad, unrelenting failures then Portrait was the account of a success or 
failure that is always about to be. As Seamus Deane has pointed out with some relish, 
Stephen departs for Paris with “an absurdly stated ambition . . . a project that can 
never, by its nature, get off the ground.” For all the talk of destiny (the future), he is 
“armed” with little more than a “half-baked aesthetic theory that, after mountainous 
labour, has only produced a little mouse of a poem.”169 Exiles appears then to have 
been conceived as being complementary to these other accounts. Having used the 
short story to study the fate of those, like Eveline, trapped in Ireland, and the novel to 
offer a way out, Joyce’s play would dramatize the return of one who had found 
success beyond the paralysing forces of Ireland. Joyce clarifies this point in one of 
the first entries in the Exiles notebook at Buffalo. 
 
Why the title Exiles? A nation exacts a penance from those who dared to 
leave her payable on their return. The elder brother in the fable of the 
Prodigal Son is Robert Hand. The father took the side of the prodigal. 
This is probably not the way of the world – certainly not in Ireland; but 
Jesus’ Kingdom was not of this world.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Deane, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, xlii. As I have argued, listing Stephen’s 
inadequacies in this way slightly misconstrues the point, since Joyce’s account, rather than 
wholly “ironic” takes Stephen’s semi-delusional self-making seriously. But, equally, it is 
important that in Portrait Stephen remains perched always on the precipice of greatness 
rather than achieving it; the driving teleological force that the Künstlerroman provides, gives 
a false sense of completion that Joyce denies.  
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(Mays, 334) 
 
The irony is bitter as Joyce oscillates between a wry contrast between real-world and 
fable and an attack on Ireland for being unnaturally quick to attack its returning son 
(“certainly not in Ireland”); Joyce’s structural and universal drive competes with his 
sense of Irish exceptionalism.  
This dynamic, which drives much of Joyce’s thinking and writing on betrayal, 
is then present also in the fundamental composition of Exiles. The threat of 
suppression by Ireland that Joyce had made Stephen’s “raison d’être exile” in 
Portrait, that pervades the paralysing atmosphere of Dubliners, and forms the central 
tenet of Joyce’s Triestine non-fiction, is both confirmed and yet problematized by 
Joyce’s improving fortunes. He was right to leave Ireland, he can say, since his work 
would not have been recognized there, but, since his work is being recognized 
internationally, why not return to Ireland anyway? Joyce’s key themes for the 
preceding years had been the stultifying forces of Irish self-destruction, the necessity 
of exile, the historical force of betrayal in Irish history, and the dramatic and poetic 
potential this logic provides. It’s clear from the conception of Exiles that Joyce felt he 
had more to say on the subject. Yet, his improvement in circumstances subtly 
changed the dynamic in which he worked. Perversely, the themes of betrayal and 
exile that so dominated his work—as narratives of overcoming—became all the more 
vital and central in Exiles for being so suddenly contested. This is not to say that 
Joyce was moved to offer a rebuttal through his fiction, but that new expressions of 
the logic that had undergirded his writing became apparent. The intellectual 
foundations of betrayal and exile upon which Portrait had been built were now 
incomplete expressions of the logic through which Joyce had (re)constructed the 
world in his fiction.  
Similarly, as Joyce’s sense of imminent failure receded, he lost some of the 
energizing force of persecuted genius that drove his literary investigations. Exiles is 
not simply an investigation of what would happen were a grown Stephen Dedalus (or 
Joyce himself) to return to Ireland, but an attempt to purify the conception of betrayal 
that drove the Joycean exile170 from Ireland in the first place. If Joyce’s writing up to 
this point had been saturated with a concern for betrayal, Exiles is a head on assault 
on betrayal as a problem to be understood and solved. If Ireland’s threat to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Both Joyce’s characters and Joyce himself as, in a sense, a character performing exile. 
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budding artist manifested itself always through betrayal, how did that betrayal 
manifest itself when the artist had already, in a sense, broken free? 
 
“It is too soon yet to despair”: Betrayal of the self 
This question, since it is essentially a question about success, is wrapped up in 
the larger Joycean theme of Irish failure.171 Not so much the failure of Dubliners—
which catalogued the quiet suffering of unremarkable people172—but the heroic 
failure that Joyce attacked as typically Irish (and typically self-defeating) in his non-
fiction. This concern with heroism was, as I have suggested, both an apology for an 
already desired exile (Stephen wants to leave Ireland for the excitement of the 
continent; Joyce, from his position of exile, wishes to establish the necessity of that 
exile) and a response to a history of glorious martyrdom in Ireland that was, for 
Joyce, entirely unsatisfying. Stephen left Ireland in order to avoid what was, in his 
terms, an unavoidable decision between a form of heroic martyrdom—which 
achieves nothing—and fundamental compromise—which achieves nothing but 
strengthens the forces of stagnation at the sacrifice of personal integrity.173 More 
simply put: if one were unwilling, as Stephen was, to submit one’s independence to 
the “mob,” only two choices remained. One could be a dead hero or a living exile, but 
one could not be a living hero. Stephen’s solution—and the implicit argument of 
Joyce’s non-fictional constructions of Irish heroism—is to be both hero and coward: 
too much a hero to compromise, too much a coward to accept martyrdom. In exile, 
the principled refusal to compromise is sustained simply by the act of continued exile. 
Joyce’s refusal to return to Ireland is itself an embattled position that contains within 
it the germ of all supporting conflicts. The permanence that Joyce achieves—and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 It is a commonplace of Joycean criticism that Dubliners is a book about failure, while both 
Portrait and Ulysses are clearly interested in this problem to varying degrees. 
172 This wording is imperfect. But some clear line needs to be drawn between the quotidian 
paralysis of Dubliners, which refuses to be absorbed into the grander tone of overcoming and 
achievement that Portrait promotes, and the heroic narratives Joyce responds to in his non-
fiction. In Portrait, the possibility that Stephen may redeem, save, or at least transform his 
nation is central to the novel’s dynamic, even if one reads this possibility as inherently 
deluded. 
173 This sacrifice might be made in the name of nationalism, revivalism, Catholicism, or any 
other –ism. 
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Stephen flees in pursuit of—allows him to be at war without ever fighting any 
specific battles.  
In the period prior to Richard’s return to Ireland, he appears to have similarly 
balanced this tension between battle and retreat. He tells Beatrice that “on account of 
her [Richard’s mother] I lived years in exile”; Richard has retreated from the 
powerful forces of social convention that his mother personified. But Richard also 
stresses, without any sense of contradiction, that he “fought against her spirit while 
she lived to the bitter end” (E, 9). In exile, Richard could “fight against her spirit” 
without ever having to confront the reality of that fight. In exile, simply existing in 
accordance with his principles was sufficient. But this static tension cannot be 
sustained upon Richard’s return to Ireland, where refusal to conform is a political act 
that will not go unnoticed, precisely because it is an attack on the status quo. It is this 
question that appears to have motivated Joyce to compose Exiles: not merely what 
“penance” would Ireland require of a returning exile? But could the life of heroic 
integrity that was possible in exile also be possible in Ireland? Particularly when the 
failure that Ireland threatens to enforce has already been evaded? In having one of his 
heroic exiles return, Joyce reopens the logic of exile to fresh analysis.  
Richard returns to Ireland an ambiguous success. He has a reputation, but one 
built largely on the scandal that has followed his principled and public moral stances 
(on, one presumes, marriage, the church, and the Irish Literary Renaissance). He has 
published a book (its title, form, and content are unknown to us), but the publication 
has not sold well in Ireland (or, as far as we know, anywhere else); as Richard 
sarcastically responds to Robert’s well meant comment about the sale of his book, “I 
shall smoke a cigarette. Thirty-seven copies have now been sold in Dublin” (E, 19). 
That said, both the book and Richard himself appear to have made a significant 
impression on the Dublin literary classes, particularly a prominent and influential 
figure: the “vichechancellor.”174 As Robert Hand says to Richard, the vicechancellor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 The “vicechancellor” is not referred to in Exiles by anything other than his title. This 
vicechancellor should not be confused with “Old Chatterton, the vicechancellor,” who is, 
Bloom thinks, Ned Lambert’s “granduncle or greatgranduncle” (U, 7.261-2). Chatterton, 
rather than a University official, was Vice-Chancellor of all Ireland, a position in the national 
judiciary abolished upon his retirement in 1904. He died in 1910, two years before Exiles is 
set. If Joyce was referring to Chatterton, then it was an uncharacteristic lapse on his part. 
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“has the highest possible opinion of you, everyone has” (E, 19). It is unclear who 
precisely “everyone” includes, but given Richard’s small sales it must be a rather 
small group. Nevertheless, the good will of the vicechancellor—and the job as 
professor for which he is offering support—represents an opportunity to move from 
outside (exile) to inside in one swift motion. But Richard has not, it appears, been 
softened by his success and remains cautious; Robert chides him: “Richard, you are 
too suspicious. It is a defect in you” (E, 19). While he can no longer be prevented 
from achieving his basic goals of literary achievement (publication), Richard 
nevertheless perceives the attempts by “the vicechancellor” to embrace him as a form 
of attack, more subtle and pernicious in its own way than those Stephen sought to 
escape. Richard claims to have been driven into exile by the force of social 
convention, emblematized for him by his mother’s refusal to acknowledge Bertha or 
their child (E, 9). But the danger is not now that he will be forced to conform to those 
conventions he previously dismissed—though this is part of his fear—but that his 
ongoing non-conformance would be silenced, deprived of its heroic resistance.  
While Richard has been away, little has been heard of him in Ireland except 
vague rumours and hearsay. Robert has worked “tirelessly” to pave the way for 
Richard’s glorious return to Ireland by providing his own, more credible counter-
rumours. But for Richard, responding to the moralizing disapproval of his 
countrymen with anything more accommodating than quiet disdain (what Stephen 
would think of as “silence”) is the worst kind of compromise; his sense of personal 
integrity demands that he must be accepted as he is, totally and openly (E, 40). To 
obscure any aspect of himself, however questionable, is seen as a denial of that self. 
Since Richard’s “moral fearlessness,” as Robert construes it, is the bedrock of his 
genius and his philosophy, any deviation from complete autonomy and disregard for 
social convention would implicitly undermine the entirety of his personal, literary, 
and social project.  
The vicechancellor’s approach, regardless of the conscious intent behind it, 
does carry with it a certain danger. Through Robert the vicechancellor is offering 
Richard his support for the post of “chair of romance literature,” an eminent and, one 
presumes, well-reimbursed academic position. This move into the mainstream of Irish 
thought would represent a clear success, an implicit recognition by Ireland’s 
intellectual elite that Richard’s decision to leave Ireland was the correct one, that he 
was right to scorn outdated morality, and right to follow his own path. But Richard 
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astutely and immediately strikes upon a problem. He is not in fact being offered a 
job—“no questions asked,” so to speak—but the possibility of a job upon certain 
conditions. For all that the vicechancellor has influence, the process of evaluation 
would continue to judge him by more or less the same standards that drove him from 
Ireland in the first place. As Robert says, “[the vicechancellor] told me that, if your 
name goes forward, he will work might and main for you with the senate” (E, 19). 
Robert, similarly, promises to “do [his] part, of course, in the press and privately,” 
which apparently consists of setting “rumours afloat” that Richard need only “refrain 
from contradicting” (E, 20). For Richard, the entire process is merely a lure, a way of 
forcing him into a position of implicit compromise. The question of whether or not he 
might get the post is really a moot one; by playing the game at all, by showing 
himself to be willing to be anything other than completely honest and open about 
those acts of his that society may call immoral, he would not only have failed by his 
own standard, but implicitly bowed to such moralizing. This is shown by his sharp 
and pertinent response to Robert’s offer: “The conditions?” he asks. “You mean 
about the future?” Robert responds, confused. “I mean about the past” (E, 19). Robert 
has picked up on the type of discourse to which Richard is appealing—bartering—but 
not understood its import. He assumes that Richard is establishing the terms of his 
employment—the rate of pay, length of the chair, etc. But Richard appeals to this 
mode of discourse with a bitter irony; he is really talking about the integrity of the 
self, something that by its nature cannot be bartered with, traded in scraps, but, in 
Richard’s absolutist philosophy, must remain whole and unrestricted by “conditions.” 
Richard, doubtless tempted by the position, if only because it would offer him 
irrefutable and ongoing evidence of his success over the stultifying forces of Ireland, 
is nevertheless as conscious of what he would lose as of what he may gain. Like 
Stephen Dedalus, therefore, he constructs a narrative of betrayal in which he can cast 
himself as the victim of a grand plot, orchestrated not so much by the individual 
players in the drama (the vicechancellor and Robert) but by some unconscious, 
repressive Irish force of traditional morality. In order to seek the position, Richard 
must, in his words, “give the lie to [his] past life . . . for the sake of social 
conventions” (E, 20). Doing so would be a betrayal of his fundamental principles, a 
neutering of his capacity to mount a radical critique of the prevailing morality, and a 
denial of those very things that gave his past meaning and value. Compromise of this 
sort would represent an act of violence against the self as real to Richard as the moral 
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and physical assassinations that befell Caesar and Parnell, respectively. Richard’s fear 
is that Robert will tempt him into betraying himself. His refusal to commit to Ireland, 
indeed to remain in Ireland, has up until this point immunized him against such 
threats. But in returning, he has disrupted the static antagonism of exile and 
necessitated action. In Joyce’s fiction, the possible outcomes of such action are 
strictly delimited: heroic refusal; full dedication to the nation, race, and family such 
that it can be bettered, even saved from within; or the exile from which Richard is 
already attempting to return. The first of these leads inevitably to destruction at the 
hands of powerful repressive forces and the second leaves the hero open to Irish 
betrayal, which is characterized in Joyce’s writing as inevitable.  
The question is then, what kind of heroism is available in Ireland, if any is 
possible at all? In summarizing the nature of Joyce’s shorter works, Vicki Mahaffey 
has commented on the change in perspective in Joyce’s writing as “heroism is 
increasingly replaced by humour in Joyce’s mature works.”175 The choice of word is 
important here; Mahaffey is not suggesting merely that heroism becomes less 
interesting while, unrelatedly, humour a greater draw, but that somehow the two 
occupy a similar place in Joyce’s writing, but at different times. As Joyce becomes 
less concerned with the dramatic and narrative possibility of heroism, Mahaffey 
suggests, he fills the hole left behind with comedy. Any reader of Ulysses would 
likely agree with Mahaffey’s general suggestion here since the book enacts this 
process in its movement from Stephen to Bloom, from the dour, lonely pursuit of 
integrity in a country that lacks it (this is how Stephen sees himself) to the whimsical 
wanderings of an everyman. But the problem of Exiles is still primarily the problem 
of the life lived heroically in Ireland. For Richard, the “automystic” (Mays, 342), 
heroism is found in the refusal of “social convention” (Mays, 343), in “fighting for 
his own hand, for his own emotional dignity and liberation” (Mays, 348), in suffering 
the loss of a mother, a country, perhaps a wife in pursuit of high principle. And lying 
behind this heroism is, of course, the literary conviction made explicit in Stephen’s 
self-prophesying, that the heroism of the artist individual might somehow redeem and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Vicki Mahaffey, “Joyce’s Shorter Works,” Cambridge Companion to James Joyce, ed. 
Derek Attridge (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), 187. 
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mend the country against which he battles.176 But in Joyce’s construction, the Irish 
hero is always, ultimately, a martyr. Stephen’s acknowledgement of this fact in 
Portrait leads him to the conclusion that he had no choice but to sacrifice his life, his 
integrity, or his homeland. Integrity is for Stephen, as it is for Richard Rowan, all 
important; yet what use is such heroic steadfastness if it will not effect change to that 
which is resisted? If Ireland always betrays, forgets, and sanitizes those who are best 
suited to save it (as it did, in Joyce’s description, to Parnell, John O’Leary,177 and any 
number of its most realistic hopes for improvement) then the Irish hero is also, 
necessarily, either a fool or a willing but pointless martyr. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 It is a critical commonplace to think of Richard Rowan and Stephen Dedalus before him 
as “heroic,” even if this heroism is read as ironic, comic, or deluded. For examples of 
differing takes on Richard as “heroic” see: Joseph Voelker, “The Beastly Incertitudes: Doubt, 
Difficulty, and Discomfiture in James Joyce’s Exiles,” Journal of Modern Literature 14.4 
(1988), 514; Richard Brown, James Joyce and Sexuality (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 18, 44-5; 
Joseph Valente, James Joyce and the Problem of Justice, 148-153. 
177 See my discussion of “Fenianism: The Last Fenian” in the first chapter of this thesis. 
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Chapter Four: “Like thieves in the night”: Sexual Betrayal as Dispossession in 
Exiles 
 
Joyce’s resumption of hostilities with Ireland was clearly central to the early 
composition of Exiles, but it is also clear that Joyce was beginning to tire of his 
central subject. The only extant notes for the play show him working through many 
of the contributory ideas, themes, character histories, and pieces of dialogue that 
would make up the play. Of the roughly forty more or less discursive entries in this 
notebook, only eight deal at all directly with problems of personal integrity (the key 
theme of the play) in conflict with nation, history, art, or society. Yet some twenty-
seven of these entries deal with adultery, sexual betrayal, or the spiritual 
indeterminacy of quasi-marital relationships (not necessarily monogamous). In short, 
there are more than three times as many entries relating to amatory betrayal as there 
are entries relating to platonic betrayal.178 This startling imbalance is even more 
apparent on the page, since many of these amatory entries are significantly longer 
than those relating to platonic or national betrayal. Joyce’s understanding of these 
latter themes, and his experience at manipulating them in his texts, was such that he 
scarcely needed to note down many exploratory thoughts on this theme. As I have 
suggested, Richard’s understanding of betrayal is not much different to Stephen’s in 
its core aspects, nor is his conception of nationalistic affiliation as submitting to 
Ireland’s cannibalistic, fratricidal hunger. As such, Joyce did not need to devote as 
much preparatory effort to working through his position, testing it with metaphorical 
associations, and developing ways to add depth to the depiction. The preparatory 
work, in a sense, had been carried out in Dubliners, A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man, and in his Triestine non-fiction. 
Richard Ellmann attributes much of the resurgence in Joyce’s writing shortly 
prior to the composition of Exiles to Joyce’s “affair of the eyes” with the “dark lady” 
of Giacomo Joyce (JJ, 348). Ellmann names this dark lady very directly as Amalia 
Popper, but for various reasons I will make use of Joyce’s intentionally vague 
assignation. For one thing, subsequent scholarship has contested Ellmann’s assertion 
in several ways. Helen Barolini offered an apparently devastating attack on Ellmann’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 This list is of course imperfect and open to some degree of interpretation. Entries that deal 
with both sets of issues have been counted twice.  
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claim by disputing the timeline of Joyce’s supposed affair with Popper. Since Popper 
moved to Florence in 1910, Barolini argues, she would have been absent for many of 
the events Giacomo depicts.179 Peter Costello followed Barolini’s line in James 
Joyce: The Years of Growth and John McCourt cast doubt on the centrality of Amalia 
Popper to Giacomo in showing that while several of Joyce’s female students appear 
to match up with aspects of the narrative, none of them match up with all of them.180 
Vicki Mahaffey has restored a good deal of credibility to Ellmann’s Popper theory by 
pointing out that though Popper moved to Florence in 1910, Joyce continued to see 
the family, a point missed by Barolini and Costello (and, indeed, Ellmann). Certain 
key events also match up, such as the “betrayal” in Giacomo, which occurs at the 
same time as Popper’s engagement to another man, Risolo. Ellmann, at any rate, 
received strong encouragement from both Ottocaro Weiss and Stanislaus Joyce to 
view Popper as the “dark lady,” despite his own concerns about the dates involved.181 
Despite Mahaffey’s restorative work, the matter remains at best contested and it is not 
of sufficient importance to this study to deal with the issue at any great length. I use 
the term “dark lady” to name the character as she appears (composite or not) in 
Giacomo Joyce, but I also use “dark lady” to refer to a specific convocation of extra-
marital desire with the writerly performance of those desires that this affair 
allows/encourages. Giacomo rather than a love letter to a real woman is a 
performance of problematic and taboo desire.  
What is clear, at any rate, is that in the years following the completion (for the 
most part) of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Joyce was developing an 
increasing interest in extra-marital desire, particularly in relation to the complex and 
charged issue of interpersonal betrayal. This does not simply mean adultery in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Helen Barolini, “The Curious Case of Amalia Popper,” New York Review of Books, 20 
November 1969 and again later, and more summatively, in “The end of my Giacomo Joyce 
affair,” Southwest Review, 88.3 (2003): 248-61. 
180 John McCourt, The Years of Bloom: James Joyce in Trieste, 1904-1920 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2000). 
181 Vicki Mahaffey, States of Desire: Wilde, Yeats, Joyce, and the Irish Experiment (Oxford: 
OUP, 1998), 244. 
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standard sense (sex “inter vas naturalis”182 with someone outside one’s marriage) but 
rather an investigation of the emotional possibilities of a desire that is, by its nature, 
forbidden, taboo. More specifically, in Exiles, Joyce attempts to understand such 
desire through the application of his schematic understanding of betrayal. In 
mounting this “study,” as he calls it, Joyce appears to be making a conscious 
contribution to a long literary history. In his preparatory notes, he picks out Othello as 
being “incomplete” as a “study of jealousy” in that its “analysis [is] made from the 
sensationalist standpoint” (Mays, 343). Joyce’s use of the words “analysis” and 
“study” here justify my own use of these and similar words to discuss the heavy 
schematization at work in Exiles and in Joyce’s other works. Joyce’s notes are also 
poetic, thematic, and literary in a way that makes clear that this play is not completely 
and coldly intellectual (functional rather than emotive). More than any other Joycean 
text, the drama is, however, slave to analysis. Indeed, the drama is almost entirely a 
product of that analysis. One might even wish to say that, given the paucity of 
“action,” the analysis is the drama.  
Joyce connects Othello with Spinoza’s analysis of jealousy, where he argues 
that “he who thinks, that a woman whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will 
feel pain, not only because his own desire is restrained, but also because, being 
compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame and the 
excreta of another, he therefore shrinks from her.”183 Both “Othello” and Spinoza 
represent a “sensationalist” understanding of adultery in that they turn irrevocably 
towards a reaction that is violent and overwhelming. Othello is driven, all too easily, 
to murder that which he loves, unable to bear that love while it is continually 
confronted with the false knowledge of her betrayal. The sensational power of such 
representations of adultery relies on the dynamic Spinoza describes. Amatory love is 
depicted as a form of idealization where the loved one is made perfect in the eyes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Joyce’s pronounced and loaded concern with this technical (and, as a result of the church’s 
need to take a position on it, spiritual) definition in Ulysses begins in his notes for Exiles and 
in his construction of the act of betrayal in the play itself. 
183 Joyce quotes a shorter section of this piece in its original Latin—“pudenda et excrementis 
alterius jungere imaginem rei amatae”—which describes the lover’s association of the loved 
one with another’s “excreta”; I have provided the preceding comments to give Spinoza’s 
argument its basic context (Mays, 343). 
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the lover. The adulterous act cannot overwrite this loved image immediately, but 
instead “associates,” in Spinoza’s terms, this ideal image with the foulest (most 
grossly bodily) counterpoint available. In confronting an idyllic image with its 
opposite, a dynamic and painful tension is established. This tension, in general, is 
settled at great cost, by murder, exile, or some other dramatic act. 
Joyce certainly understood and accepted the reality of such bestial jealousy. 
This is clear enough from his response to his former friend Cosgrave’s accusations 
about Nora’s faithlessness in Dublin. When Joyce visited Dublin in 1909, Cosgrave 
suggested to him that while Joyce had believed Nora to be busy at work, she was in 
fact with him, going “for walks along in the darkness along the riverbank.” Despite 
the “inherent improbability of the tale,” as Ellmann puts it, Joyce’s imagination 
carried him to visions of infidelity, treachery, and betrayal (JJ, 279). His next letter to 
Nora, in which he confronts her with this revelation, is self-indulgent but relatively 
restrained as Joyce laments his “sorrow and mortification” and that his “faith in the 
face [he] loved is broken.” But he also recreates his vision of Nora’s treachery “every 
second night” (Joyce’s italics), as she “stood with him: he put his arm around you and 
you lifted your face and kissed him. . . . I can see nothing but your face as it was then 
raised to meet another’s.”184 The concentration on the painful image of the loved one 
(important because, though self-consciously imagined, it presents itself as potentially 
real) is present in this first letter, but the next morning Joyce sent another letter to 
Nora that shows the “Spinozan” turn of his thoughts. The language has become 
cruder and the focus more intensely physical: “were you fucked by anyone before you 
came to me? . . . A gentleman named Holohan . . . wanted to fuck you . . . . Did he do 
so? Or did you allow him to fondle you and feel you with his hands?” (SL, 158-59). 
Despite (or perhaps because of) his experience of such a passionate response to 
the possibility of adultery, in Exiles Joyce is clearly interested in investigating a 
conception of sexual/romantic jealousy beyond that which Spinoza allows. As he puts 
it: “The scholastic definition of jealousy as a passio irascibilis [“spirited resistance”] 
comes nearer—its object being a difficult good” (Mays, 343). Joyce is referring to St 
Thomas Aquinas’s separation of the “passions.” These passions are, in Aquinas’s 
account, essentially the motivators of good; if a thing is good, it may elicit desire so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 This letter, dated 8 August 1909, can be found in SL, 157-158 and is quoted in full in JJ, 
279-80. 
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that in wishing to attain it I wish to benefit myself. So, a good thing may taste 
pleasant, so that I may desire it and, in satisfying that desire, benefit myself. If I feel 
sadness, it is because something stands in the way of my good, which may then lead 
to anger, and then action.185 In Aquinas’s terms, the “concupiscible” passions concern 
the good taken simply: If my hand is in the fire, I am motivated to remove it in order 
to reduce the damage the flame causes. The “irascible passion,” however, has as its 
“object . . . something arduous . . . its tendency is to overcome and rise above 
obstacles.” The object of the irascible passions are necessarily more complex. If I 
remove my hand from the fire as soon as I feel pain, I will avoid the bad (burnt flesh); 
but if I keep my hand in the flame a little longer, then I may be able to save part of a 
manuscript that has been rashly thrown away.186 Peter King has glossed this 
distinction clearly enough: “Concupisible passions are directed at sensible good and 
evil taken simply, as described, whereas irascible passions are directed at sensible 
good and evil taken as difficult.”187  
Joyce’s disagreement with Shakespeare and Spinoza appears to be that their 
descriptions of jealousy are centred on an understanding of the passion of jealousy as 
purely concupiscible, as concerned only with the swift and simple removal of the 
animal pain that jealousy provokes. Through Aquinas’s terminology, Joyce can think 
about jealousy in terms of Aquinas’s conception of man as necessarily body and soul 
in concert (and, at times, in conflict). Exiles is consciously concerned with the 
construction of an apparently detached, spiritual conception of love (and, therefore, 
jealousy, betrayal, adultery) that consciously eschews the reductive animality that 
Joyce reads in other literary accounts of adultery. The act of adultery is perceived not 
as a simple wrong, but as the opportunity for a complex response that tends towards 
the good. Whereas betrayal in Joyce’s preceding writings had tended towards a 
Dantean depiction of betrayal as the ultimate sin, the ultimate dramatic denouement, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 This is my gloss on Aquinas’s argument, the bulk of which can be found in De Animabilus 
VIII. 
186 This, of course, refers to the anecdote regarding Joyce’s sister and the aborted draft of 
Stephen Hero. Whether rescuing part of this abandoned novel was worth burnt hands remains 
up for debate. 
187 Peter King, “Late Scholastic Theories of the Passions: Controversies in the Thomist 
Tradition,” in Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and 
Mikko Yrjönsuuri (London: Kluwer, 2002), 230. 
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Exiles opens the possibility that betrayal, rather than enacting the final severing of 
relationships, may open up more complex possibilities. 
This analysis of love in Exiles centres primarily on a dispute between Richard 
and Robert (and to a lesser extent Bertha) about precisely what love is. While Exiles 
is, fundamentally, a play of ideas, the characters are not merely mouthpieces for a 
Socratic dialogue Joyce is having with himself. As Joyce writes in his notes, “Critics 
may say what they like, all these persons—even Bertha—are suffering during the 
action” (Mays, 343). The ideas Joyce is tossing around also provide the emotional 
dynamic at the centre of the play, as each character’s conception of love determines 
the ways they betray, and understand themselves to be betrayed, by the others. Vicki 
Mahaffey has said that “fundamentally . . . [Exiles] is about: the discovery that 
betrayal is only meaningful in response to a prior expectation.”188 While I would not 
go as far as that, the construction of betrayal as a problem of relationships, as 
something that is the product of relationships, is central to the play’s workings. As I 
have and will argue, the drama of betrayal acts to expose the danger of commitment, 
but the nature of that commitment must determine the nature of the betrayal. That 
said, I am also arguing for a Joycean analysis of betrayal as possessing a logic that, 
once understood, is amenable to manipulation.  
As an aging womanizer and sentimental philosopher (in the sense Stephen 
makes use of in Ulysses), Robert struggles even to use the word “love,” preferring 
“like” or “passion.” He entices Bertha with his desire to speak “the one word which 
[he] has never dared to say to” her,189 but when pushed responds: “that I have deep 
liking for you” (E, 14). It is possible that he is merely being coy in an attempt to draw 
Bertha in (Bertha, for her part, is well aware that she may be merely another of 
Robert’s conquests). Indeed, in his discussion with Richard, it is clear that Robert’s 
understanding of love is essentially as a desire to “possess,” whether “carnally,” 
“spiritually,” or “emotionally” (E, 39). He returns constantly to such language—
“possess[ion]” (E, 37; 54) and “yours” (E, 37; 43; 69)—in his attempts either to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Mahaffey, “Joyce’s Shorter Works,” 201. 
189 This echoes suggestively with “the word known to all men” in Ulysses, which, in the 
Gabler edition at least, is revealed to be “love.” The further association with the “big words 
that make us so unhappy” suggests the question contained in this earlier text: is “love” worth 
all the pain and suffering it causes? 
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describe his own desires or to placate Richard: “[Bertha] is yours, as she was nine 
years ago, when you met her first” (E, 69). It is this conception of love as a form of 
possession that provides the main theoretical and emotional antagonism in the play. 
Richard, the “automystic” moral hero, rejects out of hand this conception of love as 
ownership, insisting instead on an idealized and unworkable conception of love as 
willed dispossession and absolute freedom (“liberation”). He takes this up with 
Robert, who is attempting to justify his own rather aimless hedonism through an 
appeal to nature that is, even in his own terms, really an appeal to animal nature 
devoid of a spiritual sense. 
 
ROBERT   
[Rapidly.] [There] are moments of sheer madness when we feel an intense 
passion for a woman. We see nothing. We think of nothing. Only to 
possess her. Call it brutal, bestial, what you will. 
RICHARD  
[A little timidly.] I am afraid that that longing to possess is not love. 
... 
ROBERT  
But if you love... What else is it? 
RICHARD 
[Hesitatingly.] To wish her well.   
(E, 37) 
 
Richard’s hesitant definition is much like Bloom’s definition of a nation in Ulysses: it 
contains, perhaps, a naive depth of insight, but rather than offer a workable template 
for understanding love, it is essentially a definition built on avoiding other, more 
restrictive definitions. Richard, like Bloom, refuses to define, because such definition 
produces restrictions that are harmful. Joyce’s characters regularly find themselves 
caught between a classicist concern for precise definition—whether in the form of 
Stephen’s aesthetics or Bloom’s idle speculation on all matters—and a constitutional 
distaste (phobia even) for the limitations these definitions provide. Indeed, 
“liberation” from restrictions of all kinds is seen to be Richard’s central motive in the 
play—this is acknowledged by all the characters at one point or another. As Joyce 
suggests in his notes, Richard is throughout the play, to the exclusion of all other 
concerns, “fighting for his own . . . emotional dignity and liberation” (Mays, 348). As 
such, Richard’s definition offers at best a necessary rather than a sufficient condition 
for love. One might even question whether “wishing [another] well” is a necessary 
component of love, since the “complex good” it tends towards can lead to such a 
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miserable form of well-being. The suffering by all characters that Joyce stresses to 
himself in preparing the play190 is a good indication of quite how muddy such waters 
rapidly become. If all these characters are working out of their love for one another—
their desire for each other’s good—then why is this love the direct cause of so much 
suffering? 
The ultimate answer to this question is perhaps the very point the play sets out 
to make: love is suffering. More precisely, love is suffering of a very particular kind, 
brought on by the “wound of doubt” that is seen as the fundamental metaphysical 
price of love. It is on this conception that the play is built and it is, furthermore, 
through this conception of love that betrayal comes to play such a central role. For if 
love is precisely the acceptance of a kind of radical doubt—a radical epistemic 
anxiety—then what better way for Joyce to dramatize the difficulty of this love than 
through the fear of betrayal, which is, by its nature, a fear of the “significant other” as 
significantly other. Richard’s “suspicious nature,” as Robert describes it, is not then 
paranoia in any simple sense. While he is indeed gripped by anxiety and fear, this 
manifests itself not in delusions and irrationality, but rather in a kind of extreme 
rationality; a logic that is so structurally sound as to be straightjacketed. The 
distinction may be slight, but in Exiles, it is key.  
“Paranoia” has in recent years been shown to have been a constitutive feature of 
modernist writing and, indeed, modernity itself. David Trotter has argued that 
modernist experimentation can be understood as a paranoid response to an imagined 
persecution. The lack of a legitimating authority drives a sense of persecution (the 
sense that the modernist artist is maliciously underappreciated) that in turn promotes 
the establishment of a mode of writing that insists on the expertise of the writer as a 
form of symbolic capital. Since this writing is so resistant to general appreciation, a 
vicious circle is formed.191 More recently, John Farrell has traced an older, longer 
history of paranoia from the middle ages through to the eighteenth century, arguing 
for the pervasiveness of paranoid psychology in the literary heroes of modernity.192 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 As previously cited: “All these persons . . . are suffering during the action” (Mays, 343). 
191 David Trotter, Paranoid Modernism: Literary Experiment, Psychosis, and the 
Professionalization of English Society (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
192 John Farrell, Paranoia and Modernity: Cervantes to Rousseau (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2006). 
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And, building on this work, David Spurr has produced a comparative study of the 
paranoid forms of Joyce and Kafka. Joyce’s work, he says, is “the function of a 
relation between himself and the world perceived as essentially antagonistic.”193 I 
have argued in this thesis against this psychologization of Joyce as it crucially 
undervalues the degree of ironic self-awareness built into his literary creations. 
However, there is a great deal of utility in holding on to the psychiatric definition of 
paranoia as a psychological disorder in which the self is given an exaggerated relation 
to the world so that seemingly inconsequential events are folded into an internally 
coherent narrative of extreme persecution. This paranoia is commonly manifested in 
the form of delusions of grandeur, in which the individual posits their own 
importance to the wider world and interprets all sensory data as indicative of this fact. 
While Joyce certainly had a tendency towards such self-aggrandizement, the real 
value of this terminology is that it can help reveal Joyce’s interest in the possibilities 
of mindsets that we might call paranoiac as artistically generative. Stephen’s exile 
and Richard’s exaggerated sensitivity to the possibility of betrayal allow for analyses 
and dramatic situations that are inaccessible to “normal” psychologies. This is 
paranoia as a generative rather than degenerative mentality, as a kind of healthy 
psychosis. 
Love, in Richard’s terms, in contrast to Robert’s insistence on “bestial” 
“possession,” is characterized by the desire to know a (significant) other utterly and 
the counteractive realization that such knowledge is impossible.194 Just as, in 
Spinoza’s terms, the pain of jealousy comes from the extreme contrast between the 
ideal and the degraded, the pain of love comes from the contrast between two sets of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 David Spurr, “Paranoid Modernism in Joyce and Kafka,” Journal of Modern Literature 
34.2 (2011), 179. 
194 I have coined the term “(significant) other” in order to provide some clear distinction 
between the many “others” we encounter. Otherness, being a property of our interaction with 
the world, does not alter from one other to another. But it is clearly necessary when 
discussing amatory betrayal to indicate the different stake one has in this other’s particular 
otherness. For Joyce (and this is made explicit in Exiles), the disciple is also a special kind of 
other. This is perhaps true also of the nation, language, and, particularly, the loving mother. 
All these things require a commitment founded on faith, the danger of which is represented, 
at least in my account, by the risk of betrayal. Faith is necessarily uncertain (certain things 
require no faith) and betrayal is Joyce’s master motif for exposing its nature. 
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apparent absolutes: perfect knowledge / complete unity; and unbridgeable 
separateness / the isolation of the mind/soul. Richard’s concern over the possibility of 
such a connection is indicated partially by his varied terminology. He talks repeatedly 
of his “soul” (E, 73) and of Bertha’s “heart” (E, 44), not to mention his “mind” and 
“thoughts,” but he also uses the more material “brain” (E, 37). The question is not 
just what love is, but where it happens; in the body, as Robert suggests, or in the soul, 
as Richard hopes?  
The key to understanding Richard’s conception of love as “paranoia” lies in his 
description of it as a “wound of doubt” (E, 73). The thematic argument between body 
and mind that occupies the play is brought into a kind of balance here, as the physical 
is used to describe the spiritual; the unknown and therefore unexperienced is realized 
as a direct experience. As Richard says, more fully, “I have wounded my soul for 
you—a deep wound of doubt that can never be healed” (E, 73). Though Richard 
claims to understand love in practical terms—“wishing [another] well” is something 
you do rather than something you are—he is actually concerned primarily with the 
“dignity” and “integrity” of the soul. This is no small distinction in the play, not least 
because Richard’s mysticism is contrasted directly and simply with Richard’s 
physicality in one of the earliest entries in Joyce’s Exiles notes. 
 
Richard – an automystic 
Robert – an automobile 
(Mays, 342) 
 
This separation is obviously suggestive in several ways,195 but most directly it marks 
Richard out, from the earliest point of his conception as a character, as concerned 
with an ontological reality that is not reducible to simple practical terms. In 
conceiving of himself and others in this way—as interacting on a plane of existence 
not directly accessible through the normal worldly senses—Richard shifts the core 
question at the heart of the love relationship into a domain over which standard 
epistemologies have no hold. The question is, simply put, “is the other as I conceive 
her to be?” But within this simple question are contained profound anxieties about the 
nature and possibility of reciprocal relationships. Anxieties that are, for Joyce, best 
understood, illustrated, and dramatized through the exploration of the language and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Not least in its indication that each man represents one of two distinct 
forms/manifestations of modernity: the mechanical and spiritual. 
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structure of betrayal. With its multiple manifestations of betrayal and uncertainty, 
Exiles is not, as Joyce was keen to stress, simply a play about adultery. Rather, as 
Joseph Voelker has put it, it “explores the world's inscrutability through the metaphor 
of sexual betrayal.”196 
The key to Richard’s attention to betrayal is his awareness of the paucity of 
“evidence” for true reciprocity. In his study, Adultery in the Novel, Tony Tanner has 
noted the stress in most dramatizations of adultery on “the wrong kind of evidence.” 
That is to say, in focusing on a handkerchief, Othello believes he can prove or 
disprove Desdemona’s “virtue.” But virtue is an internal feature that is, by its nature, 
intangible.197 While the displacement of concern for something intangible to 
something tangible is, perhaps, only natural, it is nevertheless problematic in that it 
allows for a kind of perverse over-signification.198 In Othello, the fate (and history) of 
a handkerchief becomes the fate of a relationship. While for the reader/audience, this 
may appear to be a particularly powerful form of metaphorical association, for the 
character the process is unconscious and thus the ontological shift—from virtuous to 
vile—appears wholly “real.”199 While the problem is epistemological—it is a matter 
of evidence—it presents itself as indicating a profound ontological shift, as if it were 
tangible evidence of the intangible (human nature), the “nature,” most importantly, of 
the (significant) other in relation to the self.  
While Joyce consciously moves away from the “sensationalism” of Othello in 
Exiles—it’s horrified violence—the structure of the drama of (adulterous) betrayal as 
primarily a negotiation between epistemological and ontological concerns is too 
central to be abandoned altogether. The key shift from what has gone before it—and 
perhaps the primary novelty of this play and, to an extent, Joyce’s entire oeuvre—
comes in the conscious abandonment of any standard of proof. While Othello, for 
example, is “surprised” by the revelation of Desdemona’s (apparent) infidelity,200 
Richard is already prepared for an infidelity that has not occurred—that perhaps will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Voelker, “The Beastly Incertitudes,” 504. 
197 Tanner, Adultery, 40-41. 
198 I discuss this in slightly greater detail in the final chapter of this thesis. 
199 That is to say, not conscious. No connection with Freud is implied. 
200 This is, as Tanner rightly points out, another of the defining characteristics of the literature 
of adultery. See, particularly: Tanner, Adultery, 41. 
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not occur—by his hyper-sensitivity to the epistemological problems built into 
reciprocal relationships. Richard is the master with “faith in the disciple who will 
betray him,” the soon-to-be-betrayed who carries on, fully cognizant of his future, 
having no other satisfactory choice (E, 24). Richard’s declaration is a pointed barb at 
Robert, who claims to have “the faith of a disciple in his master,” but it is also an 
acknowledgement of Richard’s wider conviction that betrayal is always already 
expected, since, for the artist hero, it is always inevitable.  
Richard’s pursuit of spiritual union—“to be united with you in body and soul in 
utter nakedness”—is as hopeful as it is anxious (E, 73). As Richard asks Robert, 
“[h]ave you the luminous certitude that yours is the brain in contact with which 
[Bertha]201 must think and understand”? (E, 37). In the context of their discussion, the 
question is not merely “can you know that she loves you?” Rather, the question is 
“can you be sure that your two spirits are united in perfect, uncorrupted necessity?” 
“Are you he with whom she must be united?” Beyond all practical concerns, Richard 
craves a love that commits fully in such a way that neither individual is fully possible 
without the other. And it is precisely this commitment, or, to use Stanislaus’s word, 
“dedication,” that is key in Joyce’s understanding here. Richard’s “wound” is another 
way of expressing the spiritual commitment he has made. As Stephen fears 
commitment to Ireland since it would leave him exposed to spiritual harm (usually 
expressed physically), Richard is similarly wary of exposing his soul in such a way. 
Yet the major shift between Portrait and Exiles is that while Stephen eventually 
succeeds in evading commitment to anything other than his own soul, Richard has 
willingly, knowingly exposed his soul to Bertha. The language Richard uses to 
describe this state—“nakedness”; “darkness”; “doubt”—is also the language of 
exposure and insecurity. It is the status of the committed soul as unsupported, rather 
than cushioned, by love that motivates Richard’s thoughts, both in his anxiety and in 
his eventual epiphany.  
Given this conception, it is perhaps easier to understand Richard’s behaviour in 
Exiles. In contrast to Robert, “spiritual facts . . . exist and are real for Richard” and 
(Mays, 345), as such, his concern with Bertha’s fidelity is not primarily a concern 
with the act that might mark her infidelity (the physical act, envisaged as the 
“sensational” coupling of ideal and grossly bodily), but with the “evidence” it might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Richard is talking about Bertha, but it may as well be any lover. 
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provide about the state of her soul; and, perhaps more importantly, the state of his 
own soul, which is wrapped up with it. Having no sensory access to the “spiritual 
facts” he is so invested in (he cannot “read in [Bertha’s] heart”), Richard is forced to 
make determinations from evidence that is necessarily of the “wrong kind.” This is 
how we should read Richard’s apparent attempts to push Bertha into Robert’s arms; 
as an unsuccessful but concerted attempt to cheat the logic that drives his anxieties. 
Since negative evidence (i.e. a lack of evidence of Bertha’s “betrayal”) is 
unsatisfying, Richard attempts to create a kind of “positive-negative” evidence (to 
coin a term). In encouraging Bertha to pursue her feelings for Robert to their 
conclusion (whatever it may be), Richard hopes to prove that she is, once all 
limitation is set aside, true to him. Each prompt from Richard is then another, greater 
test, as he attempts to remove all barriers between Bertha and Robert (and any other 
men she might like) so that she may pass or fail uninhibited by any pressure, societal 
or otherwise.  
Richard is still labouring against, rather than accepting, what Janine Utell refers 
to as “the pain that lies at the core of love.” Simply put, this pain comes from the 
realization that “the otherness of the beloved” is absolute, that “[n]o matter how much 
of a union” two lovers “achieve, they can never overcome the fact of their otherness 
to each other, the separateness that exists even in love: [the] ultimate and entire 
strangeness” of the (significant) other.202 For Utell, this fits into a broader account of 
what she reads as Joyce’s gradual acknowledgement in his fiction of the need to 
accept the radical otherness of the other. Her decision to call this acceptance “marital 
love” is perplexing and unhelpful given Joyce’s clear antagonism towards traditional 
legal union,203 but the central contention that Joyce is heavily pre-occupied with the 
problem of the (significant) other’s otherness (the “beloved other” in Utell’s terms) 
is, essentially, what I have argued for throughout this chapter and in this thesis as a 
whole. Where we perhaps digress most clearly is, first, in my contention that this 
radical anxiety is a feature of all relationships where any kind of commitment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Utell, James Joyce and the Revolt of Love, 28-29. 
203 The clearest account of Joyce’s awareness of the limitations of marriage is still probably 
Richard Brown’s James Joyce and Sexuality (Cambridge: CUP, 1988), where, for example, 
he describes Joyce’s depiction of “the inadequacy of the matrimonial formulation of the 
sexual relationship” (35).  
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(“dedication”) is required, however small; and, second, my contention that the 
structure of betrayal is fundamental to Joyce’s understanding of this problem. Neither 
Utell, nor those who share her interest in an “Ethical” Joyce make serious reference to 
the functioning of betrayal in this respect.204  
The “twoness” of relationships—what Richard Brown describes as Joyce’s 
“presentation of individuals as fundamentally separate from each other”205—is a 
necessary condition for (sexual and emotional) betrayal as, for a betrayal to take 
place, there must be an independent and ultimately inscrutable other to enact that 
betrayal. Equally, however, the potency of this form of betrayal lies also in the 
ceaseless tension between separation and unification it enables; the experienced faith 
that “oneness” can be manifested between two individuals through the 
sexual/emotional relationship and the equally experienced certainty that such oneness 
is impossible. The tension between these two realizations powers Exiles, but it 
powers in a different way the standoffish independence of Stephen Dedalus in 
Portrait and Ulysses. While Richard constructs himself on many of the same 
principles of forced detachment that Stephen does, he is, in a sense, already in the 
position that Stephen sought to avoid. 
The first of several tactics Richard establishes in an attempt to cheat or escape 
from the logic he has discovered, is based on the spiritual paradigm that motivates his 
anxieties. Richard privileges a form of non-contingence that is, ultimately, 
impossible. In this formation, any kind of influence over the (significant) other is 
deemed to be pernicious in that it is only in a state of complete “freedom” that the 
actions of that other can be considered valuable. To put it another way, the evidential 
quality of the (significant) other’s actions—e.g. not sleeping with another person—
ceases to have value, since it has been, in a sense, corrupted. Richard is attempting, 
essentially, to make inaction signify in a way that it cannot. This is, partly, why 
Richard is so committed to an apparently ethical refusal to limit Bertha’s “freedom.” 
Bertha, not wishing to hurt Richard, implores him: “my God, tell me what you wish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 I have other concerns with both Utell’s account and, in many similar respects, that of 
Christopher Devault in Joyce’s Love Stories (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013). I will take up some 
specific examples later in this chapter and in my discussion of the Bloom’s marital life in the 
final chapter of this thesis. 
205 Brown, Joyce and Sexuality, 35. My italics. 
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me to do?” As Bertha has what we might call a “common”206 understanding of love 
and monogamy, she sees no contradiction in amending her behaviour to avoid pain to 
her lover. But for Richard, who yearns for the confirmation of spiritual necessity 
(non-contingent love), even this kind of influence is fatal. What (the fear of) betrayal 
elucidates is a fundamental metaphysical awareness of the dangers of contingency; no 
matter how secure a relationship is, while it is based on grounds that can shift, they 
may indeed shift at any moment. Richard’s (hopeless) desire for a paradigmatic love 
is also the (hopeless) desire for absolute security. In his heightened state of anxiety, 
the mere structural possibility of betrayal is intolerable.  
The only kind of love that might offer this security would be some form of 
unconditional love. While in Ulysses, Stephen attributes this quality to “amor matris: 
subjective and objective genitive” (U, 2.126), in Exiles the mother’s love (and love 
for the mother) is deeply problematic. She stands to remind the reader both of 
Richard’s heroism (the price he must pay for his principles) and how “unnatural” he 
is, how incapable of the easy, natural love common to all people: Bertha says to 
Richard, “I never heard of any human being that did not love the mother that brought 
him into the world, except you” (E, 29). Richard’s mother, with her “cold blighted 
love,” demands that certain conditions be satisfied, even as her love remains 
unconditional. This is a form of love to be “fought against” rather than accepted (or 
reciprocated).207 Whether or not motivated by the unsatisfactory nature of his 
relationship with his mother,208 Richard requires then a form of love that asks nothing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 No word sits quite right here and, though “common” contains largely unhelpful class 
connotations, it avoids the judgemental overtones of “normal” and “regular.” The point 
being—and it is a point that is important to the dynamic of the play—that Bertha has an 
everyday, perhaps naive, understanding of love that is constantly challenged by Richard’s 
endless, anxious theorizing.  
207 I do not want to discuss this at any length here, as it is better suited to the discussion of 
“amor matris” I undertake in the next chapter. Suffice it to say that while the two mothers 
differ fundamentally—one “turns aside,” the other is turned aside from—the result is much 
the same: a sense of guilt that the love proffered could not be returned in kind. 
208 If I were to provide a psychoanalytical reading of Richard’s paranoia, I might suggest that 
his anxieties about love come from what he perceives to be his mother’s failure to love him. I 
would argue, perhaps, that Richard’s search for a love without conditions is an attempt to 
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of him except that he give himself wholly. As Richard explains to Bertha, who asks 
him “why will you not defend me?”: 
 
I cannot, dear. [Struggling with himself.] Your own heart will tell you. 
[He seizes both her hands.] I have a wild delight in my soul, Bertha, as I 
look at you. I see you as you are yourself. That I came first in your life or 
before him then – that may be nothing to you. You may be his more than 
mine. 
(E, 46) 
 
The meaning is ambiguous: is this a test by which Bertha may prove that Richard’s 
primacy is meaningful to her, or a test by which she may discover it for herself? The 
stress however is on contingency, on the radical stripping away of both those things 
that emerge from chance and circumstance (the “coming before”) and all those things 
built on that foundation: affection, pity, the gradual tying together of lives and 
responsibilities that for many defines marital love. Essentially, for Richard, “what ifs” 
become intolerable reminders of the contingency of the monogamous bond. To 
reduce this effect, he forces Bertha into a state where she is “abandoned spiritually . . 
. . [Her soul] is [that] of a woman left naked and alone that it may come to an 
understanding of its own nature” [Mays, 344]. More importantly for Richard, this 
spiritual abandonment may allow him to come to know its nature. 
The obvious ethical, social, and political aspects of Exiles’s championing of the 
difficulties of “free love” over the apparent securities of socially sanctioned marriage 
can be seen then to collapse back into a perverse concern for the security marriage is 
supposed to provide. In Exiles, marriage proper instead becomes a place of insecurity; 
adultery is a product of, rather than an external challenge to, marriage. In Richard’s 
scheme, the restriction of freedom renders the value of the marriage void, since it 
represents an artificial and unsatisfactory preservation of the structure of 
monogamous love, without providing any guarantees that the love will continue to 
inhabit the structure. This means that readings of Exiles that seek to emphasize its 
radical social politics—its attempt, for example, to forge “a new ethics” of “constant 
individual rights to choose one’s partner according to actual feelings . . . in defiance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
replace the unsatisfactory love provided by his mother. But while this is perfectly plausible as 
a reading of Exiles, it fails to account for this same concern in Joyce’s other fiction. 
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of bourgeois rules”209—tend to overplay Joyce’s commitment to social reform and to 
underplay Exiles’s commitment to a far more intensely psychological and spiritual 
investigation of the philosophical possibility of knowing the other.  
 
“He longs to be delivered”: Betrayal as deliverance from doubt / innocence 
In order to do the ideas in Richard’s position justice, I have so far discussed his 
motivations as if his response to metaphysical crisis were straightforward and 
uncomplicated, even if strange and difficult. But Joyce—indeed, Richard—is entirely 
conscious of the complex, messy motivations that drive the mannered action of the 
play. These competing motivations are similarly sourced in the same response to 
radical anxieties about the (significant) other. For if the logic of Richard’s anxieties is 
accepted, there are only two true releases from the metaphysical uncertainty he 
experiences. The first is the “luminous certitude” Richard has lost and cannot again 
retain, an ecstatic but unsustainable state, characterized as an awareness of the 
(significant) other’s non-contingent acceptance of the self, and of the shared spiritual 
unity that follows from this.210 This confirmation is powerful but only temporary, 
since it relies on a state of mind rather than any “evidence” that might sustain it. The 
second release, though painful, is a far more powerful form of deliverance, being the 
confirmation of those anxieties in the form of a measurable betrayal.211 As such, 
while betrayal is to be feared for the damage it threatens, it is also perversely 
appealing, since it offers a way to ease the constant metaphysical tension at the heart 
of the love relationship. Robert appears to grasp some of this in Richard’s behaviour; 
as he says to Bertha: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Giuseppina Restivo, “From Exiles to Ulysses: The Influence of Three Italian Authors on 
Joyce—Giacosa, Praga, Oriani,” in Anglo-American Modernity and the Mediterranean: 
Milan, 29-30 September 2005, ed. Caroline Patey, Giovanni Cianci, and Francesco Cuojati 
(Milan: Cisalpino, 2006), 135. 
210 I would say unattainable since, logically, it is. But Richard has experienced it, even if this 
was a form of happy delusion. 
211 There may be some value in adopting a quasi-Lacanian language here. Much as “desire” 
for a specific object merely soothes temporarily the unsatisfiable “Desire” at the core of one’s 
being (that is, desire itself, without any object), the confirmation that betrayal provides is a 
specific deliverance from the non-specific anxiety at the core of social being. 
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[T]here is no harm. . . . He does not know yet what I feel. He has left us 
alone here at night, at this hour, because he longs to know it – he longs to 
be delivered.  
(E, 54) 
 
This “long[ing] to be delivered” manifests then in Richard’s desire for resolution. He 
wishes to see Bertha and Robert come together in an embrace that, in confirming the 
object of his fear, will do away with that fear. 
 Richard craves also the release that is to be found in a masochistic form of 
utter humiliation, which shares a similar but counterbalancing dynamic of release. I 
will not go into this at any length here, since Joyce deals with this in greater detail in 
Ulysses. But while there the masochistic tendency is built into his unusual everyman, 
Bloom, the seductive power of betrayal in Exiles is seen as emerging directly from 
the specific psychology of the artist hero. Richard’s desire to be “betrayed . . . 
secretly, meanly, craftily” is not simply a subconscious craving that could be 
explained away clinically. That is to say, it plays a role in his self-analysis that is 
partly conscious. For his desire to be betrayed is consciously a desire for renewal and 
release from the immense pressures of his heightened spiritual ethics. Unlike 
Stephen, who craves betrayal for its capacity to confirm his value as hero and poet, 
Richard wishes for the destruction of his own heightened existence: “to be 
dishonoured for ever in love and in lust, to be . . . for ever a shameful creature and to 
build up my soul again out of the ruins of shame.” Richard’s ceaseless pursuit of 
spiritual perfection, dignity, and freedom is difficult, unnatural, and psychologically 
taxing. In pursuing his own perfectability, Richard must also confront his own 
imperfection. Thus adulterous betrayal, in its most extreme, “sensational,” form 
offers a release from the pressures this discrepancy brings. The confirmation of his 
wretchedness would relieve Richard of the burden of his potential perfection.  
 
“Steal you could not . . . nor take by violence”: (Dis)possession as self-defence 
It may appear that we have moved away somewhat from betrayal in these 
discussions of spiritual connection. For, indeed, how is betrayal possible when 
everything takes place in the open and nothing is off limits? Betrayal implies that a 
covenant or agreement has been broken, that a deceit has been carried out, and that 
harm has been done by one who is trusted to one who trusted. Robert could well 
claim to have been betrayed by Bertha, who in his mind has been “informing” on him 
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to Richard (betraying his trust); one of the few direct references to betrayal in the play 
comes when Bertha reacts unhappily to Richard’s having confronted Robert. She 
assumes that Robert will have reacted, to use the term I have above, in the “common” 
way: “He hates me. He believes I made a fool of him – betrayed him.” Richard 
similarly does claim to have been betrayed by Robert, his “disciple,” in several ways. 
But on what grounds would Richard be able to claim he had been betrayed by 
Bertha?212 As Bertha says to Richard: “There is one person in all this who is not a 
fool. And that is you. I am though. And [Robert] is” (E, 45). Given the history of 
adultery in literature, this cognizance is significant. As Richard Brown has 
commented, Richard’s position is “not one of ignorance, compromise, comedy and 
victimization but one where high principles and a degree of heroism may be 
attained.”213 This stands in stark contrast to Charles Bovary, say, who Joyce cites in 
his notes as the cause of an esthetic shift of “the centre of sympathy . . . from the 
lover or fancyman to the husband or cuckold.” This “change is utilised in Exiles” to 
give Richard’s “spiritual revolt . . . some chance of fighting before the public a drawn 
battle” (Mays, 344-45).214 Joyce may be right that “public” affection had shifted from 
the Don Giovannis of literature to the Bovarys—something he plays on in Ulysses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Vicki Mahaffey provides an excellent gloss of the ways that each of the characters betray 
each of the others: Mahaffey, “Joyce’s Shorter Works,” 202-04. Mahaffey makes perceptive 
connections between this web of betrayal and Tristan & Isolde, which clearly provided a 
contributory model for Exiles. As critics like Mahaffey have ably demonstrated what I take to 
be a more or less self-evident aspect of the play—to the extent that anyone betrays anyone, 
everyone betrays everyone—I have not taken the time to go through this in this chapter. 
213 Brown, Joyce and Sexuality, 18. 
214 For a brief account of Joyce’s understanding of this change in audience affection in the 
context of shifting social “possibilities,” see Richard Brown “Shifting Sexual Centres: Joyce 
and Flaubert” in “Scribble” 2: Joyce et Flaubert, ed. Claude Jacquet and André Topia (Paris: 
Minard, 1990), 65-84. For an alternative account of this shift in the nineteenth-century 
English novel, see Barbara Leckie, Culture and Adultery: The Novel, the Newspaper, and the 
Law, 1857-1914 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). She suggests, 
summatively, that “[o]ne encounters fantasies of adulterous desire replaced by fantasies of 
spectacular surveillance as the novels in the English tradition, again and again, choose to 
approach adultery not from the perspective of a character involved in adultery, but rather 
from the perspective of the betrayed party” (9). 
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with great success—but Richard’s dour hyperawareness and Bovary’s comic 
ignorance in the face of increasingly irresistible evidence elicit fundamentally 
differing responses. As Scarlett Baron has commented, “Joyce wished to make 
Richard impressive rather than likeable . . . an object of awed respect rather than 
sympathy.”215  
Richard is aware of most of what goes on and manipulates the other characters 
into action. This is not to say that Richard knows whether Bertha has slept with 
Robert or not. As John MacNicholas displayed with convincing comprehensiveness 
in 1973, both the audience of Exiles and Richard himself are, due to Joyce’s refusal to 
disclose certain information, unable to establish what has happened between Robert 
and Bertha.216 Joseph Voelker has commented, with some exasperation, that “[t]he 
play goes to absurd lengths to keep us in the dark. Even Robert and Bertha do not 
seem to know what has gone on between them.”217 This preservation of doubt is of 
course crucial to the play’s workings, since its logic insists that doubt is unavoidable. 
The play is unsatisfyingly static,218 denying the audience the traditional resolution 
provided by the literature of adultery.219 The audience may well desire the same 
release that Richard does—deliverance from doubt through the confirmation of 
adultery—but such release is denied, as it is denied to Richard. But the question 
remains, if Bertha has slept with Robert, would this act in any meaningful way 
constitute a betrayal?  
Let us assume, then, that Bertha has slept with Robert. She has been sent to the 
house by Richard to find what is “in [her] heart,” encouraged to discount Richard’s 
feelings, and to do whatever she desires without thought to the pain it might cause 
him. Whatever she does, she does with Richard’s blessing, and with his prior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Scarlett Baron, Strandentwining Cable: Joyce, Flaubert, and Intertextuality (Oxford: 
OUP, 2012), 124. Baron devotes a short chapter to the role of Flaubert in shaping Joyce’s 
descriptions of adultery, “Adultery and Sympathy in Ulysses and Exiles,” Strandentwining 
Cable, 107-32. 
216 John MacNicholas, “Joyce’s Exiles: The Argument for Doubt,” JJQ 11.1 (1973): 33-40.  
217 Voelker, “The Beastly Incertitudes.” 
218 MacNicholas similarly suggests that the play is “static” as a result of Joyce’s refusal to 
disclose certain information: “Exiles: An Argument for Doubt,” 38.  
219 For an account of the bourgeois operation of the literature of adultery and the type of 
resolution such texts generally provide, see Tanner, Adultery in the Novel. 
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knowledge. To put these points another way, there is no covenant to be broken and no 
need for treachery. Whatever harm Bertha’s actions might produce, they cannot 
reasonably be described as a betrayal. I have described Richard’s logic so far in terms 
of his desire for “evidence” and his secret longing for “release,” but this situation is 
also the product of a refinement of the logic of betrayal to such a point that betrayal 
ceases to be possible. In Portrait, Stephen sees betrayal written into the structure of 
all relationships and manipulates this structure to drive his flight from Ireland. The 
absence of meaningful betrayal at the culmination of Exiles is a result of Richard’s 
extension of this logic in an attempt to take the sting out of the betrayal he, sharing 
Stephen’s analyses, anticipates everywhere. 
The key to Richard’s logic is found in a short discussion he has with his son, 
Archie, where, quite unasked, he describes the logic of “giving.” 
 
Do you understand what it is to give a thing? . . . While you have a thing 
it can be taken from you. . . . But when you give it, you have given it. No 
robber can take it from you. [He bends and presses his son’s hand against 
his cheek.] It is yours then for ever when you have given it. It will be 
yours always. That is to give.  
(E, 25) 
 
What Richard is describing to his son is a defensive posture. The pleasure of 
possession contains within it the corresponding fear of loss, a fear that is made all the 
more potent by the knowledge that another might seek to take possession by force. 
This forceful dispossession is seen as sharing its form (structure) with betrayal, since 
both require that victim/betrayed has his or her will counteracted, violently and 
stealthily.220 As the pleasure of love includes within it the fear of betrayal, the 
pleasure of possession includes within it the fear of dispossession. For this fear to be 
removed, the pleasure of possession must first be given up, willingly, so that that fear 
might have no object. Analogously, the pleasure of possession built into the love 
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relationship (the satisfaction of monogamy, uniqueness, possession) must also be 
willingly sacrificed, so that the pain of betrayal has no hold. Robert suggests this 
possibility to Richard when he asks:  
 
[T]here was danger for you too . . . was there not? . . . [I]f you had not 
spoken. If you had watched and waited on until . . . I had come to like her 
more and more . . . to love her. . . . I could have said only: . . . I love her 
and I will take her from you, however, because I love her.  
(E, 36) 
 
Richard’s quick response—“Do you mean by stealth or violence?”—displays his 
transference of the principles of theft to the principles of “sensational” adulterous 
betrayal. “Steal you could not in my house because my doors were open: nor take by 
violence if there were no resistance” (E, 36). If the pain of adulterous betrayal is the 
pain of dispossession against one’s will, then, Richard reasons, willing self-
dispossession is the only way to avoid such pain altogether. To put it another way, his 
understanding of the mechanics (structure) of betrayal allow him to construct a 
defensive posture by which betrayal will itself be short-circuited.  
This logic leads Richard to become fixated on theft. He erupts at Robert’s 
desire to carry on wooing Bertha in secret, declaring him “A liar, a thief, and a fool! 
Quite clear! A common thief! . . . A thief—nothing else! But a fool also!” (E, 29). 
Richard’s anger comes not from the fact of Robert’s affection for Bertha, which he 
has encouraged, but that Robert’s subterfuge should threaten to deny Richard the 
satisfaction of his cultivated immunity. It is only through owning and enacting his 
own dispossession that Richard might find some equanimity. But Richard is also 
responding with anger to Robert’s attempts to convert his heroic non-conformance 
into a stock situation and him into a stock character: the “cuckold.” Robert hesitates 
in naming Bertha to Richard, admitting that “I admire very much the personality of 
your...of...your wife.” Haltingly, he attempts to restore conventional order to a 
situation that lacks it. As Jean-Michel Rabaté explains, Robert “prefers to place her 
and himself in the bourgeois situation of adultery, in which stock responses to typical 
situations allow people to go on playing a game, whilst he feels totally unsure of 
himself in Richard’s mystical and perverse drama.”221 
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“He’s lost in his philosophy” 
The willing dispossession Richard practices is essentially an extension of the 
logic both Richard and Stephen engage in their refusal to commit to Ireland. Sensing 
the dangers of such commitment, in Portrait Stephen simply refuses it, consciously 
breaking ties where he finds them. Richard, fearing dispossession, refuses to possess 
in the first place. But Joyce’s depiction of the struggle of both men is deeply aware of 
the pretensions, conceits, and pitfalls of these positions. And in Exiles Joyce charts 
the impossibility of sustaining such an “unnatural” position. Richard’s refusal of 
possession and his hopeless pursuit of significant evidence of fidelity both fail to heal 
his “wound of doubt.” The question that has defined critical and lay responses to the 
play has perhaps always been to what extent we are supposed to accept Richard’s 
self-flagellation on its own terms. Much as debate about Portrait for many years 
hinged on whether we should read Joyce’s depiction of Stephen as earnest or ironic, 
Exiles has suffered from the perception that Joyce takes Richard more seriously than 
most of his readers. Various critics have set out their stall on this, placing the play 
somewhere on a continuum from dark comedy to earnest autobiography. For my part, 
I take Joyce’s constructive process to be roughly the same as that I described in the 
preceding chapter. Thoughts, feelings, actions undergo a process of 
“intellectualization” that makes them ripe for transmutation into art. Joyce once 
wrote, in reference to Ibsen’s When We Dead Awaken, that “the naked drama—either 
the perception of a great truth, or the opening up of a great question, or a great 
conflict which is almost independent of the conflicting actors, and has been and is of 
far-reaching importance—this is what rivets our attention.”222 Joyce can’t be said to 
have modelled his play entirely on this reading of Ibsen—he was clearly invested in 
the construction of his characters—but in abandoning natural speech for mannered 
dialogue (there is barely a contraction in the play) and closely observed behaviour for 
outlandish and pretentious gesture, Joyce sets the exploration of the play’s central 
question ahead of, rather than in tandem with, the exploration of character. 
But, though the balance is not struck as well as it is in Portrait (and certainly 
not as well as it is in Ulysses) Joyce does allow for criticism of his protagonist even 
as he demands that his motivations be understood (and accepted). Joyce can insist on 
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the relevance and value of Richard’s tortured self-analysis even as he distances 
himself from it. For, ultimately, Richard’s understanding of betrayal, his fear of the 
dedication that precedes it, and his secret longing for release, all represent the 
culmination of a line of thinking that Joyce began in Dubliners and continued through 
his non-fiction and then in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. They are these 
ideas taken to their limit. But the result is a character who is, to borrow Bertha’s 
astute observation, “lost in his philosophy” (E, 50). Richard is the endpoint of a line 
of thinking that can only result in a form of paralysis as pernicious as that which he 
seeks to escape.  
In this respect, Richard prepares for the revaluation of Stephen that occurs in 
Ulysses and, relatedly, for the revaluation of a paranoid artistic perspective. In 
Portrait betrayal offered a powerful dramatic structure through which commitment 
could be evaded without the sacrifice of dignity. To put it another way, Stephen could 
refuse the lure of heroism (which in his terms meant death), while preserving for 
himself a greater heroism in exile. Richard’s focus on the logic of betrayal is 
destructive, however, turning in on itself in a narcissistic spiral of self-regard, self-
examination, and self-justification. Joyce’s description of Richard as an “auto-
mystic” (italics mine) could not be more apt, since he is both subject and object of all 
his inquiries. The Stephen of Portrait is a willing manipulator of an anxious logic of 
dedication and betrayal that, while experienced deeply, is turned towards his own 
empowerment. His sense of himself as victim is also his sense of himself as victor.223 
Richard, however, finds no meaningful mechanism with which to redirect his anxious 
energy, which instead begins to feed on itself. Doubt leads to doubt leads to doubt, ad 
infinitum, without reprieve. For relief is not to be found within the logic that has 
produced it. Richard realizes as much in the final pages of the play, as Bertha tries to 
reassure him about the events of the night before. 
 
BERTHA 
Do you not wish to know – about what happened last night? 
RICHARD  
That I will never know. 
BERTHA 
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I will tell you if you ask me. 
RICHARD  
You will tell me. But I will never know. Never in this world. 
BERTHA 
I will tell you the truth, Dick, as I always told you. I never lied to you. 
RICHARD  
[Clenching his hands in the air, passionately.] Yes, yes. The truth! But I 
will never know, I tell you. 
 (E, 65) 
 
Adultery, rather than the cause of anxiety, is one expression of a more fundamental 
understanding of the impossibility of knowledge. In Richard, Joyce gives himself free 
rein to take these philosophical questions to their absolute limit, to test them against 
genuinely emotive human issues. Joyce’s concern that the “critics” would fail to see 
how much his characters suffered was almost comically misplaced; the characters 
suffer and suffer and suffer. Yet the problem for the audience has always been 
whether this pain is, ultimately, necessary. Richard’s anxieties may be the logical 
result of a chain of thinking that is irrefutable at every stage, but do these micro-
concerns really add up to something as grandiose, as earth-shattering as this suggests? 
If Richard is, as Joseph Voelker puts it, “doubt personified,” is the nature of that 
doubt too far removed from reasonable concern to merit the audience’s attention and 
pity? The difficult stage history of the play and its relegation to the second tier of 
Joyce’s canon would suggest it is. It is hard to pity Richard his pain, when it appears 
that he has worked so hard to produce it—it comes from nothing and moves towards 
nothing except its own continuation. 
Richard would have done well to have heeded the words of the great sceptic 
David Hume who, while acknowledging that certainty of any reasonable kind was by 
necessity impossible, suggested that a functioning remnant of such certainty could be 
retained. This crumb, “is sufficient for our own purpose, either in philosophy or 
common life.” Moreover, if reason alone does not prove sufficient to dispel the kind 
of all-encompassing incertitude that Richard suffers, “nature herself suffices to that 
purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by 
relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, 
which obliterate all these chimeras.” For nature makes such excessive speculations 
“so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them 
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any farther.”224 Joyce’s observation in his notes that “[a]ll Celtic philosophers seemed 
to have inclined towards incertitude or scepticism – Hume, Berkeley, Balfour, 
Bergson” suggests Richard’s place in this Celtic philosophical succession, but he is 
deprived the kind of worldliness that allowed those philosophers to negotiate a way 
of living. 
Richard’s failure to reach Hume’s natural threshold is another example of how 
“unnatural” he is. And though this lack of nature is seen throughout Joyce’s earlier 
writings as a form of heroic liberation from common morality and self-defeating 
sentimentality, its problematic treatment in Exiles paves the way for a similar 
questioning in Ulysses, where Stephen’s similar contrivances are seen to fail him. 
Richard’s attempts to keep “himself heroically conscious by means of the self-
induced agonies of incertitude” work ultimately to undermine the value of that form 
of heroism.225 In Exiles, the clearest marker of Joyce’s abandonment of radical doubt 
as a workable perspective is seen in the play’s most inscrutable moment. In the 
middle of an intense discussion between Robert and Richard, the voice of a 
“fisherwoman” enters in through the window, disrupting the close atmosphere of the 
play and puncturing its pretence. We can give meaning to this intrusion in a number 
of ways, by playing on the “herrings” she is selling—“red herrings” may suggest 
intentional misdirection on Robert’s part. Perhaps we may find in it a reference to 
Hamlet, who feigning madness, calls Polonius “a fishmonger” and, when Polonius 
corrects him, complains that he wishes he “were as honest as a fishmonger.”226 Both 
readings are feasible, involved as they are in matters of truth and deceit, adultery and 
betrayal. But perhaps it is better to think of this kind of reader process as itself a kind 
of red herring. We are drawn into Richard’s “paranoid” process, desperately working 
to force meaning on to any apparently random event, when the real effect of that 
voice is to disrupt the obsessive narcissism of the play. Perhaps this is a voice from 
the outside world sent to remind the audience how small, how excessively focused 
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this depiction of human interaction is. The encyclopaedic inclusiveness of Ulysses 
and Finnegans Wake was perhaps made possible by the microscopic excesses of 
Exiles. For in taking the fundamental logic of betrayal and studying its most extreme 
tendencies, by addressing his “great question,” Joyce paved the way for an analytic 
and narrative process that was so much more inclusive—a process that was so much 
more human—than was possible in the character of Richard Rowan. 
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Chapter Five: Betrayal, Stagnation, and the Family Romantic in Ulysses 
 
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man establishes its narrative centre almost 
immediately. There are no quibbles, no doubts about who the protagonist of this 
novel is or may be. So centred is the narration on this still nameless child (we are 
given a pseudonym, “baby tuckoo”) that it warps and bends to fit his mental shape.227 
If we needed any more convincing that this character commanded the full attention of 
the narration, the text eschews lyrical wisdom and detailed description for “insights” 
of another sort altogether: “[w]hen you wet the bed first it is warm then it gets cold” 
(P, 5). Such banalities are justified because they help build a picture of the budding 
artist and, as such, they contribute to the clarity of subject and purpose provided by 
the novel’s teleologically suggestive title. There is a certainty in these first few pages 
that in this young man we have the “artist” in whom this novel finds its subject and, 
as such, that his fate is at the centre of our concern. The flight from Ireland at the end 
of the novel is, in a sense, anticipated at its beginning. 
By contrast, for all that Ulysses is expressly a return to the story of Stephen 
Dedalus—it begins, after all, with three or so episodes (the equivalent of a long short 
story) that centre on him and his movements—the certainty of subject and purpose 
that we find in Portrait appears to have disappeared. Indeed, while Portrait opens 
(and closes) expressly and dramatically on the figure of Stephen Dedalus, Ulysses 
opens on another figure entirely. It is “[s]tately, plump Buck Mulligan” who comes 
“from the stairhead,” Buck Mulligan who quotes the Latin Mass, and Buck Mulligan 
who fills the first few pages of the novel with his presence. Stephen is not named 
until the second page of Portrait, but Mulligan is named in the first line of Ulysses. 
The comparison seems playfully and suggestively self-conscious. As the “moocow 
[came] down along the road,” so Buck “came from the stairhead,” but while the 
moocow’s importance is immediately folded into Stephen’s narrative—he “met a 
nicens little boy named baby tuckoo. . . . He [Stephen] was baby tuckoo”—Buck 
emerges into an empty kitchen, filling it with his rambunctious presence. He calls 
Stephen swiftly, naming him “Kinch.” Where Portrait handed the narrative 
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immediately over to Stephen, Ulysses resists this transference. Stephen is named, but 
Buck is active, filling the space of the kitchen and the space of the page with his 
speech and his movements. Stephen, the central subject of Portrait narrative, is 
briefly transfigured into “Kinch,” the secondary subject of Buck’s story. It is not just 
that Mulligan is more entertaining than Stephen, but that he demands to be made the 
centre of attention and activity. He demands, in essence, to be made the centre of the 
novel that is about to unfold. The reader of Portrait last saw Stephen heading 
willingly into glorious exile, confidently predicting a future of achievement and 
discovery, announcing his determination to “forge in the smithy of [his] soul the 
uncreated conscience of [his] race” (P, 213). His “weapons”—“silence, exile, and 
cunning”—appear to have given way. Stephen is sullen and quiet, but not quite 
silent—he is not goaded into speech until the second page (U, 1.48). If Stephen is an 
exile, where is he exiled from and to? He lives now within walking distance of most 
of the houses in which he has ever lived. Cunning he may be, but it does not appear to 
have done him any great service. Portrait ended with a new beginning (a going 
forth), but Ulysses appears to begin with an ending, a final look at where Stephen has 
“ended up.” If Stephen’s new beginning was indeed a false one, the text seems to 
suggest, perhaps Buck could be the source of a new, less embattled narrative? 
Of course, as Ulysses unfolds, we are drawn back into Stephen’s narrative. If 
nothing else, the privilege of internal monologue assures us of Stephen’s narrative 
centrality; Stephen’s thoughts and feelings quite literally shape the language and 
structure of the events depicted. But this initial uncertainty over Stephen’s centrality 
has already raised a question that the first episodes of Ulysses set about answering: 
what has happened to Stephen between the end of Portrait and the beginning of 
Ulysses? How does he differ and why? The most basic question—why is Stephen still 
in Dublin?—is also a much larger one—(why) has he failed to fulfil his own 
predictions of artistic greatness and heroic exile? 
As we read the opening episodes, we can piece together some of the necessary 
information: Stephen was called back from Paris because of his mother’s fatal illness; 
her subsequent death and his refusal to pray at her bedside in the final days has left 
him guilt-ridden and ideologically conflicted; he is poor, in debt to many of his 
friends and acquaintances, but earns a small wage teaching at a private school. He 
cannot, perhaps, afford to strike out once again for the continent. It is clear from the 
off, however, that his unsatisfactory situation is not the result, ultimately, of financial 
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or other practical considerations, even if for Stephen “the problem is to get money” 
(U, 1.497). Joyce certainly put weight on these practical matters, singling out Ibsen’s 
failure to depict the financial realities of his characters as a mark of his, ultimately 
unsatisfying, “heroics.”228 But Stephen’s clearly spendthrift habits are ample 
evidence that Stephen could gather together enough money for a ticket to the 
continent if he so desired. Stephen’s problem is, rather, psychological. His calm, 
disdainful superiority has given way to irritation, resentment, bitterness. Whereas 
previously he has had an assuredness in his own destiny that transformed the many 
indignities he felt in his life into a necessary stage in his overcoming, he now seems 
to “suffer” them as an inescapable aspect of the life he must lead, a life that does not 
redeem or give meaning to these indignities. His enigmatical retorts now seem to be a 
way of living in the flawed world he finds about him, rather than a way of talking 
himself beyond it.  
As Stephen walks along Sandymount strand, he looks back with some shame on 
the grandiosities of his youth. 
 
Reading two pages apiece of seven books every night, eh? I was young. 
You bowed to yourself in the mirror, stepping forward to applause 
earnestly, striking face. Hurray for the Goddamned idiot! Hray! No-one 
saw: tell no-one. Books you were going to write with letters for titles. 
Have you read his F? O yes, but I prefer Q. Yes, but W is wonderful. O 
yes, W. Remember your epiphanies written on green oval leaves, deeply 
deep, copies to be sent if you died to all the great libraries of the world, 
including Alexandria? Someone was to read them there after a few 
thousand years, a mahamanvantara. Pico della Mirandola like. Ay, very 
like a whale.  
(U, 3.136-144) 
 
This is resentment turned inwards at a former self. We might be tempted to praise this 
rejection of formerly cherished absurdities as a welcome sign of maturity in Stephen, 
who, in resigning himself to a less grand future, might prepare himself for a more 
achievable one. But such a redeployment (perhaps a recalibration) of ambition when 
faced with reality requires a sense of the comic potential of such dissonance. If this 
perspective is comic, it is comedy with the sting left in. There is nothing wry in 
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Stephen’s observance of his past foolishness. Rather, he summons forth past selves 
only so as to rebuke them for believing so forcefully in a future that has not come to 
pass. Implicit in this process is Stephen’s rebuke to himself as he walks along the 
strand; in bringing forth specifically those versions of himself that were most 
ambitious, most hopeful, and most certain, he reminds himself bitterly of how 
hopeless, conflicted, and uncertain he has now become.  
As readers of Portrait, we can see just how much has been lost in the 
intervening period between the two novels. Implicit in Stephen’s rejection of his past 
hopefulness is a desire to rediscover an optimism that has been rendered, for the time 
being, psychologically impossible (for reasons the novel will gradually disclose). 
Stephen’s pride is such that he would never yearn for ignorance, but in drawing up 
the image of a young man proudly imagining a future of recognition and adoration, 
he is lamenting not so much the ignorance of his past, but the debilitating self-
awareness of the present. Stephen continues, “when one reads these strange pages of 
one long gone one feels that one is at one with one who once......” (U, 3.144-45). This 
past self is at once an “other” (“strange,” “long gone”) and a presence with which a 
kind of mystical communion is possible (“one is at one with one”). The possibility 
remains, tantalizingly close, that Stephen may be able to reconnect with a mental 
landscape in which, however delusionally, some harmony was attainable. Stephen’s 
commitment to a clear-eyed acceptance of the true state of things—a rejection of 
hypocrisy and an embrace of acute self-knowledge—disallows any self-consoling 
white lies, yet in this moment we are made privy to the difficulty of this state of 
mind. It goes without saying that the grand (some would say grandiose) self-
narrativization that Stephen achieved in Portrait is a preferable state of mind to the 
broken and resentful awareness Stephen has about his situation in the opening 
episodes of Ulysses. From early on, Joyce’s clear intent in his writing was to expose 
the hypocrisy of his characters’ actions and motivations. This is particularly clear in 
Dubliners, where we see the failures of Joyce’s characters in ways that they cannot, 
or would not. Joyce’s stated desire to “betray the soul of that hemiplegia or paralysis 
many consider a city” is precisely a desire to expose the inner workings of a 
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representative range of characters to public view.229 Once exposed, these paralysing 
hypocrisies can no longer operate as they once did. But while such performances are 
viewed as dangerously self-deluding in Dubliners, Portrait, as I have argued, goes to 
some length to emphasize the positive, necessary role of often absurd self-
narrativization. In this shabby, depressed image of Stephen, we have the embodiment 
of a question: are there worse things than fooling oneself? More importantly, Joyce is 
asking the reader to ponder whether Stephen’s current struggles are, as in Dubliners, 
the result of the delusional behaviour he displays in Portrait or the result of his 
apparent clarity now? 
The answer, I will argue in this chapter, is that Stephen has lost the ability to 
narrativize himself through moments of hardship towards a future overcoming. 
Whereas Joyce’s Dubliners are paralysed by their delusions, which stop them facing 
and solving their problems head on, Stephen is paralysed by his inability to delude 
himself. The sense of teleological certainty present in Portrait is not merely missing 
in Ulysses, its absence is put forward as the key to a psychological question at the 
heart of Stephen’s paralytic immobility. Stephen’s narrative overcoming is now 
impossible, I will argue, because the narrative of betrayal he had relied on in Portrait 
has been fatally corrupted; it now merely feeds back into his self-recriminations. The 
tensions present throughout Stephen’s narrativizations of betrayal and artistic exile—
where the artist must betray his/her country in order to save it—are brought home to 
Stephen through the death of his mother, which provides a symbolic problem for 
Stephen that he cannot, at this time, overcome. 
 
“The aunt thinks you killed your mother”: Stephen’s defensive 
posture/ressentiment  
The changes in Stephen are primarily the result of a breakdown in his ability to 
construct and maintain these narratives of flight, overcoming, and evasion. Stephen 
had constructed an efficient and effective psychological machine, capable of 
processing the mundane and ignoble details of his life and making them grand, 
heroic, and, through his awareness of paradigmatic predecessors, a part of the greater 
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with some precision, see: Jean Kane, “Imperial Pathologies: Medical Discourse and Drink in 
Dubliners' ‘Grace’,” Literature and Medicine 14.2 (1995): 191-209. 
	   138	  
weave of history. The negative connotations of breaking with one community 
(perhaps, better, set of communities) are mitigated by a compensatory narrative built 
around the logic of betrayal. While Stephen still clearly retains the capacity to 
produce such narratives in Ulysses—his talent for imagining persecution remains 
intact—he can no longer sustain his credence for these self-aggrandizements. So, he 
still displays a dab hand at producing grand aphorisms—“I am the servant of two 
masters...” (U, 1.638), etc—but in constructing himself as a victim, he can no longer 
convert that victimhood into a form of active resistance.  
This breakdown, I will contend, is traced in Ulysses back to the death of 
Stephen’s mother and the emotional fallout that results. This trauma creates a 
powerful counter-narrative that has short-circuited his ability to narrate his own 
position as heroic victim. This is not simply a matter of guilt or grief—though these 
do give this counter-narrative its power—but a structural matter of Stephen’s 
particular psychology, in which the reality of his mother’s death and his sense of 
complicity in it override his normal coping mechanisms. Stephen simply cannot move 
forward while his mother’s haunting presence continually invades his present, 
contaminating his thoughts with gross reminders of the price others must pay for his 
high-minded rejections. As Barry McRea puts it, the “mother’s (dead) body blocks all 
exits and delimits even the imaginative confines of the world of ‘Telemachus.’”230 
The idea of the mother, which appears to have been on Stephen’s mind anyway, 
is introduced as a general concept early on by Buck, who appeals to Swinburne’s 
description of the sea as “a great sweet mother” (U, 1.77-8). In the face of Stephen’s 
glum silence, he repeats his insight twice—once as “our great sweet mother” and 
once as “our mighty mother” (U, 1.80; 1.85)—before attempting to coax Stephen 
from his silence with the callous declaration: “the aunt thinks you killed your mother” 
(U, 1.88). Stephen’s reply that “someone killed her” hardly reads as a straight 
refutation and is indicative of Stephen’s position; he is caught between blaming 
himself and blaming some generalized other. We presume the “someone” to be 
Stephen’s father, whose drunkenness and spendthrift habits drove the family into 
poverty. But Stephen’s vague designation leaves the question open to interpretation. 
More important is Stephen’s insistence on the possibility of blame even as he refuses 
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to openly name a culprit. His mother died of a particularly unpleasant cancer; it is 
difficult to see how any person could rationally be held responsible for such a thing. 
Stephen is of course grieving and can be forgiven for his response to Mulligan’s 
prompting, but this insistence on the preservation of responsibility even where none 
exists speaks to a darker logic at work. Kevin Dettmar has suggested that what Buck 
describes as Stephen’s “moody brooding” is in fact “a form of Nietzschean 
ressentiment . . . passe[d] off as mourning.”231 Set out primarily in the first essay of 
On The Genealogy of Morals, ressentiment (literally “resentment” in English) is seen 
as fundamental to the production of a “slave” morality.232 It is, according to Max 
Scheler, “a self-poisoning of the mind . . . a lasting mental attitude, caused by the 
systematic repression of certain emotions and affects which are . . . normal 
components of human nature.” The morality produced as a result is based on deep-
seated emotions of “revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to detract, and spite” 
even as they masquerade as a higher call to the right and good.233 Ressentiment is, 
Nietzsche suggests, further characterized as “reactive” rather than active or defensive 
and is made up of an “inversion of the value-positing eye . . . the need to view 
outward instead of back to oneself.” Whereas “every noble morality develops from a 
triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality . . . always first needs a hostile 
external world.”234 To put it another way, the resentful self is always defined 
externally as a response to something rejected. As Gilles Deleuze glosses it, 
“ressentiment . . . wants sinners, people who are responsible. We can guess what the 
creature of ressentiment wants: he wants others to be evil, he needs others to be evil 
in order to be able to consider himself good.”235 As such, its capacity to escape the 
discourses/morality it rejects are limited, since this form of rejection is entirely non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Kevin J. H. Dettmar, The Illicit Joyce of PostModernism: Reading Against the Grain 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 135. 
232 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kauffman and R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 24-56. 
233 Max Scheler, On Feeling, Valuing, and Knowing, ed. Harold J. Bershady (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 117. 
234 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 36-37. This passage is in the “First Essay,” 
section 10. 
235 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzschean Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Continuum, 
1983), 119. 
	   140	  
productive. It works to sustain itself as anger, and to buoy up a static (read paralytic) 
version of the self as wronged. 
Deleuze further summarizes the characteristics of ressentiment as: “an inability 
to admire, respect, or love”; “passivity”; and “the imputation of wrongs, the 
distribution of responsibilities, perpetual accusation.”236 Dettmar claims, rather 
unhelpfully, that “the appropriateness of such a diagnosis to Stephen’s condition in 
‘Telemachus’ is, I should hope, readily apparent.”237 Certainly, we can read these 
three things into much of Stephen’s behaviour in Ulysses, but reading them as 
symptoms of a pre-diagnosed condition serves to obscure both the complexity of their 
manifestation in Stephen’s specific psychology and the history of ressentiment that 
precedes it. In “diagnosing” ressentiment as the source of Stephen’s ailments, 
Dettmar assigns it wholly negative connotations. But were these characteristics—the 
assignation of all faults as outside the self, immobilizing anger, sensitivity to others’ 
ill-intentions—not, as I have argued, important catalysts to forward motion in 
Portrait? If they are the source of paralysis now, why were they not so previously? 
However ironically we may choose to read Joyce’s treatment of Stephen in Portrait, 
we do not read his character as unduly “passive.” While Dettmar sees Stephen’s 
“unspoken project” in Ulysses to be the “shaking of this ressentiment,” I rather 
suggest that it is the reader’s task to establish precisely what has changed to make this 
conglomeration of behaviours and mindsets suddenly so ineffective. If Stephen is 
now in the grip of a “slave” mentality, was he not so before? 
Enda Duffy, the other main critic to make a strong case for a diagnosis of 
Stephen as riddled by ressentiment, suggests that part of the reason for Joyce’s move 
in Ulysses from Stephen to Bloom was his increasing disenchantment with the “self-
satisfaction of the post-Enlightenment young male.” As such, “the vaunted 
independence of the artist, no longer sustained by any neoromantic ideology of 
genius, begins from the opening page of Ulysses, to congeal into a humbler mock-
heroic ressentiment.”238 In other words, the change in Stephen from Portrait to 
Ulysses is really a change in Joyce, who abandons a commitment to the spiritual 
value of Stephen’s genius in favour of an embedded cultural potential depicted across 
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the pages of Ulysses. Without following the main thrust of Duffy’s argument, which 
seeks to establish a postcolonial context for Joyce’s writing, it is possible to see in his 
reading an acknowledgement of my slightly different stress on the teleologic power 
of the Künstlerroman. For rather than vaguely gesturing to Joyce’s loss of faith in the 
“genius” of the artist Stephen—which, correspondingly, requires that he wrote 
Portrait out of his full faith in that genius—I am suggesting that, having dramatized 
the contrivances and grandiose self-narrations through which Stephen escaped into 
exile, Joyce sought in Ulysses to find new dramatic potential in the breakdown of 
these grandiosities. Stephen is no more nor less a genius than he was in Portrait, but 
he, like the reader, is robbed of the narrative security that the Künstlerroman 
provides. If Stephen is now “passive,” it is not because he “imput[es] . . . wrongs,” 
and “distribut[es] responsibilities,” and “perpetually accus[es],” but because these 
attacks on the external world are now really attacks on his internal reality. Where in 
Portrait Stephen established a grand destiny and shaped his external world to fit, he 
now merely acknowledges the indignity of his situation, compares it to his once grand 
aspirations (and his still high sense of his potential value) and unleashes his 
disappointment against it.  
 
An incomplete severance: The residual family romance 
To understand this change in Stephen as something other than merely a shift in 
narrative expectation, we need to give more thought to the precise role his mother’s 
gruesome death has in disrupting the self-narrativization he had relied on. Certainly, 
its visceral quality, its gory corporeality, is important; the more Stephen attempts to 
escape into philosophical speculation, the more his mother’s decaying body insists on 
being seen, heard, and felt. The metaphorical connection that Mulligan makes 
between the sea and the mother initiates a haunting series of images that reappear 
throughout the book. Stephen connects the “dull green mass of liquid” held by the 
“ring of bay and skyline” (U, 1.107-108) with the “bowl of white china [that] had lay 
by her [his mother’s] deathbed holding the green sluggish bile which she had torn up 
from her rotting liver by fits of loud groaning vomiting” (U, 1.109-110). The 
contrasts between mind and body, “nature” and “freedom,” and elevation and 
degradation run throughout Joyce’s writing, but they are most acutely visible in the 
philosophical struggles of Stephen Dedalus and Richard Rowan. Here the contrast is 
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painful, the physical reality of his mother’s decayed body disrupting and overriding 
the intangible value of philosophical conjecture. 
But the physicality of Stephen’s mother’s image is as much a result as a cause 
of the specific breakdown in Stephen’s self-narration. I described the development of 
betrayal as, partly, a way to initiate a break with the family (and, relatedly, the wider 
filial community) that avoided a sense of guilt and strengthened the very narrative 
that allows for the break. For all that Stephen distrusts the immediacy of the family 
bond—feeling rather the “mystical kinship of fosterage” (P, 98)—in Portrait he still 
felt that bond strongly enough that he needed the betrayal narrative to console its 
sundering. But in Ulysses, this sense of fosterage—the contingency of the family 
relationship—has been replaced with an acute sense of responsibility grounded in the 
haranguing image of his dead mother. And responsibility is precisely the word. For 
what the betrayal narrative allowed Stephen to construct was a rejection of his own 
filial responsibilities that, rather than manifested as a betrayal of his own, was seen as 
a necessary step towards the redemption of those who would betray him. That is to 
say, the filial, innate bonds of family, race, and nation are seen as being in bad faith, 
as demanding a form of spiritual exposure that was utterly dangerous to Stephen. In 
rejecting this exposure, however, Stephen was able to construct himself as a martyred 
hero, a metaphorical foreigner (in the way that Joyce constructs Parnell as literally 
foreign) and as a Moses, left forever outside the promised land to which he leads his 
people. In this, then, all the pain of severance is consoled. 
In Ulysses, however, the bonds that Stephen so breezily casts off in Portrait 
return to stake their claim anew. For betrayal, as it is explored most clearly in Exiles, 
is concerned deeply with the possibility and advisability of connection. Joyce 
understands the language of connection in all its double-sidedness. “Ties,” “bonds,” 
“emotional holds”; this is the language of both support and constraint. This problem 
is all the more pressing for the artist—who, in Joyce’s writing pursues (perhaps 
hopelessly) a form of freedom that is absolute—but it is also more navigable. In the 
figure of his mother, Stephen sees the ultimate metaphor of connection, since, while 
“paternity may be a legal fiction,” the mother is unique in creation for having a bond 
that is necessary and beyond doubt. The mother is associated therefore with a truth 
beyond fiction, the “one true thing in life.” In Joyce’s fictional creations, which 
privilege the investigation of uncertainty, doubt, and intolerable epistemic vacuums, 
this is no small claim. The mother represents a connection that cannot be denied, 
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cannot be doubted. But, as we will see, this solidity becomes a problem rather than a 
comfort in Ulysses, for Stephen’s entire effort has been put towards denying the 
primacy of that connection. 
Stephen is haunted by the memory of his mother, transformed into an 
oppressive and malevolent “Ghoul! Chewer of corpses!” (U, 1.278). He dreams of her 
coming to him, decayed and gruesome, a distortion of the moment in which he 
refused to pray. 
 
Her glazing eyes, staring out of death, to shake and bend my soul. On me 
alone. The ghostcandle to light her agony. Ghostly light on the tortured 
face. Her hoarse loud breath rattling in horror, while all prayed on their 
knees. Her eyes on me to strike me down.  
(U, 1.273-276) 
 
This event, his refusing to pray, is symbolic of his entire conduct to his mother, which 
is itself conflated with his wider attempt to sever the ties of family, nation, and 
religion. The death of his mother is the one event that his formerly effective psychic 
machinery cannot convert into an empowering narrative, since it merely circles back 
to this single, foundational act of betrayal. Stephen is being forced to relive a painful 
parody of those earlier betrayals, which were necessary to his personal development. 
Now, his development has stalled precisely because he is unable to move beyond this 
“agenbite of inwit: remorse of conscience.” The sheer visceral horror of his mother’s 
image, continuously returning to him, makes impossible Stephen’s customary flights 
into self-indulgent and blinkered idealism. Such a departure from the realities of his 
(failed) obligations to his family, the ties that have helped form and sustain him, 
inevitably calls upon the recurrence of his mother’s image, a mocking reminder of the 
costs of such flights. She becomes a synecdoche not only for Stephen’s failed 
responsibilities to his family (his sisters feature similarly in Ulysses) but to his race 
and nation. Stephen’s conviction that immersing himself in these ties will mean a 
fundamental imperilling of the self, a compromising of the very individuality he has 
worked so hard to sustain, forms itself into a powerful dichotomy. He sees two 
choices: complete and painful freedom or (creative, spiritual) death. When he pleads 
to his mother’s image, “[l]et me be and let me live,” he is really pleading for the 
capacity to forget the ties that she represents, to be completely free of a sense of the 
ethical responsibilities that threaten to tie him to Dublin and to his family. 
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On its simplest level, Stephen’s ghoulish mother is merely a representation of 
this basic anxiety about separation. The gruesomeness of her death has made his 
healthy guilt about breaking the bond between them an unhealthy obsession. And, in 
essence, this is the role that Stephen’s mother plays in Ulysses: she traps him in guilt 
without recourse to a workable compensatory narration. Her rotting corpse becomes a 
physical manifestation of the cost of separation and in so doing makes any clean 
separation impossible. Her death becomes for Stephen the result of the separation he 
has forced upon her, even though logically he cannot be responsible for it. On an 
altogether realistic level, we can understand Stephen’s suffering as an unhappy 
conflation of the act of principled refusal with the act of filial separation.239 Indeed, 
his refusal to pray at his mother’s bedside was in his own mind more or less 
consciously a display (performance) of this separation. In denying his mother’s 
wishes, he denied also her power to control him and through her (more literally in this 
case) the power of his inherited responsibilities—to church and nation. His own role 
as betrayer—of the family bond—that lurked always in the narratives he told himself, 
is forced to the forefront by his mother’s death, which becomes the most potent 
countersign to his attempts to narrate himself as victim. The separation he had sought 
out symbolically is achieved finally and irrevocably in death. That his mother’s 
ghoulish image returns constantly to plague his thoughts throughout the day, is a 
reminder, ultimately, of the fact that the separation he sought is now permanent and 
irredeemable. 
 
“I’ve lost the trick” 
As the novel unfolds, it becomes clear that Stephen—self-aware, analytical—is 
capable of understanding the significance of his own behaviour. Just as we see him 
mourning, however bitterly, a more naive, but more happy former self, we see him 
also questioning his own compulsion towards severance as the solution to his 
problems. In “Circe,” Private Carr confronts Stephen with the rhetorical question: 
“how would it be governor, if I was to bash in your jaw?” (U, 1.4311). Stephen’s 
answer, “very unpleasant,” is followed by the telling phrase: “Noble art of 
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selfpretense” (U, 15.4313). The portmanteau is telling and seems, like so much in 
“Circe,” to refer to something beyond the confines of the action. “Pretence”—a false 
display or affectation, a simulation, a way of being that is false but compulsive—is 
combined with “self defence” to suggest that Stephen understands his own methods 
of battle as a form of self-imposed pretensiousness, a falsified self that allows him to 
avoid conflicts that are weighted against him, in favour of symbolic battles in which 
he has a chance.240 As Stephen says immediately afterwards: “Personally, I detest 
action” (U, 15.4313-14).241 Locally, Stephen is asserting his pacifism, but for the 
entirety of the episode (indeed the day) he has been thinking about his mother, 
thinking about his Dublin paralysis, and thinking about what modes of escape are 
available to him. The rejection of heroics (read: martyrdom) found in Joyce’s non-
fiction writing, and asserted by Stephen in Portrait, are carried through to Ulysses 
where Stephen wishes for a way to save “men from drowning” but fears his own 
entanglement in the water and slime that tug them down. His statement only a few 
lines later is telling: “My centre of gravity is displaced. I have forgotten the trick” (U, 
15.4433-34). The “trick,” I argue, was precisely the process of compensatory self-
narration he had practiced so successfully in Portrait. The “trick” was to view Irish 
betrayal as something done to him, not done by him. The “trick” was to make a break 
with the family and all the dangerous entanglements that these bonds bring with 
them. 
Stephen’s conflation of the drowning man saved by Buck with his mother and, 
ultimately, his nation is effected in these drunken declarations. In “Proteus,” Stephen 
had lamented pathetically: 
 
I want his life to be his, mine to be mine. A drowning man. His human 
eyes scream to me out of horror of his death. I . . . With him together 
down . . . I could not save her. Waters: bitter death: lost. 
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 (U, 3.327-30) 
 
The man’s death is figured symbolically as an immersion in community and family 
ties. The sea, already named by Mulligan as “our old sweet mother” maintains its 
metaphorical status as the symbol of “natural, biological destiny” that Stephen is 
desperate to evade.242 To dive into the sea and pull out his metaphorical brother, 
would necessitate a form of absolute, if only temporary immersion in that 
community. Stephen’s fear is that, rather than saving the man, he would merely 
drown with him. The language of Portrait, where family is associated with death and 
clouded sight, is resumed to argue against intervention—“I could not save her”—but 
it’s not clear that Stephen convinces himself any more than he convinces the reader. 
Nevertheless, we must take seriously Stephen’s sense of responsibility towards 
his genealogical and racial family. In Portrait, this concern was already framed by the 
conviction that severance would prove redemptive. So, when Stephen’s “youngest 
brother” begins to sing Oft in the Stilly Night and is joined “[o]ne by one” by “the 
others,” Stephen does not join in with the singing. Rather, he “wait[s] for some 
moments, listening with pain of spirit to the overtone of weariness behind their frail 
fresh innocent voices” and then leaves. Stephen figures himself as an observer, 
outside their weariness, but, importantly, one who has access to their suffering as an 
insider. It is only because Stephen stands, perilously, on the cusp of immersion in 
their genealogical “choir of voices” (“one by one”) that he is capable of hearing also 
the “endless reverberation of the choirs of endless children and [hear] in all the 
echoes an echo also of the recurring note of weariness and pain.” Genealogy is seen 
as a pattern that ensures the continuation of suffering, but it is also a siren song, a 
“choir of voices” that begs Stephen to join his voice with the genealogically 
organized chorus. It is not that Stephen is completely unmoved by the pathetic state 
of his family (and by extension his nation), but that he feels this pull as necessarily 
dangerous. To submit himself to the community is to sacrifice the independence that 
might save them. 
The narrative structure of betrayal allows for the depiction of severance as a 
necessary good and a necessary evil. It allows him to construct a life without the 
constrictions that come with responsibilities to others. But the problem with inherited 
ties is that, unlike friendship or politics, these are not elective relationships. Indeed, 
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the separation between filiation and affiliation is built on the principle that affiliative 
relationships come about through some form of chance or contingent event. The 
“amor matris: subjective and objective genitive” gains its power in Ulysses from the 
fact that it is entirely non-contingent. While in Portrait this love is seen as potentially 
suffocating (the desire to maintain the family bond is seen as an attempt to retard 
maturity), in Ulysses the haranguing image of Stephen’s mother is seen quite directly 
as suffocating (drowning) Stephen. The narrative of betrayal worked so well for 
Stephen because it allowed him to void the bonds between himself and others without 
actually requiring him to make any aggressive moves of his own. But in Ulysses, the 
resistance of his mother’s love to severance forces Stephen into the position of 
betrayer. His mother has provided him with an unconditional love, the proper 
response for this would be love in kind.  
In refusing to pray at the bedside of his dying mother, Stephen had sought to 
achieve (perform) the final act of severance. It would have cost him little to bend his 
knee, even if the symbolic power of the act would have been clear. With this act, the 
final link between himself and his family should have been completed. And yet the 
reality of this final severance is perhaps more painful than Stephen could have 
expected. Barry McCrea has commented astutely on Stephen’s situation at the 
beginning of Ulysses.  
 
The sadness and stasis that pervade the first two chapters of the 
Telemachiad carry a sense of both the imprisonment of genealogy and the 
devastating loss that leaving it behind entirely would entail. 243  
 
Stephen cannot move beyond the conviction that immersion in family and/or nation is 
equivalent to death, yet the severance he appeared to achieve in Portrait has been 
proven to be illusory and incomplete. Bernard Benstock has suggested that in 
Portrait, Stephen “is painfully sensitive to the price he must pay for such rare 
independence as he seeks for himself.”244 Yet it seems rather to be the case that 
Stephen is in fact hopelessly naive, believing as he does that a complete severance 
with the “natural” obligations of his birth could be painlessly and effectively 
achieved. Ulysses, rather than displaying a reversal in Joyce’s understanding of 
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Stephen’s heroic maturity, is in fact an investigation of the tensions left unspoken in 
that far more teleologically proscribed novel. Stephen’s anguished cry for a world 
free of entanglement reads in Ulysses—one of the most entangled worlds in 
literature—as hopelessly naive: “I want his life to be his and mine to be mine.”  
As Maud Ellmann has argued, somewhat more optimistically than I, Ulysses 
sees Stephen confronted with the basic fact of entanglement. “[t]he Stephen of A 
Portrait of the Artist, who longs to fly by nets, is superseded in Ulysses by a Stephen 
torn between the dream of flight and recognition of entanglement.”245 Entanglement 
is simply a function of the world, of human relationships. Throughout Joyce’s 
writing, this acknowledgement has been countered by the notion that entanglement 
necessarily means the possibility (and in Ireland the certainty) of betrayal. In Exiles, 
Joyce investigated the possibility of a relationship that refused any burden of 
obligations, but found that, ultimately, this relationship ends either in near-unbearable 
existential torment or simply recreates the “normal” forms of amatory relationships—
by which Joyce means the desire to “possess” and restrict—albeit in an acutely 
mannered and self-conscious way. Richard seeks a release and believes he has found 
it in his manipulation of the logic of betrayal, but he finds instead that he is, against 
all his wishes, a creature of socially constructed emotion, “passions”; he is “like all 
other men” (E, 44). If heroism remains alive in Joyce’s works, it is in this hopeless 
battling against nature, against received obligations and structures of feeling. But, 
having taken this idea to its limit in Exiles, Joyce appears to move away from this 
construction in Ulysses, where Stephen’s struggles with natural culture appear 
increasingly tiresome. I think we must maintain our sense of Stephen’s suffering as 
potentially heroic, but, ultimately, it is valueless. 
This failure of heroism comes, ultimately, because Stephen does not fully break 
free from the bonds of family and nation. He exists, as Maud Ellmann puts it, “torn 
between” flight and entanglement. Were he able to flounce off into the sunset with 
his notebook and pencil, we may believe his severance to be a form of laudable 
overcoming. But, whereas in Portrait, the whole narrative momentum is geared 
towards his flight, in Ulysses Joyce ties Stephen down with constant, tiring reminders 
of the relationships he betrays by abandoning his family to their misfortune. The sight 
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of his sister flicking through a French primer brings home to him the fact that while 
he may escape the self-destructive Irish forces he identifies, he must leave the rest of 
his family to suffer them. And yet, this was true also in Portrait,246 where the 
suffering of his race and family is converted into an even greater spur to exile. But, in 
Ulysses, the death of Stephen’s mother—and the circumstances of her death—bring 
home to him the fact that had been suppressed throughout Ulysses; Stephen, despite 
his adoption of a manner, his exercising of a consolatory narrative of betrayal, and the 
construction of a rigorous intellectual framework to justify his actions, remains 
essentially human and retains essentially human needs. Stephen’s suggestion to 
Cranly in Portrait that he does “not fear to be alone or . . . to leave whatever I have to 
leave” proves in the end to be false (P, 247). In Portrait, Stephen’s insistence on a 
kind of posthuman overcoming, on his immunity to social expectations and biological 
drives, makes him appear as a kind of counter to the far less dynamic Mr. Duffy in 
“A Painful Case.” Both men pursue a kind of queer existence, detached from 
genealogy and reproduction, favouring obligations and ties formed volitionally and 
on pre-arranged terms, and yet Stephen’s desire to “experience life” makes him far 
more appealing than the serious, ascetic, Duffy. Yet at the end of “A Painful Case” 
and the beginning of Ulysses we are left to consider that perhaps both men, despite 
their “wish for a superhuman existence” must, as a result of their “refusal to accept 
humanity,” “suffer the only too-human loneliness that haunts” them.247 Seamus 
Deane has suggested, in reference to Portrait, that “[a]lthough [Stephen] finds it 
impossible to experience the expected filial sentiments, his emotional repudiation is 
not enough to give him the release from parental origin that he craves.”248 But it 
might be more accurate to say that he feels his filial sentiments strongly, but through 
a distancing mechanism built around his sense of destiny and filtered through the 
narratives of betrayal he conceives to achieve them. Stephen’s problem, ultimately, is 
that he feels too much, that his feelings overpower and short-circuit the only 
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narratives he had available to produce the sundering he pursued as necessary and 
absolute. 
Ulysses, essentially, catalogues Stephen’s failure not only to sever completely 
his connection with the family, but his failure to replace that bond with something 
else. The child, who goes through the processes of the family romance generally 
recreates the family in a new form—by getting married, having children. Those who 
fail to reform the family in this near perfect way, will do so through the adoption of 
affiliative groups—friends, colleagues, etc. Barry McCrea has offered a convincing 
account of Joyce’s attempt to replace genealogy with “random encounter” as the 
structuring force of the novel.249 Rather than fold Stephen back into the family (as the 
prodigal son) in pursuit of narrative satisfaction and the restitution of social order, 
Ulysses sees Stephen trying out a number of alternatives to genealogies, queer 
families that might replace the natural family as the structuring principle of Stephen’s 
(narrative) life. But while it might be the case that “the shape and feel of Ulysses 
derive from the fact that Bloom, the randomly encountered alternative Jewish father, 
definitively trumps genealogy”—that, moreover, it is this relationship that “ends 
[Stephen’s] narrative life”—it is not clear that Stephen himself experiences this 
relationship as, ultimately, redeeming. Yes, “Stephen has consciously rejected his 
identity as a natural father’s son in favour, at least momentarily, of the possibilities 
unleashed by his encounter with Bloom,” but what of the next day? Stephen leaves 
the Bloom’s house and while their parting lacks the kind of distancing recrimination 
we see from Stephen elsewhere (Stephen does not feel the need to “sever” his 
relationship with Bloom as he walks out the door) this decision is nevertheless 
meaningful. Stephen does not shrug off the genetic family and take his place in a 
symbolically satisfying one, whether it is based on a “random encounter” or on an 
allusive mythical framework. Stephen may leave Merrion Square in a better mood 
than he entered nighttown, but Joyce’s refusal to grant an ending that is narratively 
and thematically satisfying is a pointed indication that Stephen is still, ultimately, 
caught between commitment and severance. Does Bloom’s queer family really offer 
Stephen an escape from the “nightmare of history” or is it merely an exchange of one 
family for another? Stephen’s departure suggests he thinks of it in the latter terms.  
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Joyce/Stephen 
Joyce’s own experiences of his mother’s slow death obviously provided him 
with a great deal of material for his depiction of Stephen here. But there is a specific 
area of difference that is particularly revealing. In a letter written to Nora on 29 
August 1904—around six weeks into their courtship—Joyce opens up about his 
dissatisfaction with his home life (“a middle class affair ruined by spendthrift habits”) 
and the death of his mother, which was evidently still a painful subject for him. Joyce 
attributes his mother’s death to three things: his father’s “ill treatment, . . . years of 
trouble, and [his own] cynical frankness of conduct.” Joyce’s sense of culpability is 
clear and apparently heartfelt. He recognizes, however absurdly, that his mother’s 
death (at least the manner of it) is partially his responsibility. Comparatively, 
Stephen’s “someone” remains ambiguous; he does not, as Joyce did, openly accept 
his own complicity (or rather feelings of complicity) in his mother’s death, nor does 
he voice a direct accusation against his father, society in general, or God above. But 
Joyce also fits his own responsibility into a larger system of inherited responsibility 
that remains in keeping with the narratives of overcoming he relied upon at this time. 
In the same letter, Joyce immediately transforms his moment of emotional openness 
into a more typically rhetorical statement of intent: “I understood I was looking on 
the face of a victim and I cursed the system which made her a victim.”250 This move 
from negative introspection to positive declaration (“I cursed”) is typical of Joyce’s 
capacity to recycle and redeploy negative psychic energies away from self-loathing 
and towards empowerment. More importantly, rather than a generalized resentment 
(like that he gives to Stephen), Joyce remains capable of narrating himself heroically 
in relation to his mother’s death. The moment of apparently genuine feeling with 
which he begins the letter, gives way to an antagonistically constructed relationship 
between himself and the “system” that we can assume denotes Ireland, the Church, 
and the kind of lower middle-class (and falling) life he had led for the larger part of 
his life. The techniques of self-narration he makes available to Stephen in Portrait are 
shown in this moment to preserve their usefulness to him. In Ulysses, Stephen is not 
permitted this same capacity. We may assume that the act of refusal that motivates 
Stephen’s guilty conscience retained similarly unpleasant connotations for Joyce, but 
while Stephen cannot move beyond his own complicity (his own betrayal), Joyce 
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manages to justify this act once again as part of a wider overcoming that might 
redeem in some way his mother’s death. “Joyce could not,” suggests Joseph Valente, 
“refrain from betraying the law of his being without betraying his mother instead; he 
could not settle accounts with himself except by defaulting on the immense debt that 
was due her for her countless, vital exertions on his behalf.”251 There being no good 
outcome, Joyce was capable of taking the least bad and converting it into a new, 
consolatory formation. Joyce sees his mother as a victim to the very forces of 
inherited authority that he has set about escaping and, thus, it is only by seeing this 
escape from filial bonds through to its conclusion that he may justify the symbolically 
loaded act of refusal that he came to associate with her death. 
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Chapter Six: Betraying Bloom 
 
In an episode of Seinfeld called “The Betrayal,” the title character Jerry sleeps 
with a woman his best friend George has been courting (rather unsuccessfully). “You 
betrayed me!” George complains. 
 
JERRY: Alright, I admit it. I slept with Nina, but that’s all. 
GEORGE: (Outraged) ‘That’s all’?! That’s everything! I don’t know 
what all the rest is for anyway!252 
 
The joke is at George’s expense, playing on his chronic failure to get to grips with the 
intricacies of human relationships and his tendency to respond melodramatically to 
situations. His response here is, the writers beg us to observe, excessive to the point 
of comedy. But George’s outburst also raises some interesting questions about the 
precise relationship between sex and betrayal. Does the sexual act represent the 
betrayal itself or only its crystallization in physical form? Is the sexual act, as George 
suggests, “everything” in and of itself or is it in fact relatively meaningless, as Jerry 
suggests? And if it is everything, why is it so? What determines when a sexual act 
becomes also an act of betrayal? Is betrayal something that is appended to the sexual 
act or is it carried along and inside the act, ready to be revealed at the appropriate 
moment? Though Jerry may be guilty of betrayal, it seems, Nina is not. Though 
equally responsible for the act (the sex) that seems to have marked the betrayal (Jerry 
and Nina dive into each other’s arms with comically perfect synchronicity—no one 
can be said to have made the first move) Nina has not, apparently, done anything 
wrong. So why is Jerry alone held accountable? And why (and how) does this act 
constitute an act of betrayal? 
Of course, whatever its strengths, Seinfeld is no commentary on Ulysses. I 
strongly doubt that Ulysses was anywhere near their thoughts when the writers 
drafted this episode. But what this example offers, I think, is a neatly focused send-up 
both of the weight that tends to be placed on sex in determining and bounding love 
relationships (George’s “I don’t know what all the rest is for anyway!”) and of the 
vague and unspoken processes by which we construct sex as the great synecdoche for 
betrayal. For while the feeling of sexual betrayal is normalized to the point that it 
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feels intensely “natural,” both Joyce and Seinfeld share, to a differing degree, an 
interest in the mechanisms that construct and empower betrayal. More importantly, 
perhaps, this example neatly emphasizes the fundamental role of the contract in 
betrayals of all kinds. Though sex is here the ultimate synecdoche for betrayal, as I 
have said, the betrayal resides in the failure of a friendship. Jerry, George is 
suggesting, has broken an unwritten agreement, something along the lines of “as my 
friend, you will not sleep with any women in whom I have a stated interest.” The 
emotional investment in betrayal that Seinfeld mocks and Joyce investigates so 
deeply253 is really an investment in the ability of human relationships to function. 
George struggles to vocalize his distress at this apparent breach of contract (hard to 
vocalize something that is so built into the social fabric—an ambiguous, unspoken 
foundation for social interaction) and eventually gives in altogether. But unlike 
George, Joyce’s characters are generally not only able to expose the social contracts 
at the heart of personal relationships, but to understand them well enough to be able 
to twist and manipulate their structure. Stephen Dedalus externalizes his own 
constitutional distrust (some would say paranoia) into an overriding historical force; 
in understanding the logic by which this force operates, he learns how best to escape 
its effects. Richard Rowan, similarly, understands the logic of betrayal to such a fine 
degree that he cannot but see its logic as proof of its inevitability; unlike Stephen, he 
seeks to rob betrayal of its emotional power not by sidestepping its force, but by 
giving in more fully to the logic that guides it—he tries to give “freely” that which 
betrayal seeks to take by force. In escaping into the apparently dispassionate logic of 
betrayal, both Stephen and Richard lose track of the complex nature of the contracts 
that they produce (and that produce them). In Ulysses, however, Joyce’s analyses 
become increasingly nuanced and the exact nature of the contract between husband 
and wife, betrayer and betrayed, begins to break down. The beguiling clarity of the 
logic Stephen and Richard provide is replaced with a less instantaneously emotive, 
but more lingeringly prosaic ambiguity as Bloom and Molly struggle to position 
themselves in relation to a logical structure that should be clear. Even though the 
sexual act that marks the betrayal has certainly occurred (Joycean betrayals usually 
occur in a hypothetical future) Ulysses is predominately concerned with resisting and 
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problematizing rather than embracing the logic that propels so much of Joyce’s 
previous writing. 
 
(Sexual) betrayal 
While adulterous or sexual betrayal shares a number of core features with the 
other forms of betrayal I have discussed in this thesis, it differs in an important and 
perplexing sense. If an informant gives up the location of a rebel soldier, s/he brings 
about, more or less directly, the imprisonment or even death of the one s/he “betrays.” 
The same can be said of the betrayals that Stephen fears: being trapped in a life of 
slavish mediocrity or being hounded to his death (spiritual and physical) by a baying 
mob made up of his countrymen. Even if the damage is not immediately apparent, it 
is certainly measurable. Whatever the emotional, epistemic, or ontological damage 
brought about by the betrayal itself, there is a corresponding, material damage (death, 
exile, poverty) that persists regardless of how I view or designate the “betrayal” that 
brings it about. But this is not necessarily the case with sexual betrayal. If I never 
have any knowledge of my wife’s adultery then it is has not harmed me. At all.  
There are two levels to betrayal in Joyce’s treatments of it. The first is 
material—the measurable consequences of an act perpetrated by a trusted other. The 
second is ontological—the act of betrayal brings into question the natures of both the 
informant and the informed upon / the “adulteress” and the cuckold.254 But the 
informer generally only initiates a radical reordering of their own ontological status—
from friend to enemy, trusted to untrustable, loved to loathed. The informed upon, 
certainly, is put into a tailspin of epistemic doubt—all relationships are ripe for 
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reconsideration—and the volte-face in the status of his/her relationship with the 
informer calls into doubt any meaning taken from that relationship. But, for the 
wronged and innocent party, there is generally very little reorientation necessary to 
explain the wrongs that have been done to them. To put it in one of Joyce’s favoured 
contexts, the puzzle is to explain Tim Healy’s betrayal, not Parnell’s “betrayedeness.” 
The betrayed gains in nobility and stature as martyr simply by being betrayed—
further analysis is not really necessary.255 But sexual betrayal offers an ontological 
problem of a different kind. A man, definable in any number of ways specific to his 
complex lifestyle, becomes suddenly and (usually) without his knowledge simply 
“cuckold.” The grammar of this is important: Molly is an “adulteress” and Bloom is a 
“cuckold.” Language seeks to bring about or enunciate a more or less fundamental 
change in the nature of the person described. Perhaps this is why Bloom’s watch 
stops “about the time” (U, 13.985) Bloom becomes a cuckold. Bloom offers the 
strange thesis that perhaps there is some “magnetic influence” (U, 13.984-45) that 
might explain the interrelation between the failure of marital fidelity and the failure of 
his watch. But if Bloom’s explanation is odd, it isn’t any more so than the 
explanation the reader happily accepts, that in this fictional world, there is a symbolic 
significance in the sexual act powerful enough to stop a watch. Joyce’s little joke is, 
perhaps, to provide us with a “real” (real within the narrative world) marker of the 
moment when Bloom’s ontological status shifts. As Bloom’s watch breaks, he 
becomes a cuckold; as Bloom becomes a cuckold, his watch breaks. The absurd 
solidity of the ontological status of cuckold—it is something one suddenly is rather 
than thinks, says, or does—is brought into focus by the absurd solidity of an 
otherwise implausible real-world effect. 
While Joyce plays with the grand sexual betrayals of history—the “faithless 
wi[ves]” and women “no better than [they] should be” that Mr. Deasy lists (U, 2.390-
95)—digging up and redeploying their emotional (tragic and comic) potential, his 
interest is always guided by a powerful structuring mind. Betrayal is always theorized 
and investigated, rather than merely recorded, in Joyce’s writing. Betrayal is 
necessarily a function of relationships—one must be betrayed by someone, (usually) 
with or for someone else. In Exiles, Joyce ponders the logical consequences of this 
structure, envisioning the difficulties that arise once the fear of betrayal takes root. 
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Betrayal ceases to be occasional and specific, instead becoming an inevitable 
consequence of any (apparently) meaningful human relationship. Indeed, the 
possibility of betrayal becomes, perversely, the very marker of a meaningful 
relationship: the risk of betrayal indicates that an exchange of power and trust has 
occurred. But, as Exiles near-exhaustively dramatizes, this exchange can only be 
known one-way. There is no way to know that the other whom you have given the 
power to harm you is similarly exposed, nor can you know that they have accepted 
your exchange in good faith. For Richard Rowan, the unachievable paradigm of 
absolute honesty, absolute exposure of one mind/soul to another, spawns an already 
imagined betrayal. Joyce dramatizes a kind of radical exposure to doubt that drives 
Richard to an extreme solution. Since he cannot know that he has not or will not be 
betrayed—and this uncertainty is unbearable—he seeks to set himself outside of the 
structure of betrayal altogether, seeking a form of certainty that might be less painful. 
Richard effectively reasons that, since betrayal requires that something be done 
against one’s will, then betrayal can be robbed of its power if the thing that would be 
taken is instead given freely. There may be pain, he reasons, but it is pain he can 
withstand more easily than the uncertain “wound of doubt.” 
Bloom is confronted with a problem of quite a different kind to Richard Rowan: 
he knows as a matter of certainty that his wife is about to commit adultery, to cuckold 
him, even if he holds out fleeting hope that she will not go through with it. While 
Richard is plagued by doubt, Bloom is plagued by certainty, spending much of his 
day seeking distraction from Molly’s infidelity. This cataloguing of distraction itself 
represents a marked shift from the extended theorizing that characterizes Exiles, 
which is built, stiflingly, on focused, intense navel-gazing that leads, ultimately, to 
nothing having “happened”—no action, only a change of perspective that is itself not 
entirely convincing. Bloom, contrarily, is constantly on the move and, though he does 
his fair share of navel-gazing (sometimes literally), his thoughts constantly interact 
with the complex, messy world around him. Whereas Exiles isolates betrayal to better 
understand its structure, Ulysses does the opposite, restoring the concept of betrayal 
to an embedded state within the complex lived experiences of Leopold and Molly 
Bloom. While in Exiles the shout of a woman selling fish in the street is a jarring 
reminder of a world beyond “philosophy,” it is the natural background noise of 
Ulysses. The simple structure of sexual betrayal (the sexual act marks the betrayal) is 
bombarded with complicating details that not only contextualize it (and therefore 
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blunt its sting) but undermine the certainty of these structural roles. Unlike the play 
that Molly jeers for its unflattering portrayal of an adulterous woman, Ulysses refuses 
(literally) to let the “wronged” man have the final word. But even if it did, the several 
hundred pages that precede Molly’s soliloquy work to resist and reshape the accepted 
structure of cuckoldry: betrayer/betrayed, wrongdoer/wronged, victimizer/victim. 
This last binary, as we will see, is particularly relevant here, as Joyce, rather than 
manoeuvre Molly into the position of victim through careful rhetorical, narrative, or 
emotive manipulations, seeks instead to destabilize this binary within Bloom and 
Molly’s relationship. 
It is important that, from the first pages of “Calypso,” we are never really in 
doubt that Molly will go through with her plans to sleep with Boylan. For all the 
parallels with The Odyssey, it is fairly clear that this Penelope will not resist her 
suitors. Her half-hearted attempts to conceal Boylan’s letter do not even convince us 
that she is at all shy or reticent about her intended adultery. Without reading back 
from what we learn of her character in “Penelope,” her sure, confident, domineering 
indolence in “Calypso” is carefully crafted by Joyce as a contrast with the quiet hand-
wringing of Bloom. Molly knows what she wants and is not ashamed to seek it out. 
We can imagine (even hope as Bloom does, if we are so invested) that some chance 
event will prevent Boylan from getting to Molly in time for their tryst, but even this 
wishful thinking does not change the main drive of the novel. While as readers we 
may find gratification in a foiled affair, there are always other days and other men. 
More than even Stephen’s forlorn, unconscious search for a father, Ulysses is driven 
by Bloom’s meandering return to the marriage bed. And the question that fills his 
mind and motivates his wandering is not “will my marriage bed be spoilt?” but “what 
does this spoliation mean?” What is the true significance of the sexual act Molly 
has/will engage in? How does it affect or define their marriage? Molly commits an 
act of “infidelity” in the most prosaic sense, but Ulysses never allows this simplicity 
to stand unconsidered. While the sexual act necessarily retains its immediate, 
emblematic power—a single, definitive act is so much easier to process than a 
thousand smaller infidelities—Ulysses develops upon Joyce’s theorizations in Exiles 
to pose questions about what it truly means to be (un)faithful. Perhaps more 
startlingly, however, Joyce also begins to question the value of such fidelity.  
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Faith in nighttown 
Perhaps the most important episode in Joyce’s reorientation of the 
betrayer/betrayed relationship is “Circe.” From the first, it announces its concern with 
falsehoods of various kinds. The red-light district is a place built on falsehood: 
prostitutes displaying false affection—“Wait, my love” (U, 15.11)—and their 
customers hiding themselves from view, disguising their true identity, or, in the case 
of the priest Bella Cohen describes, acting out forbidden carnal desires that they must 
keep hidden in their daily life. Bloom, similarly, lies throughout the episode. As well 
as playing a variety of roles as he performs in one situation after another, he concocts 
an elaborate lie to account to Kelleher for his presence in nighttown. 
 
I was just visiting an old friend of mine there, Virag, you don’t know him 
(poor fellow, he’s laid up for the past week) and we had a liquor together 
and I was just making my way home ... 
(U, 15.4873-76) 
 
To help defuse the situation after Stephen’s outburst in the brothel and his subsequent 
run-in with Private Carr, Bloom attempts to exaggerate Stephen’s importance by 
suggesting to Bella Cohen that he is “nephew of the vicechancellor” (U, 15.4299) 
before promoting him further, addressing him loudly in front of the crowd as 
“professor” (U, 15.4434). But Joyce hints repeatedly that there are other, more subtle 
falsehoods at work, that, in fact, the episode is built around these falsehoods. We are 
warned in the very first lines that there are “red and green will-o’-the-wisps and 
danger signals” (U, 15.2-3), while the sections of the episode recounting most 
obviously “real” events continually return to themes of faithlessness, adultery, and 
dishonesty. In one of the apparently unreal moments, Stephen and Lynch pass Edy 
Boardman as she describes a rich and seedy web of affairs. 
 
And says the one: I seen you up Faithful place with your squarepusher, 
the greaser off the railway, in his cometobed hat. Did you, says I. That's 
not for you to say, says I. You never seen me in the mantrap with a 
married highlander, says I. The likes of her! Stag that one is! Stubborn as 
a mule! And her walking with two fellows the one time, Kilbride, the 
enginedriver, and lancecorporal Oliphant. 
(U, 15.91-96) 
 
“Faithful place” provides an ironically appropriate setting for a story of intrigue 
within intrigue and adultery upon adultery. Bloom, for his part, passes “gallant 
Nelson’s image” (U, 15.145)—or the “onehandled adulterer” (U, 7.1018) as Stephen 
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describes him during his recitation of the “parable of the plums”—before colliding 
with Tommy Caffrey and checking the contents of his pockets—“watchfob, 
pocketbookpocket, pursepoke, sweets of sin, potatosoap” (U, 15.242-43)—thinking to 
himself that he must “beware of pickpockets. Old thieves dodge. Collide. Then snatch 
your purse” (U, 15.245-46). There is no innocence in “Circe,” as if everything has 
been tainted by the implicit falsehood in Molly’s adultery. A rambunctious child 
could be a pickpocket, a flashing, ethereal light is there to draw you to your death, 
and even “Faithful place” is the site of multiple displays of faithlessness. 
Some of this effect can be put down to Bloom’s state of mind. He has had some 
success putting Molly out of his thoughts all day, transferring his barely suppressed 
feelings into any number of potential schemes for public improvement, as well as 
disparate meditations on science, philosophy, literature, music, and history. Some of 
these reflections carry along the emotional residue of the situation, allowing Bloom to 
work out, even if not appease, his feelings in small chunks. Take for instance his 
meaningful mistake regarding La ci darem la mano, the song from Don Giovanni that 
Molly is due to sing with J. J. O’Molloy. The song choice is appropriate, as it marks 
Don Giovanni’s seduction of Zerlina. Zerlina’s reply to Don Giovanni’s offer is “I 
should like to, yet I shouldn’t” expressing a more ambiguous desire than the one 
Bloom constructs with his misremembered “Voglio e non vorrei” or “I want to, but I 
shouldn’t.”256 The difference is subtle but important and provides Molly, who we 
later find has sung this song with Boylan, with a far greater certainty of purpose than 
Zerlina. While Zerlina’s conditional “I should” is appropriately tentative—she is 
ultimately prevented or “saved” by the intervention of Donna Elvira—Molly is much 
more of an “I want” kind of woman. This song comes into Bloom’s head throughout 
the day, marking for him Molly’s final preparations for Boylan. Having been briefly 
disturbed by a sighting of Blazes in the street, Bloom thinks of Molly at “twenty past 
eleven. Up. Mrs Fleming is in to clean. Doing her hair, humming. Voglio e non 
vorrei. . . . Looking at the tips of her hairs to see if they are split. Mi trema un poco 
il” (U, 6.237-39). The song allows him some relief from the potentially distressing 
image of his wife beautifying herself for another lover. While both containing and 
suppressing the potential meaning of this song in relation to his situation, he focuses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Translation taken from Vernon Hall, “Joyce’s use of Da Ponte and Mozart’s Don 
Giovanni,” PMLA 66.2 (1951), 79. 
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in on Molly’s voice thinking: “Beautiful on that tre her voice is: weeping tone. A 
thrush. A throstle. There is a word throstle that expresses that” (U, 6.239-41).  
This is Bloom’s tactic throughout the day. Rather than discharge emotion in 
angry or unhappy ejaculations, he simply forces himself to think about absorbing but 
unimportant matters. He does not allow his distress to build beyond a certain point. 
But that does not mean that his subconscious mind is not working away, attempting 
to sort through his conflicting feelings. This misremembered song continues to appear 
not because Bloom has failed to see its importance, but precisely because he has, 
even if this awareness does not register consciously. We see this in “Circe” when the 
apparition of “Mrs Marion” appears. In response to her knowing recitation of a line 
from la ci darem la mano, Bloom pleads “Are you sure about that voglio? I mean the 
pronunciati...” (U, 15.351-54). The question refers back to his concern in “Calypso” 
that she may mispronounce the word “voglio,” which doesn’t appear in the song 
anyway (U, 4.327). Bloom’s rapid clarification is revealing. This is not really a 
question about pronunciation, its meaning is surprisingly literal: “are you sure about 
that ‘I want to’?” Or “are you sure you want to?” In “Circe” where the subconscious 
comes to the fore and is free of the daytime restrictions Bloom sets upon it, this 
question can be asked more straightforwardly than it has been. Bloom’s question is 
essentially are you sure you want to sleep with Boylan/Don Giovanni? 
The “voglio” example is indicative of the general operation of the “Circe” 
episode. While most of the preceding episodes have given us the tender pathos of 
Bloom’s evasions (psychological and physical) as he goes about his day, “Circe” is 
what happens when the suppressed, overlooked, and half-imagined contents of his 
subconscious mind are unleashed, with all the raw inconsistency, paradox, juvenility, 
and absurdity that this entails. As such, it offers a perfect opportunity to examine the 
effects of Molly’s adultery on Bloom’s psychology. Before going on to do this 
however, some discussion must be had about the nature of these “hallucinations” or 
“fantasies” as they are generally known (occasionally they are described as “dream 
sequences”), and a note of caution sounded about their presumed connection to 
Bloom’s (drunken) mind. While it will be clear that it is fundamental to my argument 
that the fantastic events of “Circe” are by and large rooted in Bloom’s (and to a lesser 
extent in Stephen’s) psychology, the connection between the two is, I think, more 
problematic than is usually acknowledged. For both “hallucination” and “fantasy” 
misrepresent the textual reality of “Circe” in important ways. For “hall
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take to mean an imagined construction that interacts with or writes over the “real,” 
observable world of the senses. Like a mirage, it is generally a trick of the mind that 
interferes with the information being gathered by the senses. Stephen, we can see, is 
suffering from hallucinations, in that what he sees (his mother) is a particular, 
psychologically-charged imaginary object, added to the world that he shares with 
those around him; this point is important. While only Stephen can see his mother, she 
is not a part of the real world, his interaction with that image occurs in the real, shared 
world of the brothel. Time does not stop and the text does not move inward into 
Stephen’s imagination, detached from the events outside his head. The clearest proof 
of this is that when Stephen responds to his mother’s ghoulish image, he does so in 
words that the “whores” can hear, even if they cannot interpret them; he swings his 
ashplant in the “real” world, not in the world of his fantasy.  
Bloom, conversely, does not hallucinate at all. The whores, Stephen and his 
friends, and the people on the street (as they are) never interact with Bloom’s 
fantastical digressions. These go on for so long—tens of pages at a time—that any 
naive assumptions we might have had about the shared synchronicity of these events 
(that the fantastic events of “Circe” occur in Bloom’s head, while the mundane events 
of the brothel continue outside it) are difficult to sustain. Even if we accept that time 
in the imagination can pass more quickly than in the real world—perhaps that events 
occur in compressed form in the mind, only to be unpacked upon later 
consideration—we must accept that the text of “Circe” is responsible for this 
unpacking. We do not skip in and out of Bloom’s head, but are treated to a display 
that is constructed by the text.257 While it is occasionally difficult to draw any hard 
distinctions between the brothel and Bloom’s projected fantasies, there is 
nevertheless no slippage between the two; Bloom does not, as Stephen does, confuse 
reality and unreality, despite the inhabitants of the brothel regularly playing a role in 
his unreal projections. Bloom’s negotiations with Bella Cohen are not observably 
affected by his supposed experiences with Bello. Indeed, there is little to suggest that 
Bloom remembers any of the things that we presume occur in his head. While in 
“Ithaca,” for example, there are several references to thoughts and memories that also 
come up in “Circe,” there is no sense that Bloom is remembering the “events” of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Obviously, everything is a construction of the text, but the distinction here between a 
semi-naturalistic, semi-realistic textual practice and the one I am outlining is important. 
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“Circe” as he potters about his house at the end of the night. For example, he thinks 
back to 1886, when he “was occupied with the problem of the quadrature of the 
circle” (U, 17.1071) but this does not lead him to recall Virag’s absurd image 
reminding him of his intentions to “devote an entire year to the study of the religious 
problem and the summer months of 1886 to square that circle and win that million” 
(U, 15.2399-401).258 One would think that had this slightly mocking, guilt-inducing 
paternal image really appeared to Bloom in the detail that he does in “Circe,” then 
some memory of this would have spilt over into “Ithaca.” Instead, all we have are 
echoes of trains of thought, some of them rooted primarily in “Circe” and others part 
of a longer series of repeating anxieties. Interestingly, in Bloom’s “recapitulat[ion]” 
of his day, his visit to the brothel gives little hint of the fantastical events we read 
about: “the visit to the disorderly house of Mrs. Bella Cohen, 82 Tyrone Street, lower, 
and subsequent brawl and chance medley in Beaver Street” (15.2054-56). The 
“disorder” is a cute textual joke, but does not give any sense of Bloom’s conscious 
awareness of quite how disorderly the episode was for the reader. While it makes 
sense that Bloom’s list would focus on the literal “events” of his day, if his 
imagination had been as active in that passage as it appears, wouldn’t it have merited 
some mention? 
Rather than assume, then, that “Circe” operates at one remove from a fairly 
straightforward psychological realism, dramatizing Bloom’s fantasies as they occur to 
him, would it not be better and more accurate to think of them as constructions? 
Perhaps a better word would be “projection,” since it captures both the cinematic 
quality of this section of text and suggests the degree to which these fantastic 
passages extrapolate from the material at their base. Derek Attridge has suggested the 
term “pararealism” to describe a style that is deeply realist in form but decidedly not 
in content. Attridge suggests that rather than attempt to find the logical key that 
allows us to categorize all the different types of event in “Circe,” we should “accept 
what typography and tone tell us, that in just the same way as Zoe pulls her slip free 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Other examples include: Bloom remembering past discussions with Owen Goldberg and 
Cecil Turnbull (U, 17.48) and the “Halcyon Days” of which they formed a part (U, 15.3325-
29); the scheme for a hydroelectric plant at Poulaphouca (U, 17.713) and its appearance as a 
waterfall (U, 15.3299). In neither case is there any acknowledgement of the events of “Circe” 
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or Kitty Ricketts smoothes her eyebrows, Lipoti Virag slides out of the chimney 
flue.”259 Following this general approach, I suggest that, rather than be tempted by the 
lure of a too-faithful psychological realism, is it not better to figure the relationship 
between thought and text in “Circe” in much the same way that we do “Oxen of the 
Sun”? or “Ithaca”? As highly-stylized extrapolations from the more mundane trains 
of thought that have filled Bloom’s mind throughout the day? 
This complex, ambiguous relationship presents a problem for my reading of 
“Circe.” It would be far easier to treat it as an extended, broken up “dream sequence” 
and analyse Bloom’s psychic machinery accordingly. But a more nuanced connection 
is needed, one that roots these projections in the reality of Bloom’s subconscious and 
conscious thoughts and anxieties, without reducing the result to simple wish-
fulfilment or nightmare. The Bloom that participates in these projections is himself a 
fantastical projection of the “real world” Bloom we have so far encountered (we can 
hardly read this Bloom’s behaviour as straightforwardly realistic). “Circe” makes 
available Bloom’s psychic machinery not by revealing his private fantasies per se, but 
by constructing a fictive, farcical play built on his anxieties, desires, and aspirations. 
The “narrator” (if such a term makes sense in “Circe”) effectively adds an 
increasingly uncontrolled side-commentary to the psychologically realistic Bloom 
hidden beneath the style of “Circe.” Though this play is not in any meaningful sense 
happening to Bloom, it is at all points limited and driven by the contents of his 
conscious, semi-conscious, and subconscious mind. As such, it is no more nor less 
valid as a measure of Bloom’s mind than the catechismal style of “Ithaca.” 
 
Bloom betrays 
Molly’s adultery, in one way or another, obviously plays a major role in 
“Circe.” Given the sheer range and number of allusions and references to it in the 
episode (not to mention the novel as a whole) I can hardly offer a reading of every 
moment in the text, but will select certain rich and significant examples to elucidate 
discussion. The Don Giovanni motif offers one such rich structure through which 
Joyce is able to explore the issue of adultery and betrayal as it affects Bloom. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Derek Attridge, “‘Pararealism’ in ‘Circe,’” in European Joyce Studies 22: Joycean 
Unions; Post Millenial Essays from East to West, ed. R. Brandon Kershner and Tekla 
Mecsnóber (New York: Rodopi, 2013), 125. 
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crossovers are fairly obvious and, at first sight, unsubtle. Bloom is Masetto, helpless 
to thwart the larger-than-life Boylan/Don Giovanni from having his way with his 
wife/fiancée Molly/Zerlina. These correspondences are easy enough to make and add 
a pleasing note of operatic melodrama to this otherwise unexplosive love triangle. 
But, as Vernon Hall showed as early as 1951, Joyce is not satisfied with such a one-
dimensional allusion. “He recognises that in the love drama one man can play 
different parts at different times-even simultaneously.”260 While Bloom occupies the 
space and inherits the narrative baggage of Masetto when he is brought into contact, 
figuratively, with Boylan and Molly, he adopts the guise of the Don when thinking 
about his flirtations with Martha Clifford, whose faux-innocence matches Zerlina 
well; it isn’t hard to imagine her responding to Bloom’s “la ci darem la mano” with a 
“vorrei e non vorrei.” But at times Bloom is also the possessive and paternal 
Commendatore, concerned about the advances of the mysterious Bannon towards his 
daughter Milly. Bannon is aligned with Blazes and, therefore, Don Giovanni through 
Boylan’s signature tune, “Those Lovely Seaside Girls.”  
Don Giovanni becomes an archetypal structure, a schema through which the 
relationships in Ulysses can be re-oriented. Joyce exploits and explores this structure, 
manoeuvring it around to test all its possibilities. In the opera, the structure is 
relatively clear: Don Giovanni is the loveable but immoral cad, Masetto the 
unfortunate but unexciting victim, and Zerlina the near-adulteress whose virtue is 
almost won all too easily. But in “Circe” Joyce explores the possibilities of Bloom as 
something far more complex than merely a Masetto. Playing, at various times, all the 
roles, he is, as Beaufoy declares, “Leading a quadruple existence!” (U, 15.853).261 
The point is not that Bloom is particularly unmoored, particularly diffuse in his 
character, but that in Ulysses Joyce is not interested in working through a particular 
construction in isolation (as in Exiles). Joyce moves towards a more polyphonic 
enunciation of these themes, in which the structural, allusive positions are given free 
rein to shift and move. While, for my purposes, the shift from Portrait to Ulysses can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Hall, “Joyce’s use of Da Ponte and Mozart’s Don Giovanni,” 79. 
261 Of course, Bloom plays many other roles in “Circe” and elsewhere—not least a parody of 
Parnell. But while I am giving this particular allusion artificial importance here, it is because 
it represents a fair example of Joyce’s practice in Ulysses of working over betrayal (here, 
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be described in terms of a move away from Joyce’s interest in the way Stephen 
constructs his position as “betrayed” towards the failures of that position, the move 
from Exiles to Ulysses can be described as a loss of interest in the single, fixed 
structure; Exiles, for all that it worries at the problem of betrayal, does so without 
seriously questioning the fixity of the triptych structure: Richard (betrayed)-Bertha 
(betraying lover)-Robert (betraying friend). All of the questioning and worrying 
occurs within the confines of this structure, leaving no space for the kinds of playful 
positional uncertainty that characterizes Ulysses.  
Bloom is the great vehicle for Joyce’s opening out of betrayal. While both 
Stephen in Portrait and Richard in Exiles are driven inward by their anticipation of 
betrayal, each man’s interiority manifests only briefly in self-questioning. Stephen 
turns towards notions of historical inevitability and race consciousness to explain his 
victimhood; Richard similarly externalizes his paranoia into the inevitable result of a 
structure that he did not create and cannot move beyond. Bloom is different. His 
experience of adultery drives him inward, but rather than produce binding 
justifications for his position, he questions both the value (and justice) of his own 
suffering and the fixity of his position as victim. When Bloom plays out his fantasies 
of “dongiovannism” (U, 9.458) with an imagined Mrs Breen in “Circe” it allows him 
to extricate himself temporarily from his position as cuckold and victim—he has just 
been reminded memorably of this by Marion’s teasing apparition (U, 15.293-355). 
The scene unfolds with Bloom coy and flustered, caught “in the haunts of sin” (U, 
15.395) and instructed to “account for yourself this very minute or woe betide you!” 
(U, 15.405): “(hurriedly) Not so loud my name. Whatever do you think of me? Don’t 
give me away. Walls have ears” (U, 15.398-99). But this fear of exposure gives way 
gradually to a cautious flirtation, with Bloom either awkwardly formal—“Would you 
like me perhaps to embrace you for just a fraction of a second?” (U, 15.429)—or 
making use of double entendres—“square party,” i.e. wife-swapping (U, 15.433)—
and the kind of cloyingly suggestive language we find in the Martha Clifford 
letters—“you cruel naughty creature” (U, 15.559). Around midway through the 
scene, Bloom and Mrs Breen even act out their own seduction scene, with Bloom 
“slip[ping] on her finger a ruby ring” and reciting, “tenderly,” “Là ci darem la mano” 
(U, 15.468-69). Mrs Breen responds, not as Zerlina does, but as Bloom imagines 
Molly to: “Voglio e non .....” (U, 15.473). But while this fantasy may allow Bloom a 
certain relief as he reminisces about a former flame, this whole scene seems to 
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revolve around Molly. The “Voglio” is Molly’s and cannot fail to raise the spectre of 
Boylan/Giovanni. Even before this, Bloom’s conversation with the imagined Mrs 
Breen has revolved around Molly. More than half of it is given over to a 
“retrospective arrangement” (U, 15.443), a shared memory that, while nominally 
about Mrs. Breen, cannot but keep adding irrelevant details about Molly. 
As well as allowing Bloom to shift his position temporarily within the structure 
of adultery, this fantasy entertains Bloom’s desire for some sort of like-for-like 
vengeance—if Molly can commit adultery, so can he (with a married woman, 
matching in different ways both Boylan and Molly). But Mrs Breen’s sly threat that 
she will let Molly know about his supposed activities in nighttown—“O just wait till I 
see Molly” (U, 15.450)—merely reminds him of comments she has made in the past 
about wanting to visit nighttown in search of “the exotic” (U, 15.408). While in the 
past these remarks titillated him, they have of course now taken on a more unpleasant 
tone. And whatever desire for vengeance Bloom may have, once actually presented 
with the opportunity to “betray” Molly with the phantom Mrs Breen, he shies away 
from her suggestion that he “kiss the spot to make it well” (U, 15.488). When she 
proffers a “pigeon kiss” Bloom ignores her and rattles off a number of subject 
changes—Plumtrees potted meat, Mrs Bandmann Palmer’s Leah, and pigs’ feet—an 
ironic echo of his habit of distracting himself from uncomfortable thoughts by 
moving through neutral topics. He has used this trick throughout the day. 
If Bloom does wish to reciprocate Molly’s adultery, he lacks even the most 
basic conviction. His great worry throughout “Circe” is that anyone should think 
either that he has come to nighttown in search of a brothel or that he has been a 
roving Don Juan; several mock-court scenes take place in the episode, accusing 
Bloom of all kinds of debauchery. Rather than exploring in detail Bloom’s 
persecution complex here, there is value in thinking through the meaning of these 
scenes in relation to Bloom’s sense of himself as both betrayer and adulterer. Many 
of Bloom’s dark fantasies follow a similar pattern: some event from his past—several 
of them earlier in the day—is recalled by some absurd apparition who holds him to 
account on grossly exaggerated charges. So Gerty MacDowell, “Leering . . . limps 
forward . . . and shows coyly her bloodied clout” (U, 15.371-72). While Bloom’s 
earlier activities were morally ambiguous, here his and Gerty’s encounter, if you can 
call it that, is transfigured into a violent deflowering, all the more disturbing for the 
fact that Bloom does not even know her. While this ignorance was central to both 
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their purposes—allowing their imaginations free rein—here Gerty becomes an image 
of female inscrutability and changeability. Within a few lines she moves from 
haranguing Bloom—“You did that [gave her the “bloodied clout”]. I hate you for 
that” (U, 15.374-75)—to exclaiming: “Dirty married man! I love you for doing that to 
me” (U, 15.385).  
Bloom’s affair with Gerty, though it had an obvious physical component, was 
mental. The whole thing takes place in the mind. Yet in “Circe” Bloom is confronted 
with increasingly troubling real-world consequences of actions he only imagined. 
Bloom’s fantasies force him to account (or better, force him to acknowledge his 
failure to account) for every aggressive, lecherous, and voyeuristic thought he has 
ever had. “The sins of your past are rising against you. Many. Hundreds” says Bello, 
before the sins themselves appear to chime out, “in a medley of voices.” 
 
THE SINS OF THE PAST 
 
He went through a form of clandestine marriage with at least one woman 
in the shadow of the Black church. Unspeakable messages he telephoned 
mentally to Miss Dunn at an address in D’Olier street while he presented 
himself indecently to the instrument in the callbox. By word and deed he 
frankly encouraged a nocturnal strumpet to deposit fecal and other matter 
in an unsanitary outhouse attached to empty premises. In five public 
conveniences he wrote pencilled messages offering his nuptial partner to 
all strongmembered males. And by the offensively smelling vitriol works 
did he not pass night after night by loving courting couples to see if and 
what and how much he could see? Did he not lie in bed, the gross boar, 
gloating over a nauseous fragment of wellused toilet paper presented to 
him by a nasty harlot, stimulated by gingerbread and a postal order? 
(U, 15.3025-40) 
 
A strange list. Benign fantasies blown out of proportion (Bloom’s mental telephone) 
mingle with acts of plain voyeurism (passing by young courting couples) and two 
unsettling displays of coprophilia. It is unclear how much, if any, of this Bloom has 
actually done. At any rate, Bloom misses the point, protesting that he “only thought 
the half of the ...”; in “Circe,” where thought and deed are equivalent, the distinction 
is effectively meaningless. The boundary between fantasy and reality is eroded to the 
point that even the briefest thought that Bloom has had now might constitute a 
completed act.  
Much of the effect and, one feels, the purpose of this is darkly comic; some of 
Bloom’s attempts to extricate himself from the ensuing confusions and 
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misunderstandings are hilarious. But “Circe” does not stop at the easy joke. The 
breakdown of this distinction is important in relation to Molly’s betrayal, for it poses 
an important question about the nature of her crime against Bloom. In Exiles, 
Richard’s problem was that he considered desire to be equivalent to action. As Dr 
Matthew O’Connor puts it in Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood, “For the lover, it is the 
night into which his beloved goes . . . that destroys his heart. . . . When she sleeps, is 
she not moving aside her leg for an unknown garrison?” But O’Connor goes on, 
“And what of our own sleep? We go to it no better—and betray her with the very 
virtue of our days.”262 Richard is certainly destroyed in this way, but for Bloom his 
wife’s fantasies were always a source of potential titillation. The demand for 
knowledge that Bertha suffers in Exiles—being forced to tell Richard everything 
about her meetings with Robert—is enacted quite differently. Knowledge of private 
desires of this sort gains an erotic charge, empowering Molly and exciting Leopold, 
providing an economy of desires that can be traded and marshalled. But the move 
from fantasy to reality that Molly has enacted corrupts this system. In the past, 
fantasy has been fantasy alone, and Bloom could enjoy the flirtation with suffering 
that it allowed. But, as the ghoulish image of his mother now blocks Stephen’s 
personal fantasies of escape and overcoming, Boylan stands, temporarily, in the way 
of Bloom. He cannot even enjoy his own fantasy life without being knocked back by 
Boylan’s visage. 
Part of the problem for Bloom is that in processing his wife’s adultery, he also 
has to contend with her choice of partner, a man who is in most respects his polar 
opposite. Where Bloom is old (for the purposes of this comparison), Boylan is young; 
where Bloom is quiet, Boylan is rambunctious; where Bloom thinks, Boylan acts 
(both in business and in love); where Bloom’s sexuality is problematic, 
polymorphous, and unfulfilling for his wife, Boylan is a vigorous lover with a large 
penis (a “tremendous big red brute of a thing”) and entirely straightforward urges (he 
and Molly have sex three or four times without complication).263 Of course, Bloom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Djuna Barnes, Nightwood (New York: New Directions, 1968), 87-88. 
263 Margot Norris has questioned some of these characterizations, suggesting that the text is 
predisposed towards presenting a skewed and incomplete image—Blazes rather than Boylan. 
I agree with this argument on several points but my point here is specifically about how 
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isn’t aware of the size of Boylan’s penis but otherwise his sexual reputation rather 
precedes him. To be clear, it’s not simply that Molly’s adultery brings home to 
Bloom that he is old and sexually inadequate. Marriage, and monogamy more 
generally, tends to be built on an aspiration towards monogamous desire. The ideal is 
that one’s lover loves one exclusively and wholly. In this sense, any extra-marital 
desire represents a failure of this monogamy. But in choosing Boylan, Molly has 
chosen an anti-Bloom, a negation of all Bloom’s qualities and characteristics. When 
Bloom observes Boylan’s “Bold hand,” he is not merely identifying Boylan, he is 
identifying himself as not-bold. As such, Molly has chosen someone with an 
immense signifying potential; Boylan’s innate “Blazesness” acts to destabilize and 
short-circuit Bloom’s fantasy life.  
The equivalence of desire and reality that “Circe” enables is not sustainable 
beyond the bounds of the episode. Even within its fantastic projections, the cracks 
already begin to appear. Bloom cannot, at this moment, get beyond the hard, 
immovable fact of his wife’s physical adultery. The playful threat has become a 
taunting reality, transformed instantly by this single act. But the problem is not 
simply that a physical act has occurred—at least not exactly. Rather, the problem lies 
in Bloom’s position relative to this physical act, which has placed him in a role that 
he has had no part in constructing. Boylan’s hidden letter under the pillow, Molly’s 
pretence that nothing is about to happen, these things mark Bloom as an outsider to 
the affair. The (insufficient) care taken to keep Bloom out of this new relationship 
(between Molly and Boylan) is itself a clear statement that it has nothing to do with 
Bloom. When Molly shares with Bloom her fantasies about men outside their 
marriage, she effectively brings these extra-marital desires within the marriage. For 
all that they may provide the couple with the thrill of illicit desire, they are swiftly 
and effectively normalized into the bourgeois structures of married love; illicit desire 
is transmuted into licit desire; dangerous extramarital urges are made into safe marital 
urges. So, while Molly’s affair with Boylan is damaging to Bloom on an immediate, 
possessive, irrational level (animalistic jealousy), it is doubly damaging because it 
announces to him (on a level he is not capable of consciously acknowledging) that 
Molly’s illicit desire is truly extramarital in that it seeks to exclude him completely. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Boylan presents himself to Bloom and how Bloom understands Boylan in comparison to 
himself. “Don’t Call Him Blazes,” JJQ 48.2 (2011): 229-249. 
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There is no place for him in it, except as negated and rejected, precisely as that which 
has no place in the affair. Molly’s affair is so psychically harmful to Bloom not 
merely because this is reality rather than fantasy, but because Bloom cannot, for the 
great length of the novel, find any sustainable position from which to participate in it. 
More importantly, Molly has not invited him to participate in it. 
Richard Rowan desperately tried to tame adultery by commanding its elements, 
but Bloom instead made a game of it, encouraging Molly to reveal her past affairs, 
demanding to know which men she liked, even suggesting that she’d like to go with 
them instead of, or in addition to, him. This allowed him to gain control over his 
anxieties as he could acknowledge the possibility of infidelity while safely raising the 
issue of his own inadequacies.264 Molly might go with other men as a way to get 
satisfactions that Bloom could not provide, but the performance of this possibility 
itself ensured him that these inadequacies would not in fact drive her to do so. The 
difference with Boylan, however, is not simply that this affair involves the physical 
consummation of what has, in the past, been fantasy—though this is a problem in 
much the same way as it is for Stephen: it cannot be undone. Rather, the problematic 
difference is that Bloom is not made a part of the process. How can he make a game 
out of Molly’s infidelity when she herself is unwilling to play? If there is no play, 
then this is no game, and the consequences cannot be absorbed into the fantasy play 
of the past.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 This model of behaviour is well described by Freud’s description of his grandchild’s 
“fort” “da” game. The child makes play out of a toy disappearing and reappearing, thereby 
modelling the distressing disappearance and reappearance of the mother. In controlling these 
disappearances and reappearances, the child enacts a form of empowerment that, by analogy, 
lessens the stress of parental absence. Bloom’s method is much more direct than Freud’s 
example and this is by no means an exact comparison, but the structural logic is similar. 
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Chapter Seven: Sexual betrayal in “Penelope” 
 
The shift from fantasy to reality may seem simple enough to be not worth 
mentioning, even if it strikes one as strangely counter to “natural” emotional 
responses. But for Bloom it constitutes an earth-shattering alteration in his marital 
dynamic. It is clear from “Penelope” that in the past Molly has indulged Bloom’s 
eroticization of the possibility of marital infidelity, even if this has been more 
Bloom’s fantasy than her own. Bloom is described as the “great Suggester don Poldo 
de la Flora” because he likes to suggest sexual partners for Molly (U, 18.1427). 
While in the past it has always been hypothetical, it has nevertheless been one of the 
key characteristics of their sex life, such as it is. 
 
doing that frigging drawing out the thing by the hour question and answer 
would you do this that and the other with the coalman yes with a bishop 
yes . . . encouraging him making him worse than he is who is in your 
mind now tell me who are you thinking of who is it tell me his name who 
tell me who the german Emperor is it yes imagine Im him think of him 
(U, 18.88-93) 
 
The differences between this intimate roleplaying and Molly’s adultery are obvious 
(one is fantasy, the other reality), but it is important to understand that Molly at least 
considers Bloom’s behaviour to be part of a wider pattern of desire. The dividing line 
between desire and action, fantasy and reality that “Circe” threatened to disrupt is as 
uncertain and imprecise for Molly as it was for Bloom. She has doubts, certainly, but 
it is clear that for the most part Molly feels that her actions are and were justified. 
While I don’t have any particular interest in making any determinations about the 
rights and wrongs of Molly’s affair, it is important to acknowledge the novel’s 
dynamic in this respect. After several hundred pages devoted to Bloom’s self-
flagellation in which, past the opening scenes of the second part of the book, Molly is 
only voiced indirectly, Joyce ends the novel with an extended defence of Molly’s 
position. Except that it is not even a defence, as it refuses to acknowledge the validity 
of the charges the novel has made against her; Molly rejects, quite openly, the very 
name that social taboo (and literary history) has sought to put on her: “adulteress.” In 
doing so, “Penelope” continues to undermine the primacy of sex as the ultimate 
determinant of the marital relationship (at least Molly and Bloom’s), continuing the 
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work begun in “Circe” and bringing into focus the more meaningful problems at the 
heart of the Blooms’ marriage.  
 
Molly’s self-defence 
Chief among the defences Joyce allows Molly to mount in “Penelope” is her 
(reasonable) conviction that Bloom has himself been sleeping with other women. 
This follows, as I have suggested, from her increasing suspicion about his interest in 
imagined adultery in their fantasy life, but is also grounded in several misreadings of 
Bloom’s behaviour. Molly is remarkably observant and feels that she understands 
Bloom completely, but the conclusions she draws from these observations are never 
quite right and create an interestingly dissonant picture when placed up against the 
novel we have been reading up until that point. Bloom’s actions and thoughts, which 
fill the pages of the novel, are put in dialogue with Molly’s interpretations of the 
events that have unfolded, producing, in the end, a complex and multi-perspectival 
image both of their marriage together and the events of the day that has just passed. 
First among these conclusions is Molly’s conviction that Bloom “came 
somewhere” (U, 18.34) before returning home. Molly is, of course, right. For the 
reader, who has just exhaustively followed the thoughts and actions of Bloom 
throughout the day, there is a strange delight to be taken in Molly’s brusque and 
(nearly) accurate deductions. The readerly thrill available in these moments is like a 
parodic, inverted Sherlock Holmes story. While Holmes masterfully unravels a string 
of the most mundane and unpromising details to expose surprising and intimate 
truths—“you have just come from the train” or “I see you are a cellist”—Molly is 
working with the smallest of evidence—small details about Bloom’s general manner 
as he enters the bed—and combining it with what she thinks she already knows. 
While Holmes solves the crime for the reader, Molly mis-solves a series of non-
crimes to which the reader is already privy. But, though the overall effect is quite 
different, Molly’s sensitivity is also reminiscent of Stephen Dedalus who can find in 
Cranly’s every look and gesture proof positive of the betrayal that is set to come. 
This parade of detective work may not be very surprising. After all, Barbara 
Leckie has suggested that in the second half of the nineteenth century, the novel of 
adultery became increasingly concerned with a certain kind of epistemological 
question: has the “injured party” been wronged? With who? And can this be proven 
so that justice and punishment can be meted out accordingly? As such, the novel of 
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adultery really became a “domestic detective story” in which the thrill comes from 
the readers’ investment in exposing the wife’s infidelity to the purifying gaze of 
social justice.265 For most of Ulysses, this “domestic detective story” is never really 
given the space to get going; Bloom is always aware of what is about to happen and, 
as a result, so is the reader. The epistemological problem in the novel is never 
“has/will Molly commit adultery?” but “why?” In “Penelope” this situation is turned 
on its head. Molly, who by generic convention is the “wrongdoer,” is allowed to 
occupy the space generically preserved for the male “cuckold.” If the bulk of Ulysses 
has been concerned with Bloom as betrayed, it is suddenly more concerned with him 
as potential betrayer. A strange thing, given this is, for obvious reasons, the episode 
in which we hear most about Molly’s affair. 
This is a remarkable turn of events: Bloom returns home to the bed his wife has 
soiled with her infidelity (literally266 and figuratively) and yet he, rather than Molly, 
is subject to suspicion and accusations of sexual impropriety. So, while Molly’s 
concerns about Bloom’s activities (as well as her conviction that these suspicions 
have as great or greater validity than the certainty of her own adultery) have an 
important realist value (they are important to the construction of a complete and 
complex character), Molly’s monologue also represents a series of quietly 
revolutionary criticisms of cultural responses to adultery. Adultery is almost always 
conceived and problematized as the wife’s adultery—a point stressed by Tony Tanner 
in Adultery in the Novel and Barbara Leckie in Culture and Adultery. While female 
adultery is seen to corrupt (adulterate) the marriage contract and, by analogy, the 
social contract as a whole, the effects of male extramarital activities are taken to be 
local and individual. Certainly, these men and these activities are regularly depicted 
as immoral, incorrigible, and unpleasant, but the social charge is rarely present in the 
way it is in female adultery. The punishments are never so inevitable nor so 
manifestly necessary for men as they are for women. One need only think of the 
broad canon of adulterous texts—Tristan & Isolde, Lancelot and Guinevere, Othello, 
Madame Bovary, The Kreutzer Sonata, to name but a small sample—to see that the 
key feature they have in common is their focus on a married (or at least contracted to 
marry, i.e. engaged) woman and an unmarried man. This is true even in those stories 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Leckie, Culture and Adultery, 14. 
266 “theres the mark of his [Boylan’s] spunk on the clean sheet” (U, 18.1512). 
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where no adultery has taken place (e.g. Othello, Coriolanus). There are exceptions, 
certainly, but they do tend to prove the rule. The overpowering interest of these texts 
has always been in examining and fetishizing (fantasizing) the destruction of the 
marriage contract, and the simple fact is that the power to preserve this contract has 
historically been in the hands of the husband. A woman had little power to end a 
marriage, whether her husband kept a mistress (a semi-accepted practice of long-
standing), visited prostitutes (morally shocking but socially innocuous), or fathered 
children outside the marriage. While marriage polices desire, sexual activity, and 
physical productivity, these prohibitions tend to be asymmetrical, the burden of 
observance and punishment falling most severely on women.  
Rather than simply the result of some dark misogyny at the heart of male-
dominated society, which sought to police women’s bodies as possessions and 
women’s sexuality as vulgar (though by all means this is most likely a partial 
explanation), this intensive focus on the wife as guardian of social stability is sourced 
in the nature of “contract.” As Tanner has argued in some detail, “[f]or bourgeois 
society marriage is the all-subsuming, all-organizing, all-containing contract.”267 
Marriage organizes and legitimizes property (e.g. inheritance), people (it also allows 
non-family to become family), and passions, establishing the bourgeois family unit as 
the “natural” basis for a civil society. Marriage is, in essence, the great synecdoche 
for the social contract (much as sex is the great synecdoche for betrayal and marital 
failure in my account) and must be preserved against corruption. Male extramarital 
activities were more or less safely contained within a legal and social system in which 
a King, Lord, or head of a family could account for his extramarital offspring safely 
(if not entirely satisfactorily). If a mistress had a baby, it mattered relatively little, 
since this child would have only a minimal claim on any property, active only, if at 
all, in cases where there were no biological heirs produced by the lawful marriage. 
The child could be acknowledged or disavowed without dramatically effecting the 
contractual constitution of civil society. Contrarily, a wife’s infidelity was not so easy 
to account for, since, as Stephen so aptly puts it, “paternity is a legal fiction.” Female 
fidelity was so stringently enforced precisely because the system on which bourgeois 
society was based relied entirely on that fidelity. If the marriage contract could be 
broken with ease—if the restrictions/protections that aim to prevent such a breach are 
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so weak—then could not all the contracts on which civil society relies also be 
broken? The epistemological problem at the heart of Exiles is really a rather extreme 
and particular form of the epistemological problem at the heart of all organized 
society: how can I know the other’s intention? If I cannot know the other, how can I 
be safe in their hands? 
For these reasons, the novel of adultery never worked up sufficient concern at 
the outcomes of husbands’ infidelities to make them the central feature of their 
narratives. Socially, there were no outcomes. But the radical interiority of Ulysses 
drives and is driven by a concern for the minutiae of thought and feeling. As such, 
Molly is given a voice not usually available to wives and is in a position to challenge 
the inequity in cultural representations of adultery. The social arguments that produce 
the taboo (sanctity of contract; certainty of parentage) are rejected and Molly’s 
genuine sense of herself as cuckold is permitted space to ferment, quietly but surely 
building into a potent challenge, firstly, to Bloom’s “passport to eternity”—a check to 
the beatification of Bloom—but also to the generic conventions that are blinded to 
female concerns about adultery by bourgeois systems of social ordering.268 Joyce 
consciously directs our sympathies towards Bloom—allowing him to give full voice 
to all his pain, uncertainty, and anxiety—and then gives Molly an uninterrupted “final 
word,” as he puts it, in which to amend our incomplete understanding.269 We reach 
“Penelope” with hundreds of pages of sympathy for Bloom already built up, and quite 
possibly tens of thousands of pages of generic expectation telling us that, regardless 
of complexity, Molly is in the wrong.270 As such, it is remarkable that Joyce reverses 
the positions if not the logic of the “domestic detective story” by allowing the 
epistemological burden to fall instead into the hands of the “adulteress.” The novel of 
adultery is always the story of the wife’s extramarital relations,271 but here it is Molly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 “The last word (human, all too human) is left to Penelope. This is the indispensable 
countersign to Bloom’s passport to eternity.” Letter to Frank Budgen, 28 February 1921 in 
Joyce, SL, 278. 
269 Letter to Budgen, 28 February 1921. 
270 I don’t want to overstate this. I’m not suggesting that we reach “Penelope” baying for 
blood. I would imagine that very few readers feel this way. Our sympathy for Bloom has had 
plenty of time to percolate, not least because he has given a good deal of insight into the 
problems in his marriage that would lead Molly to “stray.” 
271 The term “novel of adultery” always refers to adultery on the part of the wife. 
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who has all the questions. Bloom is certain, Molly is suspicious. Though she speaks 
as if she is certain, the flaws and inconsistencies in her reasoning reveal the 
underlying epistemic insecurity that drives her monologue. A detective who never 
leaves her bed, Molly weighs up claim and counterclaim, evidence and counter-
evidence in order to settle to her own satisfaction the multi-layered question at the 
heart of all novels of adultery: “have I been betrayed?” 
As I have already mentioned, Molly assumes that Bloom has achieved orgasm 
somewhere outside their marriage that very day. So far so correct. But she reaches 
this conclusion by delightfully dubious logic. The revelation that opens the episode 
can be seen to bring about all of the monologic discussion that follows: “Yes because 
he never did a thing like that before as to ask for his breakfast in bed” (U, 18.01-02). 
This deviation from marital habit poses a question that Molly is forced to answer. 
Bloom has done something different, unexpected, something that Molly cannot 
immediately account for with reference to the banal repetition of their shared life. So, 
thirty lines later, she comes up with her first answer: “yes he came somewhere I’m 
sure by his appetite” (U, 18.34). A strange suggestion. It’s not clear why Bloom 
requesting breakfast in bed the following morning need necessarily indicate his 
appetite at the time of the request, nor, if he’s hungry, why this can’t be the result of 
his late-night wanderings, which have kept him from home till well past midnight. 
Molly’s reasons for moving straight to sex as an explanation are fairly transparent, of 
course: she has her own adultery in mind and is keen to square things with Bloom by 
making their actions equivalent (Molly has already paved the way for this, thinking of 
the “smutty photo [Bloom] has” [U, 18.22]). It’s as if she reasons that if she has 
cuckolded Bloom, then he has done the same to her and on the same day. If she has 
betrayed him, then he has also betrayed her. Bloom’s return to the bed on which she 
cuckolded him only hours before, and his unusual request for breakfast, produces this 
complex mix of defiance, self-justification, and ethical questioning that we follow for 
the rest of the episode. 
At times, the logic of Molly’s suspicions appears largely contingent on her own 
sense of ethical failure. When she feels anxiety building about her actions she is more 
likely to talk about Bloom’s infidelities; when she is flushed with self-confidence 
(railing against the social taboos that prevent women from enjoying sex) Bloom is 
less likely to appear as a factor in her decision. This is important as an indicator of the 
fragility and provisionality of Molly’s self-justifications, but our growing awareness 
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of this level of complexity should not, I think, completely undermine our sense of this 
process as at least mitigating in considering the ethics of her actions. If we wish to 
hold to the line that Bloom has been wronged here, then we are forced to confront the 
barrage of counter-arguments Molly provides, even if these arguments do not, 
ultimately, quite hold together. For Molly’s reasoning is no simpler than Bloom’s in 
this respect. As Bloom spends the day struggling to properly interpret Molly’s 
adultery (is it a betrayal? Why?) so Molly struggles to properly interpret Bloom’s 
behaviour and in so doing properly justify her own. Similarly, she shares Bloom’s 
subtle problematizing of the connection between sex and infidelity, working away at 
the problem both by undermining the ultimate value of sex as a signifier and by 
teasing out the marital failures on Bloom’s part that have precipitated her own sexual 
dalliance. 
Molly’s first thought is that he is having a love affair, but she dismisses this 
quickly, basing her conclusions once again on the disturbing effect of Bloom’s 
request for breakfast: “love its not or hed be off his feed thinking of her” (U, 18.35-
6). The effect is to remind us of the intimacy they share, her unparalleled, though 
somewhat scornful, knowledge of the ways Bloom loves, but we also receive another 
heavy dose of dramatic irony. Deciding that Bloom is not in love, she then wonders 
whether Bloom may have visited a brothel earlier that night (“one of those night 
women” [U, 18.36]), unaware that while Bloom has indeed visited a brothel, neither 
the intention nor the outcome of this visit are as she imagines. If not a prostitute, she 
thinks, then “its some little bitch or other he got in with somewhere or picked up on 
the sly” (U, 18.36-7). Molly’s resentment here (“little bitch”; “on the sly”) comes 
across as a bit rich, given her activities that day, but it at least makes clear that, first, 
she still has something invested in Bloom (even if it manifests itself here mainly as a 
righteous sense of ownership), and second, that she hasn’t abandoned entirely a moral 
sense about adultery. She clearly feels that there are rights and wrongs in this matter 
and that, generally, she is more in the right than in the wrong. So, in order to establish 
her blamelessness,272 Molly works to distance herself from comparatively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Perhaps this is too strong a word; Molly is willing to accept that her behaviour is not 
perfect. What she is not willing to do is accept a subject position that is forced upon her: 
sinner—spiritual or social—or loose woman. Molly denies that a crime has been committed 
but mounts a defence just to make sure. 
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reprehensible versions of her own behaviour. Bloom’s imagined liaisons must be 
either a seedy transaction (brothel), the product of some foolish weakness (Molly’s 
anger at the imagined “other woman” is suggestive of her thoughts later about 
Bloom’s susceptibility to women of low quality), the product of some wheedling, 
undignified activities on Bloom’s part (“got in with somewhere”—one might think of 
Joyce’s genuinely unscrupulous Corley in “Two Gallants”), or simply some quick, 
low tumble somewhere secretive (“picked up on the sly”). Indeed, it’s as if Molly is 
proud to have committed adultery “out in the open,” so to speak: in her own bed in 
the early afternoon.  
We can see from the short passage in the previous paragraph (little more than 
twenty words) that Molly is not merely lashing out at Bloom for imagined wrongs, 
she is distancing herself from a number of practices, drawing a kind of negative 
portrait of herself by scrubbing out all the things that she isn’t. It’s not that she 
doesn’t see anything questionable about adultery of any kind, it’s that she is not 
willing to reduce her behaviour to a simple, loaded designation, “adulteress,” with all 
the concomitant social sanctions that it implies. Tony Tanner, in his discussion of the 
marriage contract as the established order of bourgeois society, has suggested that 
adultery “points to an activity, not an identity.” I think it’s clear, however, that what 
Molly fears is precisely that “adulteress” will become her identity, that she will be 
erased and encompassed by this simple, derogatory term.273 Molly remembers with 
some venom the man—“thing” she calls him—who shouted out “adulteress” at the 
performance of a play she attended (U, 18.1516). But thinghood is precisely what 
Molly fears, to become a “thing devoid of indwelling determinants and thus pliant to 
the handling, shaping forces and figures around her. [To enter] the realm of 
interchangeable objects, which is the dehumanized, reified realm of the society and 
its prevailing currencies, financial and emotional.”274 She is all too aware of the 
power of seemingly neutral language (“these big words” as Stephen says) to suppress 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Tanner, Adultery, 12. This is not really in conflict with Tanner, since his point is that 
“adulteress” is not a meaningful social role in the way that “mother” and “wife” are. 
Moreover, one can be both wife and mother at the same time, though the degree to which one 
is one or the other is dependent on context. One cannot, in Tanner’s terms, be both 
“adulteress” and “wife” at the same time, since the one negates or undermines the other.  
274 Tanner, Adultery, 367. 
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complexity, to enforce taboo, and to overpower self-constructed identities. Once an 
“adulteress,” an object outside of functional, positive social identities, what does it 
matter what else you are? While Bloom’s intellectual journey led him to wonder 
whether adultery in the mind was any less grievous a sin than adultery in the flesh, 
Molly works from the opposite direction. She wants to denude the very word 
“adulteress” of its power and, if she can’t do that, to disconnect the socially 
prohibitive power of the word from the physical act itself. The question for Bloom is: 
does his extramarital desire make him an adulterer, albeit one who has not had 
extramarital sex? The question for Molly becomes: is it possible to have sex outside 
her marriage without being an adulteress?275 Both questions are, of course, part of 
Joyce’s larger one: what precisely constitutes a betrayal? 
As I’ve shown, for her part, Molly has strong suspicions that Bloom has already 
broken their marriage vows by committing some very real, not at all metaphorical 
adultery of his own. If the marriage has already been broken from his side, what faith 
is there to break? This is not merely a matter of sex, for though she is initially certain 
that “its not love,” Molly seems to share Bloom’s awareness (even if only half-
consciously) that sex is the sign of adultery rather than the thing itself. Molly does not 
“discover” Bloom’s affair and use that knowledge to then expose previously 
unacknowledged faults in their married life, rather it is the faults Molly acknowledges 
in their married life that drive her conviction that Bloom has found another woman. 
The metaphorical connection between adultery and the state of the marriage is so 
strong that Molly reads the connection in the other direction. Since marital 
dissatisfaction is a reasonable explanation for adultery, for Molly it almost becomes a 
sufficient rather than contributory cause of it: since there is dissatisfaction, there must 
be adultery. Obviously there is nothing very surprising about a woman in an unhappy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 I use the word “adulteress” as if constantly surrounded by quotation marks. Some 
distinction needs to be made between male and female adultery, since this is key to 
understanding the uneven social taboos in place. Similarly, Molly’s awareness of the power 
of this particular word gives it a specific charge in this discussion. Using quotation marks at 
every instance is, however, tiresome and awkward, while I would like to have some 
distinction between my use of the word as a quotation from “Penelope” and my use of it more 
generally. Outside the context of this discussion, however, the word is unpleasant and 
unnecessary.   
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marriage wondering if her husband has “strayed,” but I think it is important to 
acknowledge Joyce’s dissection and amplification of this logic in “Penelope.”  
Tony Tanner speaks at some length about the recurring theme of “suddenness” 
in the literature of adultery.276 As suspicion takes hold, the husband tends to go from 
happy to manic in the space of a few pages. Occasionally, and particularly in 
Shakespeare’s later works, this step is seen as tragically mistaken—Desdemona is as 
true a lover as ever she was—and these plays investigate the epistemic problems of 
marital trust. But oftentimes this suddenness is seen as epiphanic and revelatory. The 
husband’s awareness of adultery in a sense changes everything. that this language is 
primarily ontological rather than epistemological. It is not just that everything good in 
the marital relationship is cast into doubt (though this happens), but that there is an 
instantaneous alteration (adulteration) that changes the nature of the marriage and its 
participants. In Ulysses, this traditional revelatory narrative procession—from 
foolish, happy husband, unaware of the faults at the centre of his married life, to a 
man forlorn and fully cognisant—relies on the idea that the act of adultery is itself 
more a symbol of marital imperfection than it is marital imperfection in itself. Of 
course, the crime is the adultery—the breaking of contract—but the punishment 
meted out to the adulterous woman, and the powerful drama of anxiety that is built up 
around the husband’s doubts, are indicative of the deeper significance contained by 
the sexual act. Both Molly and Bloom are deprived of this suddenness. With Bloom, 
we are not privy to his moment of realization, only to the smaller act of revelation 
that occurs at the opening of “Calypso,” when Boylan’s letter arrives, effectively 
announcing that the affair will occur that day. With Molly, we are introduced to her 
mental processes at a point of relative certainty—“he came somewhere Im sure”—
even if the exact details remain to be established through a process of reasoning, 
abductive, inductive, and (falsely) deductive. In principle, we are exposed to the very 
moment of revelation, “yes because he never did a thing like that before”—in the 
logic of “Penelope,” Bloom’s breakfast request is as damning as the proverbial 
lipstick on the collar,277 the smoking gun in Molly’s solitary investigation—but we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Tanner, Adultery, 41. 
277 Molly later decides that she will check Bloom’s shirt for lipstick in the morning: “first Ill 
look at his shirt to see” (U, 18.1234-35). 
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experience none of the table-turning, earth-shattering, consequences that this 
revelation generally provokes.  
One might argue that this is because the structure of the chapter precludes the 
sense of comparison usually afforded by the traditional narrative—a husband is 
deliriously (and deludedly) happy, discovers the dark truth, and is thereby robbed of 
all that made him happy in the first place. By entering Molly’s thoughts at the very 
moment of revelation, we are deprived of a sense of the comparative contentedness 
that drives this narrative structure. But to what extent would this narrative even be 
possible in Ulysses? Had we been privy to the previous hour of Molly’s thoughts, 
would we have been charmed by the quality and extent of her marital contentment? 
We’ll never know, but we can at least say that Molly was not occupied with reveries 
of Desdemonic innocence or (Charles) Bovariesque delusions. Indeed, the time I have 
spent stressing the extent of Molly’s self-justifications for her own adultery has also 
been spent stressing the degree to which Molly’s dissatisfaction with her marriage is 
nothing new. In the majority of his writings, Joyce is drawn to literary confirmations 
of the inevitability of betrayal, intense, epiphanic, moments of earth-shattering 
realization portrayed and read as darkly necessary. But in Ulysses he works overtime 
to ensure that such a description of the Blooms’ marital infidelities is impossible and 
unsustainable. Indeed, as I have suggested with Bloom, Joyce goes out of his way to 
deprive us of the various moments of realization he so successfully made use of in 
Dubliners (Gabriel Conroy for example), Portrait, and even Exiles. This is important, 
I contend, because of what it says about Joyce’s dramatic shift (both a “big” shift and 
a shift in the nature of his drama), but it is also important for what it says about his 
treatment of the Blooms’ marital problems here. Joyce was always drawn to the 
structures of things. While in traditional narratives adultery reveals the flaws in a 
marriage (reveals marital bliss to be an illusion), in Ulysses, marital dissatisfaction 
drives suspicion (and false certainty) about adultery (as well as driving adultery itself, 
of course). Joyce’s understanding of the structure of adultery and marriage, the 
interrelation of its parts, allows him to reorient and redeploy it. So, as far as Molly is 
concerned, Bloom is an adulterer not because there is some particularly compelling 
(apparently irrefutable) piece of evidence to the fact, but because their marriage is 
already, in a sense, adulterated (corrupted, devalued, debased). The metaphorical, 
figurative adulteration of the marriage that, by generic convention, should have been 
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uncovered as an epiphanic result of literal, sexual adultery is here the cause of an 
assumed adultery (and, of course, is the cause of Molly’s own actual adultery). 
 
The case of Josie Powell/Breen  
We can see this reverse metaphorical equivalence at work in a particularly 
charged way when Molly entertains the idea that Bloom might “get back in with” 
Josie Breen (née Powell), the woman from whom Molly effectively “won” Bloom’s 
affections. We have already seen that Molly does have some legitimate reasons to 
think Bloom has been with other women: his past behaviour with the maid (U, 18.61-
2; 18.72-5), his general interest in the erotic potential of adulterous activities (U, 
18.88-103), his secretive letter-writing (U, 18.43), and, indeed, Molly’s sense that “he 
couldn’t possibly do without it that long” (U, 18.75). But while these possible 
infidelities offer general, unspecified challenges to Molly as wife and lover, the case 
of Josie Breen is quite different. Sex with a prostitute manifests itself more or less as 
a kind of general affront; it is disrespectful to Molly and the monogamous 
commitment encoded in the marriage contract, hurtful to her sense of sexual 
attractiveness, dishonest, underhanded, and generally unpleasant. But, barring what it 
says about her capacity to sexually satisfy her husband,278 Bloom visiting a prostitute 
signifies relatively little. I am certainly not suggesting that a husband visiting a 
prostitute is meaningless or of minor interest to his wife. Indeed, when Joyce, in a 
moment of bravado, admitted to Nora that he had visited a (perhaps several) 
prostitute(s) on one of his trips to Dublin, it initiated a short, but apparently 
explosive, crisis in their relationship. Joyce’s apparently genuine surprise at Nora’s 
reaction may indicate how lost he could be at this time in his own anti-marriage, anti-
bourgeois, freedom-fetishizing theorizations. But coming through the other side of 
this affair strengthened their relationship, opening up the possibilities of 
sadomasochistic erotic play, spurring a new round of Joycean spiritual epistolary 
poetics, offering Joyce a necessary, corrective perspective—ideas have no 
consequence, actions do; his theoretical striving for absolute, unfettered freedom was 
theoretically sound but practically far too difficult and self-destructive to be worth the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Molly dulls this point slightly by referring over and again to the incorrigible sexual 
appetite of men in general. If all men, by their nature, seek, even require, sex outside of 
marriage, then Molly’s inability to “satisfy” Bloom is not a failure. 
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effort. I doubt, then, that Joyce’s aim here is to proselytize for the freedom of 
husbands to visit prostitutes or advising wives simply to ignore such activity.279 But 
what he is doing in Ulysses—and what this personal event may later have helped him 
to do—is, if not to rob (adulterous) sex of its power to (over)signify, then at least to 
properly understand the structural, psychological, and social reasons for this 
(over)signification. 
So, while sex with a prostitute would signify all kinds of things for Molly, 
Bloom’s potential affair with Josie Breen is significant in a far more damaging way. 
A visit to a prostitute asserts conclusively that the marital relationship is incapable of 
fully satisfying and containing sexual desire. The husband looks outside the marriage 
because his desires are not being met quantitatively—his libido simply demands more 
sex than the marriage can or does provide—and/or qualitatively—his fantasies have 
progressed beyond the point that, for whatever reason, they can safely or 
satisfactorily be practised in the marital bed. Sex becomes, in a sense, detached from 
the other “stuff” of marriage, even if in practice this division is almost impossible to 
maintain. This detachment is of course painful, since marriage specifically, and 
monogamy generally, is built on the assumption that marriage can and must satisfy 
all desires. As such, it demands that the wife should, as Molly does, experience her 
husband’s visit to a prostitute as a failure; an insufficiency in the marriage is, in these 
terms, an insufficiency also in the wife. Molly’s angry assertions that “I suppose he 
thinks Im finished out and laid on the shelf” (U, 18.1021-22) and “I suppose Im 
nothing any more” (U, 18.1244) are indicative of her awareness of the specific nature 
of this challenge to her sexual potency and desirability. In this sense, sex maintains its 
synecdochic power to announce the insufficiency of the marital bond, to declare its 
adulteration, even as Molly becomes aware of the finer gradations of betrayal 
available to her. But, while Bloom’s supposed visit(s?) to a prostitute announces all 
of this, this challenge to Molly is largely, perhaps exclusively, as a desirous (or not) 
body.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 In a sense, he is doing precisely this, since a husband is “naturally” free to have sex with 
whomever he likes, but socially bound by contract. The distinction is between natural 
freedoms and social bonds. One trades some of the former for the security of the latter. The 
binding intrusiveness of that contract on personal freedoms is built more or less consciously 
into all social contract theory, but for Joyce it provides an ongoing provocation. 
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A love affair offers a different and more dangerous challenge. If Bloom has 
gone outside the marriage in search of love, then what is there in their marriage that 
remains exclusive and monogamous, beyond a series of codified economic and 
property arrangements? Bloom’s pursuit of Josie would not only be an implicit 
acknowledgement of the failure of his marriage with Molly (a statement of 
insufficiency that is hurtful, but generalized), it would be a symbolic rejection of their 
entire marriage. For Josie is not just “some little bitch” Bloom’s “got in with;” her 
symbolic potential is not even defined by her position as Molly’s friend (her 
friendship would make it a double betrayal). Josie’s signifying power, for Molly, lies 
in her position as the defeated competitor in the love game that culminated in Molly’s 
marriage to Bloom. Bloom had shown interest in Josie—and Josie in Bloom—and 
Molly first had to win Bloom’s affections from Josie in order to marry him. As such, 
a relationship between Bloom and Josie represents a great “what if?” an unfulfilled 
history that was wiped out by Molly’s “victory.” So, in imagining Bloom rekindling 
his relationship with Josie, Molly is also imagining him erasing the entirety of their 
marriage, restoring a neutered history (a love-relationship with Josie) and erasing a 
mistaken one (his marriage to Molly).  
If this reading seems a little too strong (reading too much into too little), bear in 
mind that Molly has built this fantasy on nothing more than Bloom having mentioned 
(we presume) that he bumped into Josie earlier that day—Molly attributes Bloom’s 
strange behaviour to his “meeting Josie Powell” (U, 18.169). This, combined with her 
general conviction that Bloom “came somewhere,” produced this fantasy of a fantasy, 
this image of Bloom’s desires built in accordance with and speaking to her own 
anxieties. For all that Molly worries about the “little bitch(es)”—those sexually virile 
young women willing to use their charms to wheedle money out of Bloom—with 
whom she cannot reasonably compete (not at least on the grounds of their imagined 
superiority), Molly’s anxieties come to rest on a woman of the same age, who, by 
Molly’s account, is more weathered by time and circumstance than she is herself. So, 
though she eventually dismisses the possibility that Bloom has returned to Josie—
“hed never have the courage with a married woman” (U, 18.1253)—her monologue is 
plagued by its possibility and shaped by the concerns that drive that fantasy. 
Ultimately, Molly entertains this unconvincing thesis not because it is well-supported 
by evidence but because it best gives voice to, first, her own conception of her 
marriage as decayed and, second, her concomitant projections about Bloom’s feelings 
	   186	  
on the matter. Just as for Bloom, Molly’s choice of Boylan as lover is especially 
damaging because Boylan is so different from Bloom (his “bold hand” is an implicit 
challenge to Bloom’s quiet “womanly” gentility), Bloom’s possible selection of Josie 
signifies a particular challenge to Molly that is not easily written off (by reference to 
the fact that she is “young still” for example [U, 18.1398]). 
 
“You couldnt call him a husband” 
I’ve focused so far mainly on the anxieties and turbulence adultery creates in 
Ulysses, but part of the development from Exiles to Ulysses is in Joyce’s treatment of 
adultery as potentially generative. As Tanner has made more than clear, the literature 
of adultery has almost exclusively been concerned with the disruptive power of extra-
marital relationships. Marriages always break down as a result of adultery, but it is 
often the case that families, kingdoms, and societies either break down with them, or 
survive only by enacting the harshest of punishments against the offending parties. 
While the adult Joyce never showed any sympathy with the kind of social policing 
implicit in much of this literature, it’s clear from Portrait and Exiles that he was 
deeply interested in the emotional potential of these moments. The power of a simple 
sexual act to wreak devastation is, like betrayal more broadly, impossibly seductive to 
his rhetorical imagination. So, for Stephen to flee Dublin, he must first perform the 
role of husband/lover under threat from his close friend (Cranly) who must destroy 
him to attain his bride (E. C.). In Exiles, for all its self-conscious intellectualization, 
the central conviction is that the adulterous act is inherently and seductively powerful. 
Indeed, it is because Richard perceives infidelity to be a form of devastating betrayal 
that he goes to otherwise inexplicable lengths to tame and control all the adulterous 
urges that circulate within his marriage. 
In Ulysses, Joyce moves away from this more or less po-faced obeisance to the 
emotive potential of betrayal in order to examine the potentially generative 
possibilities such moments afford. We have already seen that Bloom’s response to 
Molly’s affair deviates from the majority of Joyce’s previous writing on betrayal in 
that he is so passive, so unwilling to define the event as betrayal in the heightened, 
melodramatic literary formations Joyce favoured. Whereas Stephen and Richard 
Rowan share complementary conceptions of the structural and historical inevitability 
of betrayal, Bloom resigns himself to a more extended mourning of the situation that 
has brought it about. So, while he pines for the world that has, in a sense, been 
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brought to an end by Molly’s act, he is also far more prepared to consider the shape 
of the new world into which he is entering. He is prepared, further, to consider just 
how different this new world could and should be. 
While King Mark or King Arthur are narratively and socially bound to enact 
righteous, tragic punishment upon their adulterous wives, the text of “Ithaca” actively 
foregrounds Bloom’s choices, even when these choices appear falsely binary. So, as 
Bloom finally reaches home in the early hours of the morning, we discover that he 
does not have his keys. His options are laid out by the catechismal narrator simply: 
“To enter or not to enter. To knock or not to knock” (U, 17.80-83). The obvious 
allusion to Hamlet has its comic intention, of course, but it also captures the 
heightened quality of this moment and the episode that follows. Like Hamlet, Bloom 
is responding to an adulterous situation, a situation of betrayal (for Hamlet, multiple) 
that drives a moment of intense decision. The preceding events will find their 
resolution in the acts that follow Bloom’s/Hamlet’s respective decisions at these 
moments. As Hamlet stands in solitary thought he is faced with a defining binary—
“to be or not to be”—the answer to which—the known indignities of life are 
preferable to the unknown horrors of death—determines the subsequent gruesome 
conclusion to the play. He presents himself with two options that are equally violent: 
to end his own life, or, ultimately, wreak destruction on all those around him. Bloom 
is presented with slightly different options—there is no talk of suicide, though his 
thoughts about his father’s suicide throughout the day are suggestive280—in that his 
choices are activity or passivity; Bloom can enter or not enter, knock or not knock. 
He is not presented with any subtle gradations of action, no range of actions are 
available, he can simply either act or not act.  
On the literal level, Bloom’s quandary is whether to wake Molly and be forced 
to face her before he is mentally prepared to do so. But I think this early moment in 
the episode is immensely significant in that it lays out the process by which Bloom 
will deal with and understand his new position as cuckold. For while Hamlet presents 
himself with and accepts the binary restrictions of his rhetorical formation, Bloom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Bloom is clear on the causes for his father’s suicide: depression caused by the death of 
Bloom’s mother. By this logic, could Molly’s adultery not represent a similar loss with 
similar consequences? There is no sense in Ulysses that Bloom is thinking seriously about 
taking his own life, but the spectre is certainly raised. 
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refuses to do so. He does not knock, but nor does he stand still, choosing instead to 
scale a wall and “enter” through the back door. The reader may smile at the lengths to 
which Bloom will go to avoid facing his wife (though a heavy dose of sympathy 
would also be appropriate), but what is perhaps less clear is the significance of this 
breakthrough in relation to the narrative structure of retribution built into the 
literature of adultery. Bloom should enter the house and act (violently, decisively). 
He should be the bearer of the law, righting wrongs and restoring balance. Action and 
action alone can satisfy the requirements of the form. But Bloom is the “new 
womanly man” with a “firm full masculine feminine passive active hand” (U, 17.289-
90) and a “reluctan[ce] to shed human blood even when the end justifies the means” 
(U, 17.293). Joyce forms Bloom to be constitutionally caught between the binary 
ontological formations that guide such narrative progressions. When presented with a 
binary option, Bloom finds alternatives, a third way that allows him to navigate 
between two unsatisfying options.  
While in the moment of his decision Bloom is simply seeking to avoid his wife, 
Joyce’s formation makes clear, I think, the significance of this capacity. Stephen, for 
instance, would be incapable of doing so. After all, as I’ve argued, Stephen’s 
departure from Dublin is effectively constructed, however artificially, as fight or flee. 
Vicki Mahaffey has commented on this tendency in Stephen’s character and in 
Joyce’s characters more widely: a constitutional inability to navigate creative 
solutions to apparently binary problems.281 In my account so far, I have been thinking 
through this kind of issue largely in terms of these characters’ (and Joyce’s) 
commitment to the structural inevitability of betrayal, but I think Mahaffey’s insight 
picks up on some of the same issues in Joyce’s writing. With these in mind, one can 
see how revolutionary Bloom is: he refuses to accept the teleological narrative 
promptings that seek constantly to limit the range of endings available to him. Maud 
Ellmann has described Joyce recently as both “teleophobic” and “teleophiliac,” as 
constructing narratives that drive powerfully towards conclusions that once they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Mahaffey uses the example of the “Athy” riddle in Portrait. Stephen is unable to see “the 
other way you could ask it” because for all his (creative) intelligence, he is simply unable to 
move beyond the binary options he is offered. Vicki Mahaffey, Reauthorizing Joyce 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1988), 58-59. 
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arrive are clouded in ambiguity.282 But the teleophilia that drives Portrait does not 
drive Ulysses. While Stephen’s decisions are based in his sense of himself as an artist 
in the making, Bloom constantly alludes to the literature of adultery without ever 
quite accepting its narrative conclusions. 
Having had the whole day to reach a decision, “Ithaca” represents Bloom’s 
final opportunity to review all available information before re-entering his now 
adulterated marital bed. The detachment of the catechismal style of the episode is 
perfectly suited to capturing the mental processes involved in their complexity. So, as 
Bloom wonders to himself whether it would be better if he simply slipped away that 
night, never to return, the narrative voice asks progressively more direct questions: 
“What considerations rendered departure not entirely undesirable?”; “What 
considerations rendered departure not irrational?”; “What considerations rendered 
departure desirable?” (U, 17.1958-72). Bloom’s answers to these questions don’t 
involve Boylan, but rather represent an at times fantastical (examples of desire 
detached from prosaic reality) but largely cogent, prosaic, and human analysis of the 
state of his marriage. While Molly’s adultery is the unarguable immediate cause of 
these late night reflections, it is not the sexual act, ultimately, that drives his 
considerations but the state of a marriage brought home to him by this signifying act. 
Bloom wonders whether he’d be better off elsewhere because “constant cohabitation 
[has] imped[ed] mutual toleration of personal defects”; because the first purpose of 
marriage, production of “offspring,” is now “absurd” and anyway “impossible” (i.e. 
they are unable now to have full, penetrative sex, and if they were able they would 
not have children); and because the second purpose of marriage, caring for that 
offspring, is all but completed (Milly is more or less an adult and has moved away). 
Bloom’s thoughts take a more whimsical turn as he imagines the “public 
advertisement”—“£5 reward, lost, stolen or strayed from his residence 7 Eccles 
street”—that would follow, but while his vision of himself as a kind of permanent but 
rootless Odysseus—“Everyman or Noman” (U, 17.2008), “Ever would he wander, 
selfcompelled” (U, 17.2013)—is seductively suggestive, its very idealistic 
impracticality is a marker of the speed with which Bloom moves from “reasons to 
leave” to “reasons to stay.” By moving from realistic considerations to idle fantasy, 
Bloom also ceases to consider realistic courses of action. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 In a paper delivered at the 2012 James Joyce Symposium, Dublin. 
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It’s important that the specific nature of Bloom’s considerations here are taken 
into account, but my focus is on the generative possibilities that adulterous betrayal 
affords Bloom in the novel. Even though the adulterous act is constituted in such a 
way that it demands its place as the ultimate and overriding signifier, Bloom instead 
makes use of the question that Molly’s adultery raises to evaluate the nature of their 
marriage on its merits. This means acknowledging its strengths and its faults. For 
Bloom, this begins simply with his physical fatigue—“the necessity for repose, 
obviating movement”—and “the anticipation of warmth (human) tempered with 
coolness (linen), obviating desire and rendering desirable” (U, 17.2031-33). The 
physical realities of a solid, shared bed trump the idealized fantasies of constant 
rootlessness that would replace them. Following his desire, Bloom moves upstairs 
entering “with circumspection . . . with solicitude . . . the bed of conception and of 
birth, of consummation of marriage and of breach of marriage, of sleep and of death” 
(U, 17.2113-21). On entering the bed he observes evidence of its use that day—“New 
clean bedlinen, additional odours, the presence of a human form, female, hers, the 
imprint of a human form, male, not his, some crumbs, some flakes of potted meat” 
(U, 17.2123-25)—and smiles to himself (even if only mentally) at the thought that 
“each one who enters imagines himself to be the first to enter whereas he is always 
the last term of a preceding series even if the first term of a succeeding one, each 
imagining himself to be first, last, only and alone whereas he is neither first nor last 
nor only nor alone in a series originating in and repeated to infinity” (U, 17.2127-31). 
The list that Bloom constructs in this “series” has no easily discernible internal 
consistency for though it includes some who have had some sort of sexual activity 
with Molly, it is really just a list of anyone for whom Molly has expressed some 
interest, anyone who has expressed an interest in Molly, and anyone who may in 
Bloom’s estimation be one of these. These are perhaps merely Molly’s “suitors,” but 
if so the suggestion that Boylan is merely the most recent of many suppresses the 
obvious difference—is Bloom suggesting that these are all the same? But if Bloom 
truly “defeats” the suitors, then it is here, in this particularity-denying list, that he 
achieves the kind of superiority that he requires. The sexual act is made (relatively) 
meaningless, the marital demand for sexual virginity and purity is concomitantly 
denuded of its power as it is rendered a fiction, and, importantly, the “spiritual 
virginity” that Joyce studies so powerfully in “The Dead”—and perhaps more 
consciously in Exiles—is seen as equally absurd. 
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These realizations are perhaps pessimistic as much as they are realistic, but the 
tone continues to develop towards “equanimity” as the narrative voice interrogates 
Bloom’s feelings about Boylan. Bloom feels “envy, jealousy, abnegation, 
equanimity,” which breaks down to “more abnegation than jealousy, less envy than 
equanimity.” Bloom reasons further (and once again) against the pre-eminence of sex, 
asserting world-wide “animality,” “the frangibility of the hymen: the presupposed 
intangibility of the thing in itself” and concluding, finally and with “equanimity,” that 
the adulterous act is: 
 
not so calamitous as a cataclysmic annihilation of the planet in 
consequence of a collision with a dark sun. As less reprehensible than 
theft, highway robbery, cruelty to children and animals, obtaining money 
under false pretences, forgery, embezzlement, misappropriation of public 
money, betrayal of public trust, malingering, mayhem, corruption of 
minors, criminal libel, blackmail, contempt of court, arson, treason, 
felony, mutiny on the high seas, trespass, burglary, jailbreaking, practice 
of unnatural vice, desertion from armed forces in the field, perjury, 
poaching, usury, intelligence with the king's enemies, impersonation, 
criminal assault, manslaughter, wilful and premeditated murder. . . . As 
more than inevitable, irreparable. 
(U, 17.2180-94) 
 
And with this reduction of sex to its animal physicality comes the activation of 
Bloom’s own sexual potency within an “approximate erection . . .  a tentative 
revelation” the “visible [sign] of his antesatisfaction,” which gives way to the 
satisfaction of a resounding kiss on the “plump mellow yellow smellow melons of 
[Molly’s] rump, on each plump melonous hemisphere, in their mellow yellow furrow, 
with obscure prolonged provocative melonsmellonous osculation.” This reactivation 
of Bloom’s erotic connection with Molly is the sign of the wider acceptance he has 
achieved.  
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Coda 
 
I began this thesis by claiming that betrayal had been for too many years the 
great donnée of Joycean criticism. The greatest shame of this state of affairs is that 
for Joyce betrayal was never allowed to ossify into too predictable, too repeatable a 
performance of already decided and already rehearsed narratives. He returned to it 
time and time (and time) again, not out of a pathological need to satisfy some 
personal demon; not because he lacked the sense, imagination, or energy to find 
another subject of for his art; he returned to betrayal because every time he did he 
found some new avenue to explore, some new structural dynamic with which to 
punish his characters. Betrayal was not separated from Joyce’s other concerns and 
themes, but layered into the general weave of his works. By constructing and 
maintaining a static view of Joycean betrayal, criticism has for too many years 
deprived it of its capacity to surprise, beguile, and reveal.  
In this thesis I have tried to restore a sense of narrative progression to Joyce’s 
investigations into betrayal and, therefore, emphasize the degree to which Joycean 
betrayal was always shifting and changing. I am under no illusions that I have offered 
a full account of the many ways betrayal features in Joyce’s writings. I hope, 
however, that I have provided a clearer vision of the ways that Joyce narrated with 
and through betrayal, the ways he exploited its logical simplicity and its (melo)drama, 
and the ways he reframed human relationships as a problem that could not be fully 
expressed without reference to betrayal. I hope, moreover, that the picture of Joyce I 
have given is of a conscious artist in control of the theme that he made most his own. 
Rather than the victim of an obsession that proved to be generative, Joyce took 
betrayal to its limits and made it play his tune.  
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